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CHAPTER [1] GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Neuropsychology and pseudo-memories 
An adjusted version of this chapter is published as: Peters, M.J.V., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. (2006). Neuropsy-
chology and pseudo-memories. In J.R. Dupri (Ed.), Focus on neuropsychology research (pp. 163-184). Hauppage, 
NY: Nova Science Publishers.
Some typical cases
Case Bob Hunter1
On February 19th 1985, at 3 a.m., two policemen found a confused man in the red 
light district of Amsterdam. He was unable to respond to questions and comments. 
The man made an anxious impression, was disoriented in time, place, and person 
and found himself in a state of mutism. The police suspected that he might have 
been involved in a ﬁght and suffered from brain injury. A CT scan was made at the 
hospital, but no neuroanatomical abnormalities were detected. From March 1st until 
June 20th 1985, this man stayed in a psychiatric hospital. He still was unable to talk, 
but communicated with other patients and clinicians by writing in French. In his wri-
tings, he referred to himself as Bob Hunter. Neurological examination showed no 
abnormalities, but his performance on several neuropsychological tests suggested 
residual signs of brain damage. His main complaint was that he could not remember 
anything before February 19th 1985.
 During the spring of 2002, we saw Bob Hunter, who still had no autobiographi-
cal memory for events that took place prior to February 19th 1985. We administered 
a neuropsychological test battery and collected psychophysiological data. We found 
his most recent Full Scale IQ to be 110. His score on a long term verbal memory task 
was excellent, but he performed poorly on a working memory task (i.e., digit span 
task). His performance on the Trail Making Task, which is sensitive to frontal (i.e., 
executive) dysfunctions, was also very poor. He scored below average on memory 
for famous events up until 1985 (e.g., Mayes, Downes, McDonald, Rooke, Sagar, & 
Meudell, 1994; Sanders & Warrington, 1971). However, his memory for news facts 
from 1985 through 2002 was intact. Bob Hunter did not show any autonomic respon-
sivity (heart rate, skin conductance) when presented with information pertaining to 
his past or present state (e.g., the name of his mother). During an interview, three 
further features became apparent: A paresis (i.e., partial paralysis) on the left side of 
his body, an indifferent attitude, and a tendency to confabulate. 
 The patient’s working memory impairments, his deﬁcits in executive functions, 
and his tendency to confabulate clearly indicate right prefrontal cortex damage (see 
also Weinstein, 1996; Kopelman, 1999). Bob Hunter’s left sided paresis further sup-
ports this interpretation. His autonomic hyporesponsivity is consistent with damage 
to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Caltagirone, Zoccolotti, Originale, Daniele, 
& Mammucari, 1989; Tranel & Damasio, 1994; Zocollotti, Scabini, & Violani, 1982).
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 Unfortunately, these signs were disregarded by the psychiatrists who treated 
him. Encouraged by the police, Bob Hunter ﬁrst underwent a series of hypnosis ses-
sions and, following this, treatment with the “truth serum” pentobarbital. Questions 
were based on the assumption that Bob Hunter had a military background. That this 
was not without effect became evident when Bob Hunter began to uncover memo-
ries about his Canadian background and his work as a CIA agent. Although these 
memories were detailed and compelling, they turned out to be full-blown pseudo-
memories. By coincidence, the police was able to establish the real identity of Bob 
Hunter. He was born in a Paris suburb and had never been to Canada or the US. 
One day, in February 1985, he decided to visit Amsterdam and when he came there, 
he became involved in a ﬁght, during which he was injured, thereby suffering brain 
damage.
Case JD2
On February 20th 2002, the remains of a man were found on a local industrial zone, 
situated near the river Maas in a suburb of the city Liège. The local police and detec-
tive department tried to discover the identity of this person and the possible anteced-
ents of the case. After a few months, the investigation reached a deadlock. Two years 
later, after new eyewitness accounts in a local television program and matching DNA 
examination, the remains were identiﬁed as belonging to Mr K.
 Further investigations showed that Mr K disappeared on the evening of June 
30th 2001. On that summer evening, he went for a swim in the river Maas, situated at 
the border of his village near the local industrial zone. Mr K was accompanied by his 
close friend Mrs JD with whom he had a secret relationship.
 In the period shortly after his disappearance, Mrs JD was questioned as a wit-
ness. She acknowledged that she had accompanied Mr K during his swim on that 
summer night, but stated that she left after a quarter of an hour, while Mr K was still 
in the water. This was the last time she had seen Mr K alive.
 In 2004, after identifying Mr K, the police reopened the case. Several persons 
possibly involved in this case were interrogated, among them Mrs JD. After several 
long-lasting interrogations in the period between May-June 2004, Mrs JD was iden-
tiﬁed as the single suspect in this case, based on several incriminating statements. 
She was ﬁrst charged with taking the life of Mr K in the period between June 2001 
and February 2002. Later on, the indictment was changed into “burying and/or, hid-
ing and/or transporting the body of the victim in question.” 
 However, in 2003 Mrs JD had experienced two cerebral vascular accidents, 
located in the right posterior (parietal) brain areas and a left lacunar infarction. As 
a consequence, she suffered severe brain damage in these and related frontal brain 
areas. Mrs JD neglected her left visual ﬁeld, had problems with articulation (dys-
arthria), and showed marked impairments in visuo-spatial orientation, recognition 
of faces, and source monitoring. That is, Mrs JD was unable to identify whether an 
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event had really happened to her or whether she had only imagined it. These obser-
vations were corroborated by neuropsychological testing. Mrs JD showed a global 
cognitive deterioration, as indicated by a score of 23/30 on the Mini Mental State 
Examination. Processing speed, attention, working memory, and executive control 
(e.g., Concept Shifting Task, Digit Span task) were impaired. Furthermore, she showed 
deﬁcits on visuo-spatial memory tasks (Rey complex ﬁgure task, Warrington face rec-
ognition task), motor abilities (dynamical aspects of Luria), and visuo-construction 
(line bisection task, line crossing task). She had pronounced difﬁculties with learning 
complex verbal information (immediate recall of complex story), and also showed 
an increased tendency to add non-existing information to her memory traces (i.e., 
confabulations; Dalla Barba Confabulation Questionnaire; Dalla Barba, 1993). Mrs JD 
also had an increased tendency to rely on external suggestions (Gudjonsson Sug-
gestibility Scale; Gudjonsson, 1997). 
 Nevertheless, according to the police and the prosecutor, the statements 
made by Mrs JD were accurate, and thus revealed intimate knowledge of the 
assassination of Mr K.
 We cannot rely on the statements of Bob Hunter and JD as accurate recon-
structions of their past experiences. Both Bob Hunter and JD suffered brain dam-
age. To determine whether this damage affected their competence to give ofﬁcial 
accounts, one ﬁrst has to know which brain structures and functions are involved 
in the reconstruction of memory. More importantly, knowledge is needed about the 
consequences of lesions to these brain areas for memory accuracy. In recent years, a 
vast amount of case studies and laboratory experiments in clinical populations have 
shown that (pre)frontal lobe damage gives rise to remembering information never 
presented (i.e., confabulations). Thus, the (pre)frontal cortex can be considered a 
key player in reconstructing our memories. This is nicely illustrated in the cases Bob 
Hunter and JD, where damage, either directly or indirectly via disconnecting neural 
networks, led to confabulations – one particular type of pseudo-memories. 
What more can neuropsychology tell us about the reconstruction of memory and 
the creation of pseudo-memories? In this Chapter, we will give an overview of past, 
present, and future developments in neuropsychological research on pseudo-memo-
ries, thereby linking neurocognitive functions to pseudo-memories. The review be-
low will serve as a starting point for the outline of this dissertation. 
Memory metaphors: Reconstructing pieces of the memory puzzle
Throughout history, memory has been described in terms of different metaphors: 
From a wax tablet (Plato) up to the popular computer metaphor in our times (Draais-
ma, 2000; Merckelbach & Wessel, 1998). However, apart from making analogies with 
saving, deleting, number of bytes, and so on, memory is more than just a matter of re-
membering and forgetting past events (e.g., Kopelman, 2002; Schacter, 1999). That is, 
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events and experiences may be remembered in a distorted way. An eyewitness may, 
for example, remember a yellow taxi, when in fact the taxi was blue. These subtle 
changes in details of a memory have been termed distortions (Gudjonsson & Clare, 
1995). Sometimes events are completely fabricated, as was the case with Bob Hunter 
and JD. Even neuropsychological intact people may make such pseudo-memories 
(i.e., commission errors). An example is the eyewitness who remembers a gun, when 
in fact there was no gun at all. Throughout this dissertation, we will refer to this type 
of error as pseudo-memory although we are aware of the fact that the term “false 
memory” is more common. Regardless of terminology, an important point about dis-
tortions and pseudo-memories is that they make plain that the idea of memory as a 
reproductive entity, in which events are reproduced with photographical precision, is 
incorrect. Instead, memory is reconstructive, precisely because events are encoded 
in an incomplete and fragmentized way. When retrieving an experience, different 
fragments have to be combined to form an entity. Almost 40 years ago, Neisser used 
the analogy of the palaeontologist when describing memory. He wrote: “Out of the 
few stored bone chips we remember a dinosaur” (Neisser, 1967, p. 285).
 Until recently, neuropsychological research in this domain was limited to case 
studies of brain damage patients with peculiar memory illusions (e.g., Delbecq-
Derousne, Beauvois, & Shallice, 1990; Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 
1996; Schacter, Curran, Gallucio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996a). The patients described in 
these case studies had a tendency to falsely recognize non-presented stimuli as be-
ing previously presented (e.g., Parkin et al., 1996), misattributed the source of their 
memories (e.g., Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989), or recollected ﬁctitious 
events (e.g., Dalla Barba, 1993). It was in such case studies that the reconstructive 
nature of memory became most compelling. In recent years, inspired by ongoing 
debates about the “accuracy” of human memory and its legal implications (e.g., Ko-
riat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000; Loftus, 2003), there has been an increased interest 
in neurocognitive research on pseudo-memories (e.g., Kopelman, 2002; Schacter, 
1999, 2001). The introduction of modern imaging techniques such as functional Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET) has also 
stimulated new studies in this ﬁeld (e.g., Kopelman, 1999, 2002; Schacter & Slotnick, 
2004). Before describing past and current ﬁndings of neuropsychological studies on 
pseudo-memories, we will ﬁrst give a brief theoretical and methodological overview 
of pseudo-memories.
Familiarity vs. recollection
During the past century, a plethora of research has focused on how pseudo-memo-
ries can be explained. The early works of Burnham (1889) and Bartlett (1932) show 
that incorrect details of an event can be implanted and that memory reconstruction 
is partly based upon general schematic knowledge (cognitive schemas). Since then, 
several studies have documented similar ﬁndings, converging on the notion that 
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proactive interference (i.e., memories can be distorted by earlier experienced events) 
or retroactive interference (memories can be distorted by experiences that are expe-
rienced later on) produce such pseudo-memories. At this moment, cognitive theories 
on memory reconstruction generally focus on the trade-off between two competing 
attributions: Familiarity and recollection (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Jacoby, 1991; 
Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989, Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Schacter, 1999), thereby also incorporating ﬁndings from cognitive neuroscience on 
memory distortions and pseudo-memories like the Constructive Memory Framework 
proposed by Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1998; Dodson & Schacter, 2002a).
 Familiarity can be described as a global impression of events. It refers to mere-
ly “knowing” that an event took place (Tulving, 1985) i.e., remembering the general 
gist of experiences that is consistent with many possible events (e.g., “I remember 
that I took a taxi somewhere this week”). Recollection, on the other hand, is accom-
panied by impressions of item-speciﬁc knowledge and thus gives access to repre-
sentations of detailed perceptual and contextual features (e.g., “I clearly remember 
the taxi picking me up an 12.30 p.m. on Saturday, that it was black, that the taxi driver 
was Hispanic, and that I had to pay 15 euros”). In terms of the “Remember-Knowing” 
distinction proposed by Tulving (1985), recollection can be described as “remember-
ing” an event. How then can this trade-off between two competing attributions lead 
to memory distortions and pseudo-memories?
 New experiences are organized in patterns of features that represent differ-
ent aspects of the experience (Dodson & Schacter, 2002a; Schacter et al., 1998), like 
perceptual details (black taxi, Hispanic), contextual information (New York, Saturday), 
and so on: “The things I did on my birthday, the things I ate on that day, the various 
presents I got, the place where I celebrated my birthday.” During encoding and con-
solidation, these perceptual and contextual features need to be bound together to 
form a “coherent” memory representation (i.e., the feature binding). It is also neces-
sary to keep these bound representations separated from each other (pattern separa-
tion), thereby decreasing the amount of overlap between memory representations. 
The retrieval of this information requires an act of pattern completion, whereby the 
features belonging to a past experience are activated and the activation spreads out 
over other features (spreading activation). This phase of retrieval also involves post-
retrieval monitoring (i.e., criterion setting), in which it has to be determined whether 
the memory representation is a veridical recollection of an experienced event or a 
fantasy. This critical step in retrieval is also known as source attribution. Technically 
speaking, strict criterion setting promotes correct source attributions. When memory 
representations have to be recalled or recognized, a reliable and valid heuristic is 
to strictly rely on perceptual and contextual information surrounding the memory 
representation and to base one’s source attribution judgments on the vividness (i.e., 
richness of perceptual and contextual details) of the memory representation in order 
to obtain an accurate recollection (Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). 
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 Problems in the reconstruction of memory representations arise when encod-
ing, consolidation, or retrieval function are suboptimal. More speciﬁcally, when fea-
ture binding, pattern separation, pattern completion, or criterion-setting fall short 
(either individually or in combination), memory errors occur. Factors that can affect 
feature binding, pattern separation, pattern completion, or criterion setting are indi-
vidual differences in personally relevant factors (e.g., suggestibility, brain damage, 
subjective plausibility, cognitive functioning; internal factors) and environmental fac-
tors (e.g., social inﬂuence; external factors). For example, when one is confronted 
with a statement of another eyewitness in a robbery case, this environmental factor 
will increase the event’s familiarity. And this will a fortiori to be the case, if one scores 
high on suggestibility, which is a personally relevant factor. 
 Distinctive perceptual and contextual details need to be encoded and consoli-
dated efﬁciently in order to retrieve an accurate recollection of this event. However, 
when due to internal or external factors, encoding or criterion setting during retrieval 
is inefﬁcient, one will systematically retrieve the general theme and may take this 
familiarity feeling for granted. People then may misattribute the item’s familiarity to 
a variety of extraneous sources, such as thinking that you saw a particular person 
robbing a bank, when in fact you rely on a statement made by another witness. Thus, 
once an event is perceived as plausible (thereby increasing familiarity), people may 
come to believe that the event has happened to them (belief). The following step 
would be the acceptance of these beliefs as genuine memories (i.e., true recollec-
tions), which requires loose criterion setting and, as a result, a source misattribution 
(e.g., Hart & Schooler, 2006; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997; Smeets, Merckelbach, 
Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). 
 The strategy of relying on recollection in order to avoid familiarity-based mis-
attributions and pseudo-memories is supported by a variety of empirical evidence. 
Studies on criterion setting and source misattribution are often referred to as source 
monitoring research (Johnson et al., 1993). Source monitoring is closely related to 
criterion setting. It is a mechanism that serves as a screening and controlling device, 
involved in determining the source of information at retrieval and includes three dif-
ferent abilities: the ability to differentiate between one’s own verbal or motor actions 
and those imagined (internal source monitoring/self-monitoring), the ability to distin-
guish between information from two external sources (external source monitoring), 
and the ability to distinguish between self-generated and external verbal or motor 
actions (reality monitoring). Recent neurocognitive ﬁndings localize these abilities in 
a network encompassing primarily the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). 
Pseudo-memory paradigms
During the nineties, Sir Frederic Bartlett’s groundbreaking work (1932) on the recon-
structive aspects of memory resurfaced, inspired by the debate about the accuracy 
of traumatic memories recovered during psychotherapy (Loftus, 1993; Loftus & Ket-
19
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cham, 1994; Read & Lindsay, 1997). Catalyzed by this revival, cognitive psychologists 
developed various experimental paradigms to elicit memory errors (e.g., Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978). Paradigms can be classiﬁed as memory distortion paradigms, 
in which accurate memory traces are distorted by misinformation, and pseudo-mem-
ory paradigms in which the misremembered information results from inferences or 
constructions that a person creates internally and then later mistakes for events that 
really happened. We now brieﬂy describe the most common techniques.
 Exposure to (post-hoc) misinformation can have detrimental effects on the ac-
curate recollection of a speciﬁc event (for a review, see Loftus, 2005; Loftus, Feldman 
& Dashiell, 1995). An example may clarify this: Suppose that X is a witness to an 
accident, caused by a car that did not stop at a stop sign. During the interrogation 
of X, a police ofﬁcer asks X what happened when the car arrived at the yield sign. 
Research by Loftus and Palmer (1974) and Loftus and colleagues (1978) shows that 
there is a serious possibility that X will misremember that the car did not stop at 
the yield sign. Thus, subtle suggestions provided after the event has occurred (i.e., 
post-hoc) may distort the way in which people come to remember the event (see also 
Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Crombag, Wagenaar & van Koppen, 1996; Jelicic, Smeets, Peters, 
Candel, Horselenberg, & Merckelbach, 2006;Ost, Vrij, Costall & Bull, 2002; Smeets, 
Jelicic, Peters, Candel, Horselenberg, & Merckelbach, 2006). 
 Encouraging people to fantasize about events that they never experienced is 
the crux of the imagination-inﬂation paradigm. Imagining a ﬁctitious event can lead 
to an increase in subjective conﬁdence that the event did take place (Garry, Manning, 
Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). Consider the following example: A young man is asked 
to imagine how he, at age 5, was a passenger in a hot air balloon. According to the 
man’s parents, such an event never took place. After several days, he is asked to as-
sign a conﬁdence rating to the following item: “At age 5, I ﬂew as a passenger in a 
hot air balloon”. It is likely that he will overestimate the probability of the balloon trip 
compared to items that were not imagined (Garry et al., 1996; see also Horselenberg, 
Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, Sijsenaar, & Spaan, 2000).
 “Did I do this, did I only imagine doing this, or was this done by someone 
else?” are the most important questions participants have to ask themselves during 
a traditional source monitoring paradigm (e.g., Anderson, 1984; Johnson et al., 1993; 
Parks, 1997). Thus, rather than only making old-new distinctions, in the source moni-
toring paradigm, people are asked to remember and report the source of the memo-
ry item. To give an example: A card depicting questions is shown to a participant for a 
period of 5 sec, followed by a blank card for 2 sec. The participant is instructed to read 
each question on the card in silence and to be prepared to say the answer out loud 
without actually verbalizing unless he/she is speciﬁcally told to do so. After this card, 
he/she receives the instruction “Say out loud” or the next trial giving the following 
question in the series is given. After the study phase, a forced choice recognition task 
is presented to the participant, consisting of the original questions, each being paired 
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with new questions with similar content. For both types of questions, the participant 
has to indicate whether they are “old” or “new” and when the participant says “old”, 
he/she has to specify whether he/she verbalized or only imagined the answer to the 
question (i.e., source monitoring). 
 In semantic relatedness paradigms (e.g., Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDer-
mott, 1995), participants are exposed to cues referring to a critical item that is never 
presented. In such paradigms, pseudo-memories are not explicitly established by 
an outside source, but are created by a cascade of internal processes. For exam-
ple, in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, initially developed by Deese 
(1959b) and later modiﬁed by Roediger and McDermott (1995), people are asked to 
remember related words, such as bed, nap, pillow, and snooze, all of which are asso-
ciated to a common word, in this particular example, the word sleep. The word sleep, 
however, is not presented in the study list and serves as a critical lure at test. Follow-
ing each list presentation, participants are asked to recall the studied words. Once all 
lists have been presented and recalled, participants are typically given a recognition 
test comprising of the studied words, unrelated lures, and critical lures. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) reported that on average, participants falsely recognized 65-80 per 
cent of the non-presented critical lure words. These ﬁndings were replicated in a fol-
low-up study by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999). 
 In essence, the methodology of the pseudo-memory implantation paradigms 
is strongly related to the (post-hoc) misinformation paradigm. Yet, they differ in one 
important respect: Instead of distorting memory traces by post-hoc misinformation 
(e.g., a blue taxi, while in fact the taxi was white), planting memories for an entirely 
new event that was never experienced is the crux of the implantation paradigms 
(e.g., Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In a standard implantation paradigm, participants are 
given brief descriptions of events that supposedly occurred in the past while partici-
pants were accompanied by a close relative. Most of the events are true events (cor-
roborated by the relative), but one event is ﬁctitious (e.g., being lost in a shopping 
mall). Participants are then asked to try to write about these events in detail. Later, 
they are interviewed about the events. Loftus and Pickrell (1995) found that a quarter 
of the participants in their study were “remembering” the ﬁctitious event of being 
lost in the shopping mall. 
 What post-hoc misinformation, imagination-inﬂation, source monitoring, se-
mantic-relatedness techniques, and pseudo-memory implantation all have in com-
mon is that they produce source monitoring problems (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). 
That is, such techniques put increased pressure on feature binding, pattern separa-
tion, pattern completion, and/or criterion setting. When these encoding and retrieval 
functions are suboptimal, memory distortions or even pseudo-memories may arise. 
In that case, participants take familiarity feelings for granted, thereby misattribut-
ing the item’s familiarity to a variety of extraneous sources, such as believing that 
a certain event must have happened. Obviously, the tendency to accept plausible, 
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internally generated beliefs as authentic events is an important step in the direction 
of a full-blown pseudo-memory (see also, Smeets et al., 2005). We now turn to the 
contribution of neuropsychology to pseudo-memories.
The neuropsychology of pseudo-memory
Before linking neuropsychology to pseudo-memories, we ﬁrst start with a brief re-
view on the neuropsychology of declarative memory (episodic, semantic, spatial). 
Scholarly reviews on this topic can be found in Fletcher and Henson (2001), Green-
berg and Rubin (2003), and Squire and Schacter (2002; see also Kopelman, 2002; 
Moscovitch et al., 2005).  Brieﬂy, these authors argue that when attention is paid to 
stimuli, different regions of the primary sensory and association cortex are activated. 
Thus, a visual stimulus activates the visual cortex, whereas auditory stimulation ac-
tivates the auditory cortex. The role of the medial temporal lobe (hippocampal com-
plex) and related structures in the diencephalon (MTL/D) can best be regarded as a 
switchboard, linking different brain regions that are simultaneously activated during 
the encoding of a speciﬁc event. The hippocampus has a high number of reciprocal 
neural connections, potentially mediating transfer of information from the hippo-
campal complex to the neocortex. Therefore, this brain structure may be seen as an 
intermediate linking site between experienced events and their representations in the 
neocortex. When one wants to recollect/retrieve speciﬁc events, certain structures in 
the medial temporal lobe mobilize different regions in the sensory and association 
cortex, thereby creating feature binding and pattern separation.
 The prefrontal cortex is involved in search strategies and the evaluation of 
their results. Its primary role is evaluating and monitoring relevant information and 
inhibiting irrelevant information during pattern completion and criterion setting. The 
aim of this post-retrieval control is to verify the appropriateness of the retrieved in-
formation in a given context (error-checking; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). That is, the 
prefrontal cortex organizes, selects, and activates the correct representation from 
the various representations that are encoded and consolidated at different points in 
time (Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996). More speciﬁcally, the left prefrontal cortex 
organizes the encoded information in the most efﬁcient way for later remembering 
(Fletcher, Shallice, Frith, Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1998). In contrast, the right prefrontal 
cortex guides retrieval (Kapur, Craik, Jones, Brown, Houle, & Tulving, 1995; Wheeler, 
Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) and some authors (e.g., Markowitsch, 1996) believe that it is 
particularly involved in the retrieval of autobiographical memory. 
 In his review article on the neuropsychology of pseudo-memories, Parkin 
(1997) states that prefrontal damage may lead to different memory distortions. Pa-
tients with prefrontal damage show a decreased usage of post-retrieval control (e.g., 
monitoring, evaluation, inhibition, criterion setting). This often leads to increased re-
liance on familiarity based processes and, thus, endorsement of irrelevant memory 
representations during the retrieval of a speciﬁc event (Shimamura, 1995). 
3
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 According to the Constructive Memory Framework by Schacter and colleagues 
(1998; Dodson & Schacter, 2002a), memory distortions and pseudo-memories are 
modulated by neuropsychological factors operating primarily at encoding or retriev-
al stages of memory. As described above, during encoding perceptual and contex-
tual features need to be bound together to form accurate representations. However, 
these representations also need to be distinctive. During retrieval, speciﬁc criteria 
need to be employed to be certain that the retrieved representation is the correct 
event rather than the product of a dream or fantasy. Lax criterion setting can lead to 
source misattributions and later memory distortion or pseudo-memories. 
 When combining the insights of what we know about the neuropsychology 
of memory, it seems clear that the medial temporal lobes are responsible for en-
coding and retrieval of recent experiences, while the prefrontal cortex controls the 
retrieval of old experiences. More speciﬁcally, the prefrontal cortex is involved in 
retrieval focus, criterion setting, updating, inhibition/suppression, and monitoring of 
information. Plainly, both require activation and manipulation of distinctive informa-
tion during encoding, and cognitive inhibition and active manipulation/monitoring of 
schema-related material during retrieval. Evidence for the distinct roles of temporal 
and frontal areas in memory can be found in case studies and empirical studies 
involving patients with focal brain damage, aging research (including dementia of 
the Alzheimer type), research in clinical populations, research using neuroimaging 
techniques, and individual difference studies.
Brain damage and aging 
As mentioned before, initial evidence for the role of the prefrontal cortex in the crea-
tion of pseudo-memories came from several case studies (e.g., Delbecq-Derousne 
et al., 1990; Parkin et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1996a). The patients described in these 
papers had the initials JB (Parkin, Leng, Stanhope, & Smith, 1988; Parkin et al., 1996), 
BG (Curran, Schacter, Norman, & Gallucio, 1997; Schacter et al., 1996a), and RW 
(Delbecq-Derousne et al., 1990; see also patient MR; Ward, Parkin, Powell, Squires, 
Townshend, & Bradley, 1999; patient JT; Young, Flude, Hay, & Ellis, 1993; patients WJ 
and BH; Rapcsak, Polster, Comer, & Rubens, 1994). Patients JB and RW were both 
diagnosed with a ruptured aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery (ACoA), 
whereas patient BG was diagnosed with an infarction located in the right frontal 
lobe. These three patients exhibited an extremely high rate of false recognition errors 
in a forced-choice recognition task. The data of JB further revealed a recall impair-
ment in which intrusion rates (i.e., producing non-presented words) were abnormally 
high. Ward and colleagues (1999) described a patient (MR) who was able to correctly 
recognize famous people, but also had a strong tendency to falsely classify unfamil-
iar people as familiar (see also Rapcsak, Reminger, Glisky, Kaszniak, & Comer, 1999). 
This patient had had a lacunar infarction in the area above the left lateral ventricle 
adjacent to the left frontal horn.
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 Recent attempts to explore the separate contributions of medial temporal and 
prefrontal areas to memory reconstruction have supported the ﬁndings from these 
case studies. A study by Melo, Winocur, and Moscovitch (1999) examined patients 
with either isolated damage to the medial temporal (MTL/D amnesics) or the prefron-
tal areas (FL nonamnesics) or a combination of both (medial temporal and prefrontal; 
FL amnesics), and healthy controls using the DRM paradigm. At recall, FL amnesic 
patients showed a lower proportion of critical lure intrusions than did controls. How-
ever, MTL/D amnesic patients and FL nonamnesic patients made more critical lure 
intrusions than control participants. At recognition, both MTL/D amnesics and FL 
amnesics made signiﬁcantly less critical lure intrusions in comparison to FL non-
amnesics. In conclusion, Melo and colleagues (1999, p. 356) state: “The tendency 
towards exaggerated levels of false recall and recognition by frontal lobe patients 
may result from defective monitoring that allows them to generate only a vague or 
unfocused representation of characteristic features of the target words against which 
test items are matched.” In contrast to this, amnesic patients with MTL/D lesions 
show markedly reduced levels of false recognition which has been taken as evidence 
for impairments in the encoding, maintenance, and retrieval of recollections and the 
accompanied feeling of familiarity (Schacter, Verfaellie, & Koutstaal, 2002; Verfaellie, 
Page, Orlando, & Schacter, 2005).
 Relative to younger adults, neurologically intact elderly tend to make more 
false recognition errors. Using the DRM paradigm, a study by Butler, McDaniel, Dorn-
burg, Roediger, and Price (2004) investigated the relationship between prefrontal lobe 
functioning and age differences in false recall. These authors found that older adults 
were less successful in reproducing studied items and more often falsely recalled the 
non-presented critical lure words in comparison to younger adults, which is in line 
with other studies (Balota, Cortese, Duchek, Adams, et al., 1999; Budson, Sullivan, 
Daffner, & Schacter, 2003; Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Intons-
Peterson, Rocchi, West, McLellan, & Hackney, 1999; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Nor-
man & Schacter, 1997; see review by Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997). These 
pseudo-memories were not related to the length or elaboration of the learning phase 
(Kensinger & Schacter, 1999). Most importantly, Butler and colleagues (2004) showed 
that these pseudo-memories were intimately linked to measures of prefrontal lobe 
functioning (i.e., executive functions). That is, only older adults characterized by poor 
prefrontal lobe functioning exhibited heightened levels of false recall. Older adults 
with intact frontal lobe functioning and young adults had similar levels of accurate 
and false recall. In line with this, imaging studies of older adults show deviant activa-
tion patterns in the prefrontal cortex during memory tasks. This is most prominent 
when they have to rely on controlled retrieval strategies during these tasks (Schacter, 
Savage, Alpert, Rauch, & Albert, 1996b). 
 Recent studies have begun to explore pseudo-memories in individuals who 
suffer from Dementia of the Alzheimer Type (DAT; see Balota et al., 1999; Budson et 
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al., 2003; Budson, Todman, & Schacter, 2006; Marsch, Balota, & Roediger, 2005; Mitch-
ell, Sullivan, Schacter, & Budson, 2006; Pierce, Sullivan, Schacter, & Budson, 2005; 
Waldie & Kwong See, 2003; Watson, Balota, & Sergent-Marshall, 2001). Basically, 
these studies show that DAT patients are especially susceptible to pseudo-memories 
when pre-existing semantic information is activated. Budson, Daffner, Desikan, and 
Schacter (2000) tested DAT patients using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm 
(Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Surprisingly, these researchers found 
that, whereas DAT patients were signiﬁcantly less susceptible than controls to falsely 
recognize the critical lure word after a single presentation of the study lists, this pat-
tern reversed when study lists were presented ﬁve times. 
 The deﬁcits in recall and recognition in DAT are related to their MTL/D dys-
function and mild prefrontal lobe dysfunctions (e.g., Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 
1999). As long as stimuli are presented incidentally, it seems that DAT patients cannot 
rely on familiarity or recollection for making source attributions. However, after re-
peated presentations, familiarity with the presented semantic related items increas-
es. Due to mild prefrontal lobe dysfunctions, the error-checking cannot inhibit these 
familiarity feelings evoked by lure items. Lack of efﬁciency in prefrontal mediated 
inhibitory control and post-retrieval monitoring system could increase the amount 
of familiarity based source misattributions. 
Functional Imaging data
Paralleling the increased interest in neuroimaging during the last decades, pseudo-
memory neuroimaging studies have accumulated. A complete description of the 
various fMRI, PET, and electroencephalogram (EEG) studies is beyond the scope of 
this Chapter (for a thorough overview of research in this area see Schacter & Slotnick, 
2004). Below, we will highlight one prototypical study. 
 In a PET study, Schacter, Reiman, Curran, Yun, et al. (1996c) focussed on true 
and false recognition in the DRM task. They found that an increased activation in left 
temporal region was found during accurate recall of presented words. Moreover, 
there appeared to be an increase in right prefrontal activity during false recognition 
of critical lures. Using fMRI during a follow-up study, the same researchers noted 
a similar pattern (Schacter, Buckner, Koutstaal, Dale, & Rosen, 1997). In this study, 
a delayed onset of prefrontal activation during false recognition occurred, a phe-
nomenon that the authors relate to suboptimal controlling of the prefrontal cortex 
during retrieval.
 A number of other studies have tried to disentangle the brain mechanisms in-
volved in accurate and pseudo-memories (e.g., Rodriguez-Fornells, Koﬁdis, & Münte, 
2004; for reviews, see Dodson & Schacter, 2002a; Gonsalves & Paller, 2002; Schacter 
& Slotnick, 2004). Of these studies, different neuroimaging studies have pointed to 
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as supporting this error-checking/ post-retriev-
al monitoring (e.g., Allan, Dolan, Fletcher, & Rugg, 2000; Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 
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1999). By and large, neuroimaging research demonstrates that, in addition to a (mod-
est) involvement of the medial temporal lobe, the prefrontal cortex plays a leading 
role in error-detection, notably pseudo-memories during retrieval (see also Mitchell, 
Dodson, & Schacter, 2005). 
Clinical populations: The case of schizophrenia
Studies on the antecedents of pseudo-memories are not limited to neurological 
patients, aging research, and the cognitive neuroscience ﬁeld. In recent years, a 
plethora of research has investigated source misattributions and pseudo-memo-
ries in schizophrenia (e.g., Brébion, Gorman, Malaspina, & Amador, 2005; Henquet, 
Krabbendam, Dautzenberg, Jolles, & Merckelbach, 2005; Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, 
Whitman, & Watson, 2004; Nienow & Docherty, 2004; Waters, Maybery, Badcock, & 
Michie, 2004). 
 Memory performance of schizophrenic patients is characterized by leaving out 
presented information (i.e., omission errors). That is, schizophrenic patients have a 
tendency to omit information when asked to recall or to recognize speciﬁc verbal or 
non-verbal material (e.g., Moritz et al., 2004; see Aleman, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 
1999, for a meta-analysis). However, source monitoring mechanism is also markedly 
impaired in schizophrenia (Johnson et al., 1993). Schizophrenic patients consistently 
show a deﬁciency in internal source attributions (e.g., “Did I do this or did I only 
imagine this?”; Nienow & Docherty, 2004) and reality monitoring (e.g., “Did I say 
this or did someone else say this to me?”; Brébion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina, & 
Sharif, 2002; Moritz, Woodward, & Ruff, 2003). A recent study by Waters et al. (2004) 
found that deﬁcits in binding contextual cues together might explain commonality of 
these source misattributions in schizophrenia. Forty-three schizophrenic patients and 
24 healthy controls were subjected to a paradigm in which item memory could be as-
sessed in conjunction with memory for both source and temporal information. In this 
paradigm, 48 common household objects were presented to the participants. Half 
were allocated to the “watch” condition, in which the participants watched the ex-
perimenter pair these household objects. The other half of the objects were allocated 
to the “perform” condition, in which participants performed the pairings themselves. 
In two sessions, a series of cards informed the participant to position objects next to 
one another or to watch the experimenter perform the action. Next, participants un-
derwent a recognition task consisting of 24 pairs of objects. Of these, 16 pairs were 
kept in their original combination, while 8 pairs were recombined into new pairs. 
Participants had to indicate whether each pair was an original or a new pair. For intact 
pairs, they also had to specify source (self/experimenter) and temporal (session 1 or 
2) context. It was found that schizophrenic patients were less accurate in identify-
ing the source and temporal context and were unable to combine contextual cues 
together to form an integrated representation of the event, which indicates a speciﬁc 
feature binding problem. 
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 As described above, binding of contextual cues depends on encoding and 
the ability to “reactivate” the correct information during retrieval (i.e., post-retrieval 
monitoring). As the memory deﬁcits observed in schizophrenia closely parallel those 
of patients with MTL/D damage, one could argue that the underlying mechanisms 
are similar (i.e., inefﬁcient feature binding during encoding). Alternatively, prefron-
tal lobe dysfunctions may also underlie memory deﬁcits in schizophrenia. After all, 
the prefrontal lobes play an important role in monitoring the retrieval of encoded 
events in memory. Until now, the role of executive dysfunction in explaining source 
misattributions and pseudo-memories in schizophrenia has not been systematically 
studied (but see Moritz et al., 2003). 
Individual differences
Clearly, some individuals are more susceptible to source misattributions and pseu-
do-memories than others. As noted above, there are neurocognitive precursors for 
source misattribution and pseudo-memories. Indeed, recent aging and lesion stud-
ies suggest that executive functions such as post-retrieval monitoring and inhibition 
play a critical role in the creation of source misattributions and pseudo-memories 
FIGURE 1.1: MODEL OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF PREFRONTAL AREAS IN PSEUDO-MEMORIES.
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(SEE FIGURE 1.1). It would not be too farfetched to assume that even in young, healthy 
people, individual differences in speciﬁc neurocognitive functions might be related 
to source monitoring and pseudo-memories. Recent individual difference studies 
provide some tentative evidence that this could be the case for subtle executive dys-
functions, working memory, and inhibition of schematic knowledge.
Executive functions 
A ﬁne example of the possible link between subtle neurocognitive dysfunctions and 
pseudo-memories is an individual difference study by Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, 
Edelstein, Quas, and Shaver (2002). These authors interviewed children (n = 51) be-
tween the ages of 3 and 7 years about an inoculation that they had undergone two 
weeks earlier. Children’s memory accuracy and suggestibility were examined in re-
lation to their stress levels during inoculation, parental attachment styles, and cog-
nitive inhibition (i.e., ability to suppress irrelevant information). The authors antici-
pated that children with higher levels of cognitive inhibition would provide more ac-
curate information and would be less suggestible than children with lower levels of 
inhibition. In support of this, children with poor cognitive inhibition exhibited more 
pseudo-memories on a free recall task about inoculation and more often accepted 
misleading information than children with adequate inhibition capacity. This differ-
ence remained, even when controlling for age. More recently, Lödvén (2003) inves-
tigated the underlying mechanisms of age effects on pseudo-memories. A total of 
146 participants, aged 20 to 80 years were subjected to tasks measuring processing 
speed, inhibition, episodic memory performance, and pseudo-memories. Results re-
vealed that levels of pseudo-memories increased with age. Using structural equation 
modeling, Lödvén found that impaired inhibitory control affected susceptibility to 
pseudo-memories indirectly via episodic memory performance. That is, participants 
with impaired inhibitory control scored low on episodic memory tasks. Moreover, 
participants scoring low on episodic memory tasks more often falsely recalled the 
critical lure in a DRM paradigm, compared to participants scoring high on these epi-
sodic memory tasks.
Working memory 
Working memory is closely related to prefrontal cortex mediated executive func-
tions. A paper by Reinitz and Hannigan (2004) related pseudo-memories to working 
memory capacity. In one of their three experiments, the authors had participants (n 
= 48) in an experimental group study pairs of compound words (e.g., toothpaste, 
headache) while simultaneously monitoring speciﬁc digits (digit monitoring task), 
such that at the end they had to report the total number of even digits. The authors 
found that participants in the digit monitoring condition more often tended to falsely 
remember never presented compound words (e.g., toothache) than control partic-
ipants. The results indicated that intact working memory is necessary for binding 
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stimulus parts together in episodic memory. Inefﬁcient working memory leads to 
binding failures, and subsequently to an increase in pseudo-memories for never pre-
sented compound words.
 McCabe and Smith (2002) examined age differences in the ability to suppress 
pseudo-memories, as elicited by the DRM paradigm. In two separate experiments, 
one group of younger and older adults were subjected to a standard DRM proce-
dure. Other young and older adults were explicitly warned before studying the DRM 
lists that the presented words all relate to a semantically non-presented word. Still 
other young and older adults were warned after studying but before testing. Lists 
were presented at different rates (4 sec/word or 2 sec/word) to each of the groups. 
Individual difference measures like working memory were also administered. Young 
adults were better in discriminating between studied words and critical lure words 
when warned about the DRM effect (either before or after the study phase). Older 
adults were able to discriminate between studied items and critical lure words when 
given warnings before the study phase, but not when given warnings after the study 
phase and before retrieval. As to the individual difference measures, working mem-
ory capacity predicted false recognition following study and retrieval warnings. That 
is, reduced working memory capacity was associated with higher rates of pseudo-
memories (see also Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). McCabe and Smith 
(2002) concluded that discriminating between similar sources of activation critically 
depends on working memory capacity, which declines with advancing age. This leads 
to a heightened susceptibility to pseudo-memories.
Inhibition of stereotype activation
Social psychology research has recently begun to address the relationship between 
prefrontal lobe functions and abstract schematic knowledge, like stereotype activa-
tion (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999; Mitchell, Cloutier, Banaji, 
& Macrae, 2006; Payne, 2005; Wood, Romero, Knutson, & Grafman, 2005). A study by 
Mather, Johnson, and De Leonardis (1999) showed that relative to young participants, 
older participants with prefrontal lobe dysfunctions showed and increased tendency 
to rely on stereotypes when attempting to remember who said speciﬁc statements in 
an earlier presented video (see also Von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000).
 A stereotype can be deﬁned as a widely held schematic belief about a certain 
social group (Graham & Lowery, 2004; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Concerning ster-
eotype activation, an ambiguity is seen when it comes to its inﬂuence on memory. 
Stereotypes facilitate encoding and retrieval of stereotype-consistent information, 
but they may also lead people to remember stereotype-consistent details that were 
not present (e.g., Araya, Ekehammar, & Akrami, 2003). False stereotype-consistent 
information is especially likely to be reported when the cognitive inhibition func-
tion is overloaded, i.e., when people are instructed to deliberately inhibit stereo-
types. This was demonstrated in a study by Araya and colleagues (2003) in which 
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participants had to study stereotypical (i.e., immigrant words) and non-stereotypical 
words, either with an initially activated social category (immigrant prime) or with no 
social category (neutral prime). Participants were then instructed to either forget or 
remember the studied words. This was followed by a recognition test. Participants in 
the immigrant, but not in the neutral prime condition, more often falsely recognized 
non-studied stereotypical words, but only when they had previously been given in-
structions to forget them.
Urgent questions
In recent years, a vast amount of research explored whether certain personality traits 
may be related to source misattribution and pseudo-memories. Thus, traits like dis-
sociation, suggestibility, and imagery vividness have been studied to ﬁnd out wheth-
er they modulate performance in pseudo-memory paradigms (e.g., Candel, Merckel-
bach, & Kuijpers, 2003; Eisen & Lynn, 2001; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, 
& Merckelbach, 2005; Horselenberg et al., 2000; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998). 
On the other hand, the connection between these traits and pseudo-memories is 
far from robust (e.g., Wright, Startup, & Mathews, 2005). That is, some studies were 
unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between dissociation and pseudo-memories 
(Horselenberg et al., 2000). Thus, while research along these lines has yielded impor-
tant clinical insights, its theoretical contribution is limited. As we have noted so far, 
focusing on neurocognitive concepts may explain why certain traits are related to 
pseudo-memories and, therefore, this research line might be fruitful. Indeed, recent 
aging and lesion studies suggest that neurocognitive dysfunctions play a critical role 
in the creation of pseudo-memories. Given this considerable amount of aging and 
clinical research, it is surprising how few studies have explored whether individual 
differences in neurocognitive tasks in young adults inﬂuence the likelihood of pseu-
do-memories. This is not only of theoretical interest, but also of practical importance 
(e.g., the accuracy of eyewitness testimonies). It is to these issues that we now turn. 
 Secondly, speciﬁc questions about the relationship between neurocognitive 
functions and pseudo-memories in clinical samples need to be answered. One issue 
still open to debate is whether established neurocognitive dysfunctions in schizo-
phrenia relate to the increased susceptibility for source misattributions. To address 
this issue, apart from carrying out studies in schizophrenic populations, a commonly 
used research strategy is to examine to which extent normal samples with schizo-
phrenia-like characteristics (i.e., schizotypy) exhibit similar deﬁcits. That is, whether 
subtle neurocognitive deﬁcits are present in this sample and whether they relate to 
certain memory aberrations.
 As discussed earlier, the primary role of the prefrontal cortex is evaluating 
and monitoring relevant information and inhibiting irrelevant information. Inefﬁcient 
monitoring may lead to source misattributions, such that plausible, but ﬁctitious 
events are believed to be true. The next step is the acceptance of these beliefs as 
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genuine memories (i.e., true recollections). Until now, research has only focused on 
monitoring deﬁcits involving plausible events like remembering words never pre-
sented, or imagining and performing simple actions. The question arises whether 
these monitoring deﬁcits would also arise in speciﬁc groups of people who report 
memories of events that seem very implausible to have happened to begin with.
Outline of this thesis
This thesis aims to explore new directions in the neuropsychology of pseudo-memo-
ries. It consists of three parts:
PART [A] NORMATIVE DATA AND PSYCHOMETRICS
The ﬁrst part of this dissertation describes the standardization and validation of a 
pseudo-memory paradigm and a neurocognitive task. They served as a starting point 
for conducting our ﬁrst empirical study relating suboptimal executive functioning to 
pseudo-memories (see Chapter 4). More speciﬁcally, Chapter 2 describes the devel-
opment, standardization, and normative data of a Dutch version of the Deese/Roedi-
ger-McDermott paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) in a sample 
of Dutch undergraduate students. Although this is a standard paradigm to elicit pseu-
do-memories in experimental settings, a version based on Dutch word association 
norms was still lacking. 
 As described above, deﬁcits in inhibitory control mediated by the prefrontal 
cortex may play a crucial role in pseudo-memories. In order to test this, a psychomet-
rically-sound neurocognitive task measuring inhibitory control is a prerequisite. With 
this in mind, Chapter 3 summarizes the results of a psychometric study on a speciﬁc 
inhibition measure, namely the Random Number Generation task (RNG; Ginsburg & 
Karpiuk, 1994, 1995).
PART [B] SOURCE MONITORING, PSEUDO-MEMORIES, AND NEUROCOGNITIVE 
 FUNCTIONS IN UNDERGRADUATES
In this part, the links between suboptimal neurocognitive dysfunctions, source mis-
attribution, and pseudo-memories were examined in undergraduate participants. To 
this end, empirical studies using several memory distortion and pseudo-memory 
paradigms and neurocognitive tasks, are summarized. Chapter 4 explored whether 
individual differences in the ability to inhibit cognitive schemas (measured by the 
RNG task) are related to recalling or recognizing words never presented as measured 
by the DRM paradigm.
 Similarly, the study described in Chapter 5 examined whether undergradu-
ates who differ in simple and complex working memory capacity, also differ in their 
proneness to (develop) pseudo-memories.
 Chapter 6 examined whether complex working memory capacity and schizo-
phrenia-related symptomatology in an undergraduate population were related to 
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source misattributions in a high processing demand environment. In this study, par-
ticipants had to ﬁll out a psychosis-proneness questionnaire and were subjected to 
an action source monitoring paradigm. A task measuring complex working memory 
capacity was also included in this study. 
 In Chapter 7, we investigated whether an active manipulation of inhibitory 
control may lead to an increase in source misattributions of to-be-suppressed in-
formation. As described above, instructions not to think about (i.e., actively inhibit) 
stereotypes after stereotype priming may lead to an automatic rebound, i.e., more 
thinking about stereotypes. However, until now, there are no studies investigating 
the effects of these manipulations on the accuracy of eyewitness memory. This was 
addressed in Chapter 7. Here, we were primarily interested in whether active inhibi-
tion of stereotypes would rebound on a later memory task and would also lead to 
stereotype-consistent pseudo-memories.
PART [C] NEUROCOGNITIVE DYSFUNCTIONS, SOURCE MONITORING, 
 AND PSEUDO-MEMORIES IN CLINICAL POPULATIONS
The ﬁnal part describes two studies addressing the relationships between neuro-
cognitive dysfunctions, source monitoring, and pseudo-memories in clinical popula-
tions. More speciﬁcally, in Chapter 8 we investigated whether executive dysfunctions 
could explain certain memory aberrations (correct recognition, pseudo-memories, 
and source misattributions) in schizophrenic patients and matched controls.
 As discussed earlier, the primary role of the prefrontal cortex is evaluating 
and monitoring relevant information and inhibiting irrelevant information. Inefﬁcient 
monitoring may lead to source misattributions, such that plausible but ﬁctitious 
events are taken as real events. The following step is the acceptance of these beliefs 
as genuine memories (i.e., veridical recollections). A question that arises is whether 
these monitoring deﬁcits would also occur in speciﬁc groups of people who report 
memories of events that seem very implausible to have actually happened. Chapter 
9 therefore describes a study in which we investigated whether individuals with pre-
vious-life beliefs and memories are more prone to make source misattributions, as 
compared to controls with no such beliefs or memories.
 Finally, in Chapter 10 the results of our work are summarized, discussed, and 
some ﬁnal conclusions are drawn. To further illustrate our ﬁndings, some new data 
on the link between pseudo-memory and neurocognitive function are brieﬂy pre-
sented. Directions for future research are also discussed. 
 It should be noted that most of the studies that will be described in this thesis will 
be correlational in stead of directly testing causal relationships. Thus, most of our studies 
are not a direct test of the causal model described in FIGURE 1.1. However, causal relationships 
always presume correlation. In this respect, it would be unnecessary to look for causal rela-
tionships when no relation is identiﬁed in the ﬁrst place. Most of our studies can be seen as 
a ﬁrst exploration in identifying this ﬁrst necessary prerequisite of causal relationships.
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CHAPTER [2] INDUCING PSEUDO-MEMORIES
A Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm
An adjusted version of this chapter is submitted as: Peters, M.J.V., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. (submitted). Induc-
ing false memories: A Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm.
Abstract
The Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995) is a widely used method to induce pseudo-memories in laboratory situations. 
In this paradigm, participants study lists of words that are semantically associated 
with a central non-presented word, called the critical lure word. A standard ﬁnd-
ing is that these lures are often falsely recalled and/or recognized. The purpose of 
the current study was to provide a set of Dutch normative data for 64 word lists in 
a sample of undergraduates (n = 70): 32 twelve-item word lists were derived from 
Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999), and 32 ﬁfteen-item word lists were based 
on Dutch word association normative data. Rates of falsely recalling and recognizing 
the critical lure varied widely across lists, ranging from a high 72% of participants 
who recalled the critical lure word NAALD (“needle”) after studying a 12-item list, to a 
low 0% of participants who recognized the critical lure HEMD (“shirt”) after studying 
a 12-item list. 
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Introduction
Our memories are far from perfect. Sooner or later, most of our experiences will be 
forgotten, and the relatively few events we do remember, may differ from how they 
actually took place. Often, there are only minor discrepancies between actual events 
and our memories, but sometimes we remember events that never happened in real-
ity (e.g., Loftus, 1993; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). In such cases, people are said to 
have “false” memories or in our terminology pseudo-memories. In the past decades, 
researchers have developed laboratory methods to study pseudo-memories. One of 
these methods is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM paradigm, read 
DREAM; Bruce & Winograd, 1998). This paradigm was originally developed by Deese 
(1959b) and revived by Roediger and McDermott (1995).
 Over 40 years ago, James Deese published two complementary articles on 
memory quantity and accuracy (Deese, 1959a,b). The ﬁrst study showed that cor-
rect free recall of a word list is directly related to the interitem associative strength 
of the list, i.e., the mean relative frequency with which each list item elicits all other 
list items as free associates. In the second study, Deese (1959b) presented 50 par-
ticipants with word lists that varied in their interitem associative strength. Lists con-
sisted of 12 highly associated words such as dream, pillow, bed, etc., all related to a 
non-presented critical lure word, e.g., sleep. It was found that participants often had 
intrusions of the non-presented lure word. For example, in recalling the 12 previ-
ously studied associates to the non-presented word sleep, 44 % of the participants 
falsely recalled this critical lure. 
 Three decades later, Roediger and McDermott (1995) reﬁned and expanded 
the paradigm developed by Deese. To this end, they adopted six lists that produced 
the most intrusions (i.e., false recall) in Deese’s experiment. The authors found that 
on immediate free recall tests, the critical lures were recalled 40% of the time. This 
rate is comparable to the recall of words from the middle of the study list. To ob-
tain additional parameters, Roediger and McDermott (1995) gave their participants 
a forced-choice old-new recognition test, in which studied items, critical lures, and 
unrelated lures were presented. Participants were also asked to rate their conﬁdence 
that each presented word had occurred in the study lists (ranging from 1 “sure new” 
to 4 “sure old”). There were no differences in recognition between studied items and 
critical lures, as participants classiﬁed the critical lures as being old (.84) as often as 
the studied words (.86). Mean conﬁdence rating for the critical lures (3.3) was similar 
to ratings for the studied words (3.6). In their second experiment, the test material 
involved 18 newly created lists, along with the 6 lists used in experiment 1. Further-
more, list length was expanded with word lists now consisting of 15 words. During 
the recognition test, participants were asked to make meta-memory judgments (re-
member-know) to qualify their “old” recognition responses, as proposed by Tulving 
(1985) and Gardiner (1988). In Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) second experiment, 
participants recalled the critical lure on 55% of the lists, a rate that is even higher than 
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that in experiment 1. Moreover, participants were just as likely to report remember 
judgments for critical lures (.48) as they were for studied words (.49).
 Many authors have taken false recall and/or recognition of the critical lure 
in the DRM paradigm as a prototypical example of pseudo-memories. Meanwhile, 
there are important differences between pseudo-memories as elicited by the DRM 
procedure and those that occur outside the laboratory (Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Smeets, 
Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). On the other hand, over the past de-
cade, many studies have demonstrated the robustness of the DRM paradigm in in-
ducing pseudo-memories, even when substantial changes are made to the original 
method (see for reviews Roediger & McDermott, 2000). Different procedures have 
been applied in trying to reduce the probability of false recall and recognition like 
stimulus presentation format (e.g., Gallo, McDermott, Percer, & Roediger, 2001), 
presentation modus of lists (blocked vs. random; forward vs. backward; Toglia, Neu-
schatz, & Goodwin, 1999), practice (Seamon et al., 2003), number of associates per 
list (Robinson & Roediger, 1997), list presentation rate (McDermott & Watson, 2001), 
multiple study-test trials and list repetition (Benjamin, 2001; Kensinger & Schacter, 
1999), and focused and divided attention (Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002; Seamon 
et al., 2003). However, even in situations where participants are explicitly warned 
against making these pseudo-memory intrusions, false recall and recognition rates 
remain high (e.g., Gallo, Roberts & Seamon, 1997; Neuschatz, Benoit, & Payne, 2003). 
Furthermore, reinforcement (e.g., paying money for correct responses and taking 
money away for recalling critical lures) does affect memory performance, but does 
not eliminate false recall of the critical lures (Candel, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Jentjens, 
2006).
 Apart from parametric studies that looked at the methodology of the paradigm 
as described above, the DRM paradigm has also been used in special populations. 
For example, with this paradigm, neurologically intact elderly tend to make more 
false recall and recognition critical lure intrusions than younger adults (e.g., Butler, 
McDaniel, Dornburg, Roediger, & Price, 2004; Dehon & Brédart, 2004; Kensinger & 
Schacter, 1999). The DRM paradigm has also been employed to study pseudo-memo-
ries in various clinical groups. With the exception of amnesic patients (Melo, Wino-
cur, & Moscovitch, 1999), pseudo-memories elicited by the DRM paradigm appear to 
be remarkably robust across fairly diverse clinical populations, including individuals 
with schizophrenia (Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, & Watson, 2004), women 
with possible recovered memories of childhood abuse (Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & 
Pitman, 2000; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, & Merckelbach, 2005), and in-
dividuals with Dementia of the Alzheimer Type (DAT; see Marsh, Balota, & Roediger, 
2005).
 Other authors have focused on individual differences in susceptibility to pseu-
do-memories in the DRM paradigm. Recently, Watson, Bunting, Poole, and Conway 
(2005) reported that, relative to controls, participants with poorer working memory 
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capacity more often falsely recalled the critical lures, but only so when they had re-
ceived a warning concerning the purpose of the associative lists (see also Chapters 
4 and 5 of this dissertation).
 To our knowledge, the DRM paradigm has been primarily used in English 
speaking participants. Moreover, relatively few studies examining pseudo-memories 
in other languages (e.g., Brédart, 2000 for French; Pérez-Mata et al., 2002 for Span-
ish; Zeelenberg & Pecher, 2002; Zeelenberg, Plomp, & Raaijmakers, 2003 for Dutch; 
Johansson & Stenberg, 2002 for Swedish) almost all translated the original Roediger 
and McDermott (1995) or Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) word lists into 
another language (but see Anastasi, De Leon, & Rhodes, 2005). Given the popularity 
of the DRM paradigm as a method to study pseudo-memories under laboratory con-
ditions (Roediger & McDermott, 2000), we reasoned that a well documented Dutch 
version of the paradigm would be in order. The main objective of the current study 
was to construct a Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm, with 
the same list speciﬁcations as in the original DRM paradigm (i.e., lists consisting of 
the strongest associates to a critical lure and arranged in descending order of asso-
ciative strength).
 Following the methodology of Roediger and McDermott (1995), we construed 
64 word lists. Half of them were drawn from Stadler et al. (1999). For these lists, 12-
item word lists were translated into Dutch. The other 32 lists consisted of 15 words 
and were based on Dutch word association norms (15-item word lists; Lauteslager, 
Schaap, & Schievels, 1986; Van Loon–Vervoorn, & van Bekkum, 1991; van der Made-
van Bekkum, 1973). Below, we report normative data of false recall and recognition 
for these lists. 
Method
Participants
Participants were 72 undergraduate psychology students (18 men) at Maastricht Uni-
versity who agreed to take part in the study in return for course credits. Mean age 
of the participants was 19.10 years (SD = 2.52; Range: 18-33). All participants were 
native Dutch speakers. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of 
the Faculty of Psychology of Maastricht University.
Materials
In this normative study, 64 lists were tested. Thirty-two lists consisted of 12 associ-
ates of a critical lure and 32 lists consisted of 15 associates. The 32 critical lure words 
are taken from Stadler et al. (1999).1 For the 12-item word lists, associative words 
for each critical lure were drawn from Stadler et al. (1999). For these lists, the ﬁrst 12 
associates to each list were translated into Dutch. When different translations were 
possible, the translation was chosen that was thought to be most appropriate in elic-
iting a pseudo-memory. 
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 For the thirty-two 15-item word lists, associates were generally the ﬁrst 15 items 
from the Dutch word association norms. The Van Loon-Vervoorn and van Bekkum 
(1991) normative data were used as a primary source for the normative lists. When 
normative word lists for the critical lures were not provided by this normative study, 
the Lauteslager et al. (1986) and van der Made-van Bekkum (1973) normative studies 
were used. Thus, for each critical lure word, a list of semantically related words was 
obtained. Each of the lists was arranged in descending order of associative strength.
 The 64 lists were pseudo-randomly divided into four sets of 16 lists. Each set 
of 16 lists consisted of eight 12-item word lists and eight 15-item word lists. To elimi-
nate overlap between lists within each set, each word was individually checked on its 
appearance in another list within the same set or as critical lure in another list of the 
same set. If this occured, these words were substituted by less frequent words from 
the normative lists. A random order of the lists within each set was constructed. The 
64 lists were recorded onto audio tape in a female voice who read out the words at a 
rate of 1 word every 2 sec. 
 The recognition task was constructed for each of the four sets and consisted 
of 96 words randomly ordered on a sheet of paper. The 96 words consisted of items 
from serial position 1, 8, and 10 of each of the studied lists (a total of 48 items), the 16 
critical lure words, and 32 additional unrelated words taken from the lists of the three 
non-presented sets. Only the words that were unrelated to words in the studied lists 
were used for this purpose.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. They were told that they took part in a study on 
the efﬁcacy of memory functioning. Each participant was presented with one of the 
four sets (i.e., 16 lists per participant). Participants were pseudo-randomly allocated 
to one of the four sets, so that each set was administered to 18 participants. Instruc-
tions given to the participants were based on the Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
procedure. Basically, they were told that they were going to hear several word lists 
and that they would be tested immediately after each list by writing the words on 
successive pages of examination booklets. As in the Roediger and McDermott study, 
participants were encouraged to write down all of the words they could remember, 
but only so when they were reasonably sure that the word had appeared in the list 
(i.e., they were told not to guess). The lists were read out loudly one after the other. 
The words (spoken by a female voice) were presented for 1 sec with an inter-stimulus 
interval of 1 sec. Before each list, the experimenter said “List 1, List 2,” and so on. At 
the end of each list presentation, participants were given 2 min to write down all the 
words they could remember. 
 After ﬁnishing the free recall task, participants were asked to turn their recall 
packets face down. Next, they were given a 5 min ﬁller task, consisting of mental 
arithmetic problems. A total of 70 exercises were given to each participant, with an 
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equal distribution of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division exercises. 
 Following the ﬁller task, subjects were told they would receive another test. 
They were then given the old-new recognition task. For each of these 96 words, 
participants had to indicate whether the word was old (i.e., had appeared on one of 
the 16 lists) or new. They were asked to read each item carefully, and only to respond 
“old” if the word had appeared in the presented lists. Participants worked through 
the recognition task at their own pace. In addition, they were asked to make remem-
ber-know judgments for each item they classiﬁed as old (Tulving, 1985). Participants 
were told that a remember judgment should be made for items for which they had 
a vivid memory of the actual presentation, e.g., when they remembered something 
distinctive in the speakers voice, or remembered the words presented before or af-
ter it, or remembered what they were thinking when they heard the word. Partici-
pants were instructed that know judgments were to be reserved for items that they 
were sure had been presented, but for which they lacked the feeling of remembering 
the actual occurrence of the word. It was emphasized that participants should make 
remember-know judgments about words with respect to their presentation on the 
audiotape, and not whether they remembered or knew they had written it down dur-
ing the free recall tests. In addition, they were instructed to make remember-know 
judgments immediately after judging the item to be old and before they considered 
the next test item. When they had completed the recognition task, they were invited 
to write down what they thought was the purpose of the study. Finally, participants 
were thanked for their participation and debriefed.
Results
Our analyses are based on data from 70 participants. Two participants were excluded 
from the analyses because after the experiment, they admitted to possess knowl-
edge of the DRM procedure. Alpha was set at .05, unless speciﬁed otherwise. 
 Before collapsing the data obtained with the 64 word lists, the four sets of 16 
word lists were compared with regard to their potency to elicit studied words and the 
critical lure words. Four one-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA’s) with four levels 
(i.e., four sets) showed that sets did not differ in studied words that were recalled 
or recognized [both F’s (3, 66) < 1, both p’s > .05] or in critical lure words recalled 
or recognized [both F’s (3, 66) < 2, both p’s > .05] by the participants. Therefore, we 
pooled the data across sets.
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TABLE 2.1A SIXTEEN 15-ITEM WORD LISTS THAT PRODUCED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF FALSE RECALL (RANKED BY PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO RECALLED 
THE CRITICAL LURE: T; RIGHT COLUMN). PROPORTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS WHO CORRECTLY RECALLED ITEMS AS A FUNCTION OF SERIAL POSITION (1-15) ARE 
ALSO SHOWN.
List 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 T
Needle .83 1.0 .50 .56 .67 .44 1.0 .67 .44 .33 .61 .61 .78 .72 .94 .61
Soft .67 .89 .11 .83 .78 .67 .28 .44 .44 .44 .72 1.0 .72 .78 1.0 .61
Rough .78 .56 .72 .83 .22 .67 .67 .50 .67 .39 .28 .44 .50 .78 1.0 .61
Thief .33 .67 .56 .44 .72 .28 .67 .67 .72 .17 .50 .67 .61 .83 .94 .61
Bread .94 .44 .89 .67 .56 .72 .89 .44 .28 .83 .89 .89 .78 .83 1.0 .55
Cold .89 1.0 .78 .28 .61 .50 .44 .39 .72 .56 .61 .72 1.0 .78 1.0 .44
Angry .78 .94 .83 .33 .06 .56 .56 .44 .72 .28 .78 .72 .28 .83 .56 .44
Sweet .94 .78 .50 .78 .72 .89 .50 .50 1.0 .39 .39 .89 .72 .33 .83 .44
Music .89 .83 .72 .67 .44 .17 .56 .72 .50 .83 .72 .50 .89 .78 .94 .44
Smoke .89 .94 .72 .83 .89 .67 .39 .28 .50 .33 .61 .50 .56 .56 .94 .38
Car .78 .56 .56 .44 .83 .56 .61 .50 .56 .72 .67 .78 .83 .72 1.0 .33
Foot .94 .72 .50 .67 .44 .28 .89 .67 .72 .83 .89 .67 .78 .94 1.0 .33
Chair .78 .72 .78 .72 .50 .44 .67 .33 .44 .61 .78 .61 .50 .83 1.0 .28
Pen 1.0 .72 .89 .72 .33 .78 .61 .61 .39 .61 .39 .72 .61 .61 .89 .28
Window .89 .78 .50 .83 .50 .50 .56 .44 .56 .67 .67 .72 .72 .78 .89 .28
Man 1.0 .61 .39 .61 .50 .44 .28 .78 .56 .56 .89 .89 .44 .72 1.0 .22
Recall and recognition
Recall data are presented in TABLES 2.1A, 2.1B, 2.2A, and 2.2B with lists sorted according to 
the proportion of false recall of the critical lure word. TABLES 2.1A and 2.1B show the 32 
lists (sixteen 15-item word lists and sixteen 12-item word lists) for which the highest 
levels of false recall were obtained, whereas TABLES 2.2A and 2.2B present the 32 lists 
(sixteen 15-item word lists and sixteen 12-item word lists) that produced the lowest 
false recall levels. 
TABLE 2.1B SIXTEEN 12-ITEM WORD LISTS THAT PRODUCED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF FALSE RECALL (RANKED BY PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO 
RECALLED THE CRITICAL LURE: T; RIGHT COLUMN). PROPORTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS WHO CORRECTLY RECALLED ITEMS AS A FUNCTION OF SERIAL POSITION 
(1-12) ARE ALSO SHOWN.
LIST 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 T
Needle .94 .61 .56 .50 .89 .61 .72 .50 .67 1.0 .83 1.0 .72
Rough .94 .56 .33 .61 .56 .61 .72 .39 .28 .50 .78 .94 .61
Pen 1.0 .72 .83 .67 .56 .78 .39 .56 .72 .78 1.0 1.0 .50
Soft .83 .50 .39 .72 .28 .61 .17 .44 .56 .50 .72 .89 .50
Sweet .89 .67 .72 .83 .67 .72 .50 .28 .61 .89 .94 .94 .50
Black .83 .89 .61 .78 .67 .33 .50 .78 .61 .94 .89 1.0 .39
Cold .94 .83 .83 .89 .83 .61 .39 .56 .72 .50 .94 .83 .39
Window .83 .78 .61 .83 .78 .67 .56 .83 .67 .94 .89 1.0 .33
Angry .83 .72 .83 .56 .28 .17 .67 .39 .72 .83 .61 .83 .28
Foot .83 .89 .83 .72 .89 .44 .89 .44 .83 .72 .72 1.0 .28
Smoke .94 .83 .72 .61 .67 .61 .28 .50 .56 .78 .89 .83 .28
Mountain .72 .89 .56 .83 .72 .61 .61 .56 .67 .72 .89 .89 .28
Car 1.0 .50 .94 .44 .61 .61 .22 .61 .83 .83 .72 1.0 .22
City .83 .50 .94 .94 .67 .17 .61 .83 .67 .67 1.0 1.0 .22
Cup .78 .89 .83 .83 .67 .56 .44 .83 .50 .89 .67 .83 .22
Chair .94 .94 .56 .72 .67 .78 .78 .50 .39 .89 1.0 .78 .22
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 Proportions of participants who falsely recalled the critical lure varied widely 
across lists, with the highest proportions being .72 for participants who had the 12-
item word list NAALD (“needle”), to .00 for participants who had the 12-item word 
lists DOKTER (“doctor”), SLAAP (“sleep”), SPIN (“spider”) and HEMD (“shirt”). 
Across all 64 lists, the mean proportion of participants who falsely recalled the criti-
cal lure was .26. In the Stadler et al. (1999; see also Roediger & McDermott, 1995), 
it was found that the mean proportion of participants falsely recalling the lure came 
close to the proportion of participants who recalled an item in the mid-list position 
(positions 4-11).
TABLE 2.2A SIXTEEN 15-ITEM WORD LISTS THAT PRODUCED THE LOWEST LEVEL OF FALSE RECALL (PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO RECALLED THE 
CRITICAL LURE: T; RIGHT COLUMN). PROPORTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS WHO CORRECTLY RECALLED STUDIED ITEMS AS A FUNCTION OF SERIAL POSITION (1-15) 
ARE ALSO SHOWN.
LIST 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 T 
Lion .94 .72 .50 .67 .44 .28 .89 .67 .72 .83 .89 .67 .78 .94 1.0 .20
River .94 .72 .50 .61 1.0 .78 .72 .44 .83 .56 .83 .78 .83 .67 .94 .20
Doctor .89 .56 .89 .50 .56 .61 .61 .56 .44 .67 .61 .67 .83 .78 1.0 .17
Fruit 1.0 .78 .56 .39 .78 .67 .78 .78 .61 .89 .72 .61 .83 .89 .83 .17
King .94 .72 .78 .44 .39 .50 .44 .94 1.0 .72 .72 .83 .89 .89 .94 .17
Cup .89 .78 .83 .50 .61 .39 .67 .72 .61 .67 .67 .61 .67 .94 .94 .17
Trash .78 .50 .61 .78 .61 .50 .72 .67 .67 .39 .78 .22 .94 .83 .56 .17
Black 1.0 1.0 .61 .28 .17 .61 .44 .56 .56 .44 .72 .39 .78 .94 .89 .11
Girl .94 .83 .72 .89 .89 .44 .72 .50 .50 .78 .67 .78 .78 .89 .94 .11
Mountain 1.0 .83 .94 .83 .94 .72 .28 1.0 .44 .56 .28 .56 .33 .94 .94 .11
Shirt .83 1.0 .67 .78 .83 .83 .72 .78 .67 .61 .61 .61 .89 .89 .94 .11
Smell .67 .94 .61 .78 .67 .89 .83 .50 .56 .67 .72 .89 .39 .78 1.0 .11
Sleep 1.0 .94 .94 .50 .83 .67 .56 .44 .78 .44 .39 .61 .72 .78 .89 .11
Spider .78 .78 .50 .22 .72 .56 .56 .33 .78 .67 .78 .61 .89 .72 .94 .11
Army .94 .89 .83 .78 .61 .78 .50 .50 .67 .33 .50 .50 .72 .89 1.0 .05
City 1.0 .78 1.0 .50 .28 1.0 .83 .44 .78 .78 .44 .56 .67 .61 1.0 .05
 As can be seen in FIGURE 2.1, the serial position curve shows clear recency and pri-
macy effects in recalling the studied words. However, contrary to the ﬁndings of Roe-
diger and McDermott, the overall mean proportion of participants falsely recalling the 
critical lure (M = .26) was far below the proportion who correctly recalled items in the 
mid-list position (positions 4-11; M = .64). When list length is taken into account, mean 
proportion of participants correctly recalling studied words in the mid-list position was 
.60 for the 15-item word lists (using positions 4-11) and .63 for the 12-item word lists 
(using positions 4-8), with proportions for the recalling of the critical lure being .29 for 
the 15-item word lists and .23 for the 12-item word lists. For the 16 lists that produced 
the highest false recall in the 15-item (TABLE 2.1 A) and 12-item (TABLE 2.1 B) word lists, mean 
proportions of participants recalling the critical word were .43 and .37; t (30) = 1.11, p 
= .23. Thus, in the top lists, 15-item word lists did not induce more false recall than 12-
item word lists. When only the top 16 lists (across the 12- and 15-item word lists) were 
taken into account, mean proportion of participants falsely recalling the critical lure 
word was .52. These ﬁndings are in accordance with those of Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) and Stadler et al. (1999). Overall proportion of veridical recall for the 12-item 
word lists was .68 compared to .63 for the 15-item word lists.
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TABLE 2.2B SIXTEEN 12-ITEM WORD LISTS THAT PRODUCED THE LOWEST LEVEL OF FALSE RECALL (PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO RECALLED THE 
CRITICAL LURE: T; RIGHT COLUMN). PROPORTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS WHO CORRECTLY RECALLED STUDIED ITEMS AS A FUNCTION OF SERIAL POSITION (1-12) 
ARE ALSO SHOWN.
LIST 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 T
Music .83 1.0 .78 .44 .89 .50 .89 .78 .56 .50 .83 .94 .20
Bread 1.0 .89 .61 .56 .50 .78 .72 .78 .44 .72 1.0 1.0 .17
Thief .89 .67 .50 .61 .56 .56 .33 .89 .61 .50 .94 1.0 .17
River .94 .72 .83 .94 .89 .44 .39 .50 .67 .89 .61 .83 .17
Smell 1.0 .72 .56 .89 .83 .89 .72 .72 .61 1.0 .83 .94 .17
Army .78 .44 .78 .83 .94 .44 .67 .83 .83 .61 .56 .89 .11
Girl .94 .89 .50 .83 .61 .44 .78 1.0 .78 .94 .94 .94 .05
Lion 1.0 .89 .50 .83 .78 .67 .56 .56 .67 1.0 .78 .94 .05
Fruit .83 .72 .83 .83 .44 1.0 .56 .78 .78 .50 .72 .89 .05
King .94 1.0 .78 .56 .72 .78 .61 .61 .94 .94 .89 .94 .05
Man .94 .83 .78 .78 .61 .94 .56 .67 .78 .83 .44 .89 .05
Trash .89 .72 .67 .28 .56 .44 .28 .56 .56 .72 .83 .94 .05
Doctor 1.0 .89 1.0 .61 .56 .83 .72 .72 .67 .72 1.0 .94 .00
Sleep .89 .89 .39 .72 .83 .22 .67 .67 .33 .72 1.0 .94 .00
Spider .94 .72 .83 .56 .39 .83 .61 .89 .50 .78 .94 .89 .00
Shirt 1.0 .72 .56 .83 .67 .89 .78 .83 .89 .78 .67 1.0 .00
 Veridical recall did not correlate with false recall of the critical lure word. That 
is, the Pearson product moment correlation across participants (n = 70) between the 
proportion of the list items correctly recalled and the proportion of the 16 critical 
lures falsely recalled was r = -.17 (p = .17). This is in accorcance with the modest cor-
relation (r = .20) reported by Stadler et al.(1999).
FIGURE 2.1 PROPORTION OF CORRECT RECALL AS A FUNCTION OF SERIAL POSITION FOR THE 64 WORD LISTS (OVERALL MEAN PROPORTION), THE 32 LISTS 
WITH LIST LENGTH 15, AND THE 32 LISTS WITH LIST LENGTH 12. 
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 TABLE 2.3 presents the recognition data for the 15-item and 12-item word lists. The 
lists are sorted according to the proportion of participants who falsely recognized 
the critical lure. Eighty-nine percent of the participants falsely recognized the word 
RUW (“Rough”), compared to zero percent for the word HEMD (“shirt”). The overall 
proportion of participants falsely recognizing the lures across all lists was .49: .50 for 
the 15-item word lists and .47 for the 12-item word lists; t (69) = .56, p = .58. Mean 
proportion for falsely recognizing the critical lure word in the top lists was .66 for the 
15-item word lists against .62 for the 12-item word lists; t (30) = .80, p = .42. For the 
bottom lists, these proportions were .33 for the 15-word list and .31 for the 12-word 
list; t (30) = .50, p = .62. When only the top 16 lists (across 12- and 15-item word lists) 
were taken into account, the mean proportion of recognizing the critical lure word 
was .75. The mean proportion of participants who correctly recognized items across 
all lists was .83 (M = .84 for the 12-word lists and M = .81 for the 15-word lists).
TABLE 2.3 PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO RECOGNIZED THE CRITICAL LURE AS OLD AS A FUNCTION OF LIST LENGTH, WITH LISTS RANKED FROM HIGHEST 
TO LOWEST PROPORTION.
LIST LENGTH = 15 LIST LENGTH = 12
LIST PROPORTION LIST PROPORTION
Soft .88 Rough .89
Needle .78 Cold .83
Cold .78 Needle .76
Smell .78 Thief .72
Rough .76 Soft .71
Smoke .76 Black .67
Thief .71 Smoke .67
Bread .67 Sweet .65
Sweet .67 Pen .61
Trash .67 Mountain .58
River .61 Window .55
Music .53 Foot .50
Foot .50 Army .50
Chair .50 Smell .47
Man .50 Music .44
City .50 Bread .44
Angry .44 Man .42
Car .44 Sleep .42
Fruit .44 River .41
Mountain .44 Trash .41
Sleep .41 Angry .39
Lion .39 City .39
Girl .39 Chair .39
Doctor .33 Car .33
Army .33 Cup .33
Pen .29 Girl .33
King .28 Lion .28
Window .24 Doctor .28
Cup .22 King .22
Black .22 Fruit .17
Shirt .22 Spider .11
Spider .12 Shirt .00
 As was the case for the recall data, a non-signiﬁcant correlation was found be-
tween veridical recognition and false recognition. Cumulating over the lists, the correla-
tion across participants between the proportion of the 48 list items correctly recognized 
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and the proportion of the 16 critical lure words falsely recognized was r = -.04, p = .73. The 
normative study of Stadler et al. (1999) also found a non-signiﬁcant correlation (r = .15, p 
> .05) between correct and false recognition.
 Recall and recognition of the critical lure word were highly correlated. Across all 
lists, Pearson product-moment correlation between both proportions was .74 (p < .001). 
This ﬁndings nicely corresponds with the ﬁnding of Stadler et al. (1999), who reported a 
similar correlation of r = .77. Clearly, this strong relationship is at least partly explained by 
the fact that the recall task preceded the recognition task. 
Remember/Know
For 26% of the critical lures recognized as old, participants gave a remember judgment, 
while 21% of the lures were given a know judgment. For the studied words, percentage 
of items that were given a remember judgment was 57%, while 27% received a know 
judgment. 
 When list length was taken into account, percentage of correct recognition with a 
remember judgment was 56% for the 15-item word lists and 57% for the 12-item 
word lists. Know judgments for correct recognition were 27% (15-item word lists) and 
28% (12-item word lists). For the 15-word lists, overall proportions were 30% for remem-
ber and 21% for know judgments. For recognition of the critical lure word, overall pro-
portion of remember judgments for the 12-word lists was 22%, against 21% for know 
judgments.
Discussion
The present study was initiated to develop Dutch semantically related lists and evaluate 
their effectiveness in eliciting false recall and recognition in a DRM paradigm. Ever since 
the pioneering work of Elizabeth Loftus (e.g., Loftus et al., 1978) on memory distortion, 
memory research has shifted from an emphasis on memory as an accurate reproduction 
of past experiences to memory as a reconstructive process that sometimes goes awry. 
Over the past two decades, many studies have examined how, when, and why people 
are susceptible to pseudo-memories. The DRM paradigm has contributed substantially in 
clarifying these issues (Roediger & McDermott, 2000).
 Although all lists were constructed in a similar way (i.e., based on association norms), 
it is clear that they differ in their effectiveness to produce pseudo-memories. As was found 
in several studies (e.g., Deese 1959b; Gallo & Roediger, 2002), lists vary strongly in their ten-
dency to activate the critical lure. This has to do with differences in associative strength, more 
speciﬁcally the degree to which all of the list words are related to each other and to the critical 
lure word. The current study identiﬁed a series of effective and relatively ineffective word lists 
in terms of their capacity to elicit false recall and recognition. The top 16 lists identiﬁed in our 
study yielded rates of false recall and recognition that are highly comparable to the effects 
described by Roediger and McDermott (1995) and Stadler and colleagues (1999). Apparently, 
the 16 bottom lists are those with the lowest associative strength. 
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 We further explored whether the number of associates in the study lists affected 
false recall and recognition rates. However, one should be cautious in interpreting these 
data, since the difference in the construction of the 12- and 15-item word lists might serve 
as a confounding factor. The 12-item word lists were translated from the Stadler et al. 
(1999) normative study, while the 15-item word lists were based on Dutch word associa-
tion norms. When meta-memory responses were taken into account across all lists, we 
found for both correct and false recognition that the percentage of “remember” judg-
ments exceeded “know” judgments, as was found by Roediger and McDermott (1995). 
 What are the origins of false recall and recognition in this paradigm and how can 
our normative ﬁndings best be explained? One explanation relates to Underwood’s 
(1965) implicit associative response theory. By this view, pseudo-memories in the DRM 
paradigm are a byproduct of encoding. Thus, the encoding of list items during study (e.g., 
dream, pillow, etc.) triggers the critical lure word (e.g., sleep). When on a subsequent rec-
ognition task the lure word (e.g., sleep) is given, participants may claim to recognize the 
word being part of the list, due to the earlier implicit associative response. Evidence for 
this intriguing account comes from two research lines. Firstly, false recognition increases 
linearly with the number of associated items in the study lists (e.g., Robinson & Roediger, 
1997), as was found in our study. Secondly, encoding of items grouped in lists as opposed 
to encoding randomly mixed items promotes false recognition (e.g., Mather, Henkel, & 
Johnson, 1997). However, some ﬁndings are difﬁcult to reconcile with the associative 
encoding account. For example, Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) reported a study in which 
they had participants study pictures from different categories (e.g., shoes, cars, etc.). On a 
subsequent recognition task, participants falsely recognized non-presented, but category 
related pictures. It is unlikely that participants automatically encoded these distinctive 
pictures during the study phase. Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) argued that participants 
encode a general theme of the studied items, and lures are thus falsely recognized be-
cause they relate to this general theme (see also Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998). 
 A theoretical account in line with this interpretation is the fuzzy trace theory by Reyna 
and Brainerd (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). According to this theory, a two-track process is 
involved in the encoding of events in memory, namely gist and verbatim. While the former 
represents the general theme of an event (e.g., “I know that I have eaten yesterday”), the 
latter refers to event-speciﬁc details such as perceptual details (e.g., “I can clearly remem-
ber the picture of having eaten fries yesterday”). The fussy trace theory implies that false 
recall and/or recognition are a byproduct of overreliance on gist traces. Thus, in the DRM 
paradigm, it is in principle possible to remember the themes of the studied lists (e.g., tex-
tiles, transport, etc.), without speciﬁcally recalling the verbatim (studied words) traces. It 
is retrieval of the theme that may produce recall and recognition of lures. However, this 
theory makes only sense in the context of DRM studies relying on lists that elicit high levels 
of pseudo-memories. As was found in our study, certain lists produce negligible rates of 
false recall and recognition, even though they are constructed to converge on a speciﬁc 
gist trace. Nevertheless, for reasons yet to be clariﬁed, they do not produce false recall. 
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 An alternative and more suitable explanation for our ﬁndings, which is also closely 
related to the implicit associative response theory by Underwood (1965), is the activation-
monitoring framework. This approach is based on the source monitoring framework by 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay (1993) (see Gallo & Roediger, 2002. It incorporates both 
encoding and retrieval factors. In brief, when list items are studied during the study phase 
(encoding), the critical non-presented associate (critical lure) will be activated. Pseudo-
memories reﬂect a failure in correct monitoring of the source of this activation during 
retrieval. An explanation of list length differences based on the activation-monitoring 
framework (Gallo & Roediger, 2002) would be that increasing the amount of information 
to be encoded, makes it more difﬁcult to correctly monitor this amount of information 
during retrieval. Not only is the activation of the critical lure affected by the associative 
strength and presentation rate (with high associative strength within a list increasing and 
slower presentation rates decreasing false recollections), but also by list length, such that 
an increase in list length is followed by a heightened susceptibility of critical lure activa-
tion (see Robinson & Roediger, 1997). 
 In comparing our false recall and recognition rates (26% and 49%, respectively) 
to those of other DRM studies, our rates are relatively low. In the ﬁrst experiment by 
Roediger and McDermott (1995), non-presented critical lures were recalled by 40% of the 
participants. In their second experiment, false recall of the critical lure was even higher 
(55%), while a false recognition rate of 76% was obtained. A likely explanation for these 
discrepancies in false recall rates is the variability in stimulus material to elicit recall and/ 
or recognition of the critical lure. In our experiment, we used 64 lists, compared to only 6 
lists in the ﬁrst and 24 lists in the second experiment of Roediger and McDermott (1995). 
When looking at our top 16 lists, we found false recall and recognition rates of 52% and 
75%, respectively, values that come close to those reported by Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) for their second experiment. So, stimulus material is an important determinant of 
false recall rates and, indeed, by relying on our lists that thematically circle around doctor, 
sleep, spider, and shirt, we could devise an experiment that produces false recall rates of 
zero. In a recent review, Pezdek and Lam (2007) argued that “[…] researchers often seek 
paradigms that are likely to produce the effect they desire […] The DRM task is a fail-safe 
semantic priming task that always produces memory intrusion errors” (Pezdek & Lam, 
2007). As our data show, this conclusion does not hold and it is theoretically interesting 
to ask why DRM lists sometimes produce high levels of false recall and sometimes zero 
rates of false recall. 
 The DRM paradigm is a powerful tool in studying false recall and recognition within 
normal (e.g., Watson et al., 2005) as well as clinical populations (Moritz et al., 2004). With 
the normative data from our study, the road is also open for Belgian and Dutch research-
ers to address new and intriguing issues related to pseudo-memories thereby broaden 
the theoretical and applied knowledge of DRM induced memory illusions.
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CHAPTER [3] THE RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION TASK
Psychometric properties and normative data of an executive function task 
in a mixed sample
An adjusted version of this chapter is accepted as: Peters, M.J.V., Giesbrecht, T., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. 
(accepted). The Random Number Generation task: Psychometric properties and normative data of an executive 
function task in a mixed sample. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society. 
Abstract
We investigated the psychometric properties of the Random Number Generation 
(RNG) task in four studies using a mixed sample of young adults (n = 306), mid-
dle-aged adults (n = 40), and schizophrenic patients (n = 26). Data in study 1 were 
best accounted for by a three-factor solution representing inhibition of stereotypical 
schemas (seriation), output inhibition (repetition), and monitoring of previous output 
(cycling). Modest test-retest correlations were found, with the seriation factor show-
ing acceptable stability across time (study 2). In study 3, RNG task performance was 
related to scores on concurrent neurocognitive tasks to establish construct validity. 
RNG scores correlated with healthy controls’ performance on the Stroop colour-word 
test and with schizophrenic patients’ executive dysfunctions. Schizophrenic patients 
performed poorer on the seriation factor of the RNG than healthy control participants 
(study 4). Our results indicate that the RNG task has modest to acceptable psycho-
metric properties. It primarily taps executive subfunctions (i.e., inhibition, updating, 
and monitoring), which are affected by psychopathological or neurological deﬁcits. 
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Introduction
When asked to generate random sequences of digits, people usually perform poorly 
(i.e., non-random; Wagenaar, 1972). A paradigm to measure deviations from random-
ness is the Random Number Generation (RNG; e.g., Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994) task. 
In this task, participants are asked to produce sequences of digits (e.g., 1-10) in a ran-
dom fashion. Successful RNG performance requires various higher order processes, 
including retaining task-related instructions (e.g., set size, task instructions) in mem-
ory, integrating information and holding it ‘on-line’ in working memory (central ex-
ecutive involvement; Baddeley, 1986), avoiding interference, monitoring output, and 
switching or modifying production strategy in accordance with the “on-line” concept 
of randomness (executive functioning; Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998; 
Jahanshahi, Saleem, Ho, Dirnberger, & Fuller, 2006). There is convincing evidence 
that people’s difﬁculties with RNG are neither attributable to a misconception of ran-
domness nor to short-term memory problems (Baddeley, 1998; Wagenaar, 1970). 
 Several versions of RNG have been used (e.g., Brugger, 1997). They differ in 
set size (0-9, 1-20, etc.; e.g., Towse, 1998), pacing technique (paced or unpaced; e.g., 
Joppich, Däuper, Dengler, Johannes, Rodriguez-Fornells, & Münte, 2004), response 
pace (500 msec, 1 sec, etc.; e.g., Daniels, Witt, Wolff, Jansen, & Deuschl, 2003), re-
sponse modality (oral, written, etc.; e.g., Schneider, Joppich, van der Lugt, Däuper, & 
Münte, 2004), and instructions used (implicit, explicit, biased; see for a review Brug-
ger, 1997). Despite these differences, there is broad consensus that RNG requires the 
allocation of central executive resources (e.g., Baddeley, 1986).
 Several RNG parameters have been proposed to quantify deviations from ran-
domness (e.g., Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994; 1995; Towse & Neil, 1998). One inﬂuential 
set of RNG parameters is described by Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994). It consists of the 
following 9 parameters: Coupon (Cn), Gap (Gp), Poker (Pk), Runs (Rn), Repetitions 
(Rp), Series (Sr), Variance of digits (VD), Digram repetition (DR), and Cluster ratio (Cr). 
TABLE 3.1 gives deﬁnitions of these 9 parameters. In their study, Ginsburg and Karpiuk 
(1994) had 32 undergraduates (3 men), ranging in age from 19 to 50 years (M = 30), 
produce a sequence of 100 digits consisting of the digits 0 to 9, while avoiding any 
system. RNG was paced by a metronome at 40 responses/min. Next, the authors 
performed a factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis, Varimax rotation) on the 
described RNG indices. This yielded three factors: seriation (loadings Rn = .84, DR = 
.79, and Sr = .77), cycling (loadings Gp = .86, VD = .81, Cn = .66, and Pk = .50), and 
repetition (loadings Rp = .91, Pk = .78, and Cn = .53). The three factors are interpreted 
as reﬂecting inhibition of stereotyped cognitive schemas, successful monitoring of 
previous output, and output inhibition, respectively (Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & 
Rinehart, 2002). 
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TABLE 3.1 EIGENVALUES, PERCENTAGE VARIANCE EXPLAINED, AND FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE RNG THREE-FACTOR SOLUTION FOR UNDERGRADUATE STU-
DENTS (N = 306). DEFINITIONS OF THE DIFFERENT RNG INDICES ARE ALSO SHOWN.
DEFINITION
FACTOR 1
SERIATION
FACTOR 2
CYCLING
FACTOR 3
REPETITION
Eigenvalue 2.94 2.09 1.44
% Variance 32.61 23.17 15.97
Factor loadings
Cluster Ratio Variance of 100 successive responses in the digram 
matrix, which presents the frequency with which each 
item is followed by each of the possible other items. 
In a series with n there are n² possible parings. 
.871 --- ---
Digram 
Repetition
Number of digram repetitions (e.g., 1,5,……1,5).
.850 --- ---
Series Number of consecutive digrams (e.g., 4,5). Score 
is calculated by summing up the number of these 
digrams. .803 --- ---
Runs Number of responses in successive ascending runs. 
The runs score is the variance of these numbers. .756 --- ---
Gap Measure of cycling through the set of 10 items. This 
measure is obtained by counting the number of 
gaps between two identical digits. The median of this 
number is then calculated.
--- -.849 ---
Variance of 
digits
Variance of the frequencies of each digit.
--- .831 ---
Coupon Number of responses that occur before all digits are 
emitted. Coupon score is the average for all complete 
sets. --- .419 ---
Repetition Number of identical pairs (e.g., 4,4). Score is the sum 
of the number of these identical pairs. --- --- .932
Poker Number of repetitions of the same digit within the 20 
sequences of 5 successive responses. The sum of the 
number of sequences that contain exactly two of a 
kind is the Poker score.
--- --- .903
NOTE: FACTOR LOADINGS < .40 ARE OMITTED IN THIS TABLE
 
 Although RNG has been widely used as a research tool in both healthy and 
clinical populations (Artiges et al., 2000; Brown, Soliveri, & Jahanshahi, 1998; Brug-
ger, Monsch, Salmon, & Butters, 1996; Joppich et al., 2004), psychometric data (e.g., 
factor structure, test-retest reliability, construct validity) about this tool are scarce. 
With this in mind, we conducted four studies to investigate the psychometric proper-
ties of the RNG task, focusing on factor structure of the indices proposed by Gins-
burg and Karpiuk (1994) (study 1), test-retest reliability and practice effects (study 2), 
construct validity (study 3), and criterion-related validity (study 4) in a mixed sample 
of healthy participants and clinical patients.
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Study 1
The three-factor solution proposed by Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994) was based on 
a small sample (n = 32). Since their three-factor solution is generally in accordance 
with the taxonomy of response biases in human behaviour (Rabinowitz, 1970), we 
wanted to examine whether we could replicate the Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994) solu-
tion, now using a more appropriate sample size for conducting factor analysis.
Method
Participants
A group of 306 (98 men) undergraduate psychology students participated in this 
study in return for course credits. Age ranged from 17 to 54, with a mean age of 19.90 
(SD = 4.37). None of the participants had a history of alcoholism, head injury, psy-
chiatric illness, or a neurological condition. The study was approved by the standing 
ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology, Maastricht University. Note that the 
data described in this manuscript was obtained in compliance with the regulations 
of our institution and human research was completed in accordance with the Helsinki 
Declaration (http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm). 
Materials and Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Upon arrival in the laboratory, they signed an 
informed consent form and were administered the RNG task. The RNG task was tak-
en from Towse (1998), with the exception of response pace, which was set at one digit 
per sec (indicated by a metronome adjusted to 60 bpm). This was done to increase 
comparability with other factor analytic studies (e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000) and studies relying on similar samples (e.g., Brug-
ger, Pietzsch, Weidmann, Biro, & Alon, 1995). More speciﬁcally, participants were 
asked to generate a random sequence of digits (set size: 1-10), for a period of 100 sec. 
The concept of randomness was explained using the instruction of Baddeley (1966), 
which draws an analogy of picking digits out of a hat, reading them loud, putting 
them back and then picking the next digits from the hat (see also Towse, 1998). Our 
instruction emphasized that a random sequence would not contain a preponderance 
of repetitions or adjacent number values.1 Participants were told to say out loud 
one digit with each tone. They were told that if their response rate fell behind the 
required pace, they were to listen to the rhythm and speed up their response time 
accordingly.
Data analysis
The 9 RNG indices (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994), including cluster ration (CR), were calculated 
(cf. supra). These 9 indices were subjected to Principle Component Analysis (PCA) with an or-
thogonal (varimax) as well as an oblique rotation (direct oblimin), because we did not know 
whether the extracted factors would correlate with each other (oblique) or not (orthogonal). 
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 Our selection of factors was based on both a scree plot of eigenvalues and 
Kaiser’s criterion (Kaiser, 1960) with the cut-off point set at 1. Furthermore, only fac-
tor loadings greater than .4 were considered (Stevens, 1992). Of course, theoretical 
meaningfulness of the resulting factor structure was also taken into account.
Results 
The PCA yielded three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 (see TABLE 3.1). After ro-
tation, both orthogonal and oblique rotations yielded a similar factor structure. For 
this reason, the results from the simpler orthogonal (varimax) rotation are presented 
here.2 The factor solution basically replicates that of Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994; see 
TABLE 3.1). However, in contrast to the factor solution reported by Ginsburg and Karpiuk, 
we found that Cn did not load on the repetition factor, whereas Pk exclusively con-
tributed to the repetition factor. 
Discussion
Together with those of Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994), our ﬁndings imply that the 9 
RNG indices can be grouped into three clusters. The fact that these three factors 
represent orthogonal dimensions suggests that they tap different aspects of execu-
tive functioning. Repetition consists of the rehearsal of the same digit in succession, 
with excessive repetition being related to general deﬁcits in suppression of previous 
responses (i.e., output inhibition; Bradshaw & Mattingley, 1995). Seriation can best 
be understood as an inability to suppress stereotypical schemas (e.g., Williams et 
al., 2002), like counting forward, backward, by two’s and so forth. This bias can be 
interpreted as the consequence of interference by overlearned tendencies to arrange 
numbers according to their natural order. Cycling occurs when individuals attempt 
to systematically use every possible alternative before repeating any digit, which 
means that they successfully monitor previous output (e.g., Williams et al., 2002). 
Study 2
To investigate temporal stability of the RNG indices, the task was administered twice 
to a subsample of healthy controls and schizophrenic patients with an interval of two 
weeks. We hypothesized that the RNG scale would show satisfactory stability.
Method
Participants
Participants were 59 young adults (subsample of study 1; 17 men) and 10 (8 men) of 
a total of 26 schizophrenic inpatients (see studies 3 and 4). Mean age was 19.27 years 
(SD = 1.54; Range: 18-26) for the young adult sample and 37.40 years (SD = 11.81; 
Range : 18-59) for the 10 patients. Mean educational level of the patients was 4.80 (SD 
= 1.03; anchors: 1 = lower education; 7 = university degree; Verhage, 1964). 
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 Schizophrenic patients were recruited from two psychiatric hospitals in Bel-
gium. Diagnoses were based on DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for schizophrenia 
and were made by a team of experienced psychiatrists who conducted structured 
diagnostic interviews. All patients were on ﬁxed doses of antipsychotic medication, 
either typical (88%) or atypical (12%).3 Duration of illness of the schizophrenic sample 
was 5.81 years (SD = 6.21). None of the participants had a history of severe neuro-
logical disorders, substance abuse, or (co-morbid) DSM-IV axis 1 or 2 disorder. The 
study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology, 
Maastricht University. 
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedures in session one (RNG1) was identical to those in Study 1. 
During session two (two weeks later), these samples had the RNG task administered 
for a second time (RNG2). 
Statistical analysis
Using an alpha of .05; two-tailed, test-retest stability (using Pearson and Spearman 
correlations) and practice effects (paired samples t-tests and signed rank test) were 
explored using the three RNG factors established in Study 1.4 To this end, separate 
RNG parameters were z-transformed and factor scores were computed by averaging 
across relevant RNG indices. 
Results 
Test-retest stability and practice effect data are summarized in TABLE 3.2. In the subsam-
ple of healthy controls, we found the highest test-retest correlation for the seriation 
factor. In the schizophrenic subsample (n = 10), the highest test-retest correlation 
(Spearman’s rho) was found for the RNG factor cycling. In the healthy as well as the 
schizophrenic sample, no practice effects were found for the three factor scores. 
Discussion
In healthy controls, RNG factors appear to possess at best modest test-retest stability. Mean-
while, with repeated administration, healthy controls did not show signiﬁcant practice effects 
for the three factors. For the schizophrenic sample, highest test-retest stability was found for 
the cycling factor, with no practice effects on the three factors. Test-retest correlations of the 
RNG scales in healthy controls and our clinical sample failed to reach the minimum of .80 
required for a clinical psychometric instrument (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; see also De Zubic-
aray, Smith, Chalk, & Semple, 1998; Jelicic, Henquet, Derix, & Jolles, 2001). 
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TABLE 3.2 TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY AND PRACTICE EFFECTS FOR THE THREE FACTOR SCORES (Z-SCORES) FOR CONTROLS (N = 59) AND SCHIZOPHRENIC 
PATIENTS (N = 10). MEANS (SD) ARE GIVEN FOR BOTH T1 AND T2.
GROUP RNG FACTORS TEST-RETEST M (SD) T1 M (SD) T2 t (58)
Pearson
Controls Seriation Factor .51** -.23 (.43) -.22 (.53) -.01, n.s.
n = 59 Cycling Factor .18 -.05 (.56) .02 (.48) -.62, n.s.
Repetitions Factor § .42** -.07 (.73) .05 (.97) -1.17, n.s.
Spearman Z statistic #
Schizoprenia Seriation Factor .43 1.35 (1.59) 1.25 (1.31) -.15, n.s.
n = 10 Cycling Factor .67* .28 (.40) -.11 (.34) -.18, n.s.
Repetitions Factor .20 .43 (1.50) -.31 (.42) -.38, n.s.
* = P ≤ .05
**= P < .001
§ = SPEARMAN’S RHO CORRELATIONS
# WILCOXON’S SIGNED RANK TEST; (SKEWNESS REPETITION = 2.27)
Study 3
In this study, we investigated whether the RNG factors seriation, repetition, and cy-
cling are related to speciﬁc neurocognitive tasks that are known to tap the constructs 
of inhibition of stereotypical schemas, output inhibition, and monitoring of previous 
output. Firstly, based on previous research (Brugger et al., 1995), we hypothesized 
that a failure to inhibit stereotypical schemas (i.e., heightened seriation) would posi-
tively correlate with interference susceptibility measured by the Stroop task (Stroop, 
1935). Secondly, because keeping and updating information “on-line” is important 
for accurate monitoring of previous output and output inhibition, we expected a re-
lationship between the central executive “online” component of working memory 
(backward digit span; Gerton et al., 2004), and the repetition and cycling factors. 
Finally, we hypothesized that the RNG factors would relate to more unitary executive 
function tasks in a clinical sample of schizophrenic patients (see for example Miyake 
et al., 2000). 
 A typical ﬁnding in RNG studies is that when processing demands increase 
(e.g., faster response pace), deviations from randomness also become more marked 
(e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 2006; Wagenaar, 1970). We sought to explore whether indi-
vidual differences in processing speed would show a similar linear relationship with 
deviations from randomness. Furthermore, it has been argued that RNG is not purely 
driven by a limitation in non-executive working memory span (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; 
Wagenaar, 1970). We wanted to directly test this by relating the RNG factors to indi-
vidual differences in non-executive working memory (forward digit span). 
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Method
Participants
This study involved a schizophrenic subsample (n = 26; 21 men) and a young adult 
subsample (see study 2; n = 59). Mean age for the schizophrenic subsample was 
36.35 years (SD = 12.83; Range: 18-71). Mean educational level of the schizophrenic 
subsample was 4.54 (SD = 1.39). Duration of illness (in years) was 6.52 (SD = 7.21). 
Materials and Procedure
Apart from the RNG task, the young adult subsample was administered the forward 
and backward digit span task and the Stroop colour-word test. In the schizophrenic 
subsample, the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wil-
son, Evans, Emslie, Alderman, & Burgess, 1998) and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, & Curtiss, 1993) were administered. Schizophrenic 
patients were tested during standard neuropsychological screening protocols. For 
this reason, we did not have the opportunity to also collect the digit span and Stroop 
colour-word test in this sample. For the healthy sample, WCST and BADS were not 
administered since it is known that these instruments were designed to assess ex-
ecutive functions in clinical populations. Thus, these measures usually yield ceiling 
effects in (normal) healthy controls.
Digit span. The forward and backward digit span tests (for a full description see Sti-
nissen, Willems, Coetsier, & Hulsman, 1970) were administered. Each subtest was 
stopped after two subsequent incorrect reproductions. The number of correct orally 
produced strings in each subset was used as outcome measure.
Stroop colour-word test. The classic Stroop colour-word test (Stroop, 1935) was used 
in which participants are asked to read aloud or name the stimuli on each card (col-
our names of card 1, colour of the patches on card 2, and colour of the ink on card 
3) one after the other as quickly as possible but without making errors. Correcting 
errors was allowed. However, given the infrequency of errors in this sample (mean 
error score < .50), they were discarded in further analyses. As an index of process-
ing speed, time to read card 2 (T2) was measured. Susceptibility to interference was 
calculated by subtracting T2 from the time needed to name the colours of the ink of 
card 3 (T3).
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS). This task comprises 
6 subtasks (see for a Dutch version, Krabbendam & Kalff, 1998) and is used as a 
measure of executive functioning. In the current study, total proﬁle scores (maxi-
mum = 24) were used, with higher scores indicating better executive functioning.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). A computerized version of the WCST was 
61
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION | chapter 3
administered (128 test trials; for a full description see Heaton et al., 1993). For the 
present analyses, the WCST parameters “categories completed” (0-6), and “number 
of perseverative errors” were extracted.
Results 
TABLE 3.3 shows how RNG factors relate to neurocognitive tasks. For healthy controls, 
a high colour naming speed was associated with a heightened seriation score. Also, 
a modest positive correlation was found between the RNG seriation factor and the 
Stroop-interference measure. For the repetition factor, a modest but signiﬁcant and 
negative correlation was found with forward digit span. All other correlations re-
mained non-signiﬁcant. In the schizophrenia sample, the RNG factor scores of seri-
ation and cycling correlated negatively with the BADS total score.
Discussion
In this study, we made an attempt to relate RNG factors to various neurocognitive 
tasks. Signiﬁcant correlations were primarily found for the RNG seriation factor, al-
beit that these correlations were modest. Also, with so many correlations, there is 
the risk of experimenterwise errors. On the other hand, the signiﬁcant correlations 
that did emerge are theoretically meaningful. For example, RNG seriation correlated 
positively with Stroop interference, which is not surprising when one considers that 
RNG seriation reﬂects difﬁculties in inhibiting stereotype responses. In this respect, 
our ﬁndings come close to those of Brugger et al. (1995), who reported a modest cor-
relation (r = .30) between Stroop interference and counting bias. We also found that a 
high response speed (as indexed by Stroop colour naming) is related to heightened 
seriation, which is not surprising if one assumes that failure to inhibit stereotypes is 
a trade-off of high response speed. In the schizophrenic subsample, we found sig-
niﬁcant negative correlations between RNG factors seriation and cycling and BADS 
scores, which is a ﬁrst indication that these RNG factors are related to a more unitary 
executive functioning task (see Miyake et al., 2000). The signiﬁcancies (i.e., p < .01) 
of these correlations were such that they would survive Bonferroni corrections for 
multiple testing. 
Study 4
Several studies investigating RNG deﬁcits in schizophrenia (e.g., Artiges et al., 2000; 
Horne, Evans, & Orne, 1982; Rosenberg, Weber, Crocq, Duval, & Macher, 1990; Salamé, 
Danion, Peretti, & Cuervo, 1998; Shinba, Shinozaki, Kariya, & Ebata, 2000) noted that 
schizophrenic patients have an increased tendency to produce stereotyped series and 
repetitive responses. Using the Ginsburg and Karpiuk factors (1994), we made an at-
tempt to replicate this pattern. More speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that schizophrenic 
patients would show more extreme scores on the RNG seriation and repetition fac-
tors compared to healthy control participants (young and mid-age).
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TABLE 3.3 CORRELATIONS OF RNG FACTORS WITH STROOP COLOUR NAMING, STROOP-INTERFERENCE, AND DIGIT SPAN (FORWARD AND BACKWARD) IN HEALTHY 
CONTROLS (N = 59) AND WITH BEHAVIOUR ASSESSMENT OF DYSEXECUTIVE SYNDROME (BADS) AND WISCONSIN CARD SORTING TEST (WCST) IN SCHIZOPHRENIC 
PATIENTS (N = 26).
GROUP TASK SERIATION FACTOR CYCLING FACTOR REPETITION FACTOR
Controls
n = 59 Stroop colour naming     .41** -.08 -.11
Stroop interference   .30* -.02 .07
Digit span Forward -.24 -.03   -.29*
Digit span Backward -.20 -.08 -.11
Schizophrenia
n = 26 WCST number trials -.04 -.27 -.03
WCST pers. errors   .07 .32  .26
BADS total score      -.54**     -.48** -.32
* P < .05
** P < .001
 Apart from psychopathology as possible predictor of RNG performance, there 
is the issue of aging. Van der Linden, Beerten, and Pesenti (1998) were the ﬁrst to 
ﬁnd that elderly participants (age Range: 60-70) produce on random generation tasks 
more series, but not more repetitions in comparison to young adults (age Range: 
20-30). This is probably due to the demands that such tasks place on the central ex-
ecutive capacity of the elderly participants. We were interested whether a similar 
age-related decline in seriation factor would be found in a middle-aged group (aged 
40-60) in comparison to young adults.
Method
Participants
In this study, data of studies 1-3 were collapsed and further extended with a middle-
age subsample. Thus, study 4 relied on the schizophrenic subsample (n = 26), the 
young adult subsample (n = 299; now with speciﬁc age Range: 18-25), and a middle 
aged subsample (n = 40; 17 men; Mean age= 48.14; SD = 8.56; age Range: 40-62; 
hereafter mid-age). Mean educational level of the mid-age sample was 5.03 (SD = 
1.05).
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedures were identical to those used in study 1.
Results 
One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA’s) were carried out for the separate RNG factors. Apart 
from the mean z-transformed factor scores, mean scores on the 9 different RNG indices are 
also given in TABLE 3.4 for normative purposes. The only effect was a signiﬁcant effect of group 
status on the seriation factor. 5 A Games-Howell post-hoc test revealed that schizophrenic pa-
tients scored higher than both young adult and the mid-age subsample (p < .01). 6 No signiﬁ-
cant differences emerged between the young adult and mid-age subsample (all p’s > .05). 
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TABLE 3.4 NORMATIVE DATA (MEANS AND SD) OF THE RNG FACTORS (Z-TRANSFORMED FACTOR SCORES) AND INDIVIDUAL RNG INDICES (ABSOLUTE 
SCORES) FOR YOUNG (N = 299) AND MID-AGE (N = 40) HEALTHY CONTROLS, AND THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SAMPLE (N = 26).
 YOUNG MID-AGE SCHIZOPHRENIA STATISTICS
F(2,362)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Factor
   Seriation -.08 (.69) -.03 (.71) .98 (1.73) >15.0, p <.001
   Cycling .00 (.43) .05 (.57) -.03 (.34) n.s.
   Repetition -.01 (.96) .08 (.75) -.06 (.77) n.s.
RNG indices
   Cn 20.87 (8.39) 23.21 (12.26) 18.58 (6.26) n.s.
   Gp 8.36 (.68) 8.31 (.65) 8.33 (.96) n.s.
   Pk 4.35 (3.27) 4.60 (2.73) 4.15 (3.27) n.s.
   Rn 1.17 (.50) 1.17 (.49) 2.06 (1.92) > 6.0, p <.005
   Rp 1.40 (2.83) 1.76 (2.42) 1.27 (1.80) n.s.
   Sr 33.62 (8.27) 34.17 (8.49) 41.08 (14.32) > 6.0, p <.005
   VD 7.62 (5.25) 7.31 (4.39) 8.79 (5.85) n.s.
   DR 43.37 (4.55) 43.95 (4.69) 48.96 (8.41) > 6.0, p <.005
  Cr 1.41 (.30) 1.44 (.33) 1.83 (.68) > 6.0, p <.005
Discussion
Criterion-based validity of the RNG task is most promising for the seriation factor, 
as this factor was able to differentiate between schizophrenic patients and healthy 
controls. This accords well with previous studies showing a strong counting bias in 
schizophrenic patients (e.g., Horne et al., 1982; Rosenberg et al., 1990). However, un-
like these previous studies, we found no signiﬁcant difference between schizophren-
ic patients and controls for the repetition factor. This has probably to do with the 
low frequency of repetition biases in our samples. Also contrary to our expectation, 
we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant RNG differences between the young adult and mid-age 
healthy controls. Apparently, our mid-age subsample was too young and too healthy 
to ﬁnd subtle deﬁcits in central executive resources with the RNG parameters. 
General discussion
This study replicated previous ﬁndings with the RNG task, but also added new data 
about the psychometric properties of the RNG task. More speciﬁcally, the present 
studies examined factor structure, test-retest reliability, construct validity, and crite-
rion-related validity of the Ginsburg and Karpiuk (1994) RNG indices in samples of 
young adults, mid-age adults, and schizophrenic patients. 
 Our extracted factors resemble those from previous RNG factor analyses (Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000; Towse & Neil, 1998) using Towse and Neil’s RgCalc 
program indices. In previous studies, PCA identiﬁed three uncorrelated factors, with the 
ﬁrst factor loading on randomness indices similar to our seriation factor, i.e., indices that 
are sensitive to the degree to which stereotype sequences are produced (prepotent asso-
ciates). The second factor had high loadings for indices showing clear similarities with our 
cycling factor, i.e., indices assessing the degree to which each number is produced at the 
same frequency, named “equality of response usage”. Factor three was described by Fried-
man and Miyake (2004) as repetition avoidance, which is similar to our repetition factor. 
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 The test-retest correlations of the RNG scales in healthy controls and schizo-
phrenic patients failed to reach the minimum of .80 required for a sound clinical tool 
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). When comparing the test-retest reliability of the RNG to 
more traditional, well-studied executive function tasks like the WCST (see for example 
Heaton et al., 1993), its stability is modest. However, no substantial practice effects 
were found on RNG factor scores of healthy controls and schizophrenic patients. As 
our study was one of the ﬁrst to explore test-retest stability of the RNG, future studies 
should further shed light on this issue, using larger samples of clinical patients and 
healthy participants over various periods of time (e.g., two weeks vs. six months). 
 As hypothesized, seriation was found to be related to processing speed and 
interference susceptibility in healthy controls and general executive functioning in 
the schizophrenic sample. In this clinical group, poor executive functioning was also 
associated with the cycling factor. Thus, it seems that RNG indices loading on the 
seriation and cycling factors measure deﬁcits in executive or “frontal” functions, 
possibly originating from psychopathology or neurological deﬁcits. For the repeti-
tion factor, ﬂoor effects may explain why this factor was not associated with other 
neurocognitive tasks. In both the healthy and the clinical sample, correlations be-
tween most RNG factors and various neurocognitive tasks were moderate. Future 
studies should relate Ginsburg and Karpiuk’s factors to other neurocognitive tasks 
to further establish construct validity of the RNG, or conduct latent variable analyses 
to see whether these factors relate to a more unitary executive function or represent 
independent executive subprocesses (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). 
 Over the past years, several cognitive and structural theoretical models for ex-
plaining RNG deviations from randomness have been introduced, such as the alea-
tory model (Treisman & Faulkner, 1987), the network modulation model (Jahanshahi, 
Proﬁce, Brown, Ridding, & Rothwell, 1998), the Wagenaar model (1970, 1972) and the 
Baddeley model (1986; Baddeley et al., 1998). A detailed description of these models 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, what these models share is that they 
converge on the notion that RNG is attention demanding and reﬂects the limited ca-
pacity of central executive working memory and other executive functions (but see 
Treisman & Faulkner for a signal-detection based model), needed to suppress stereo-
typed sequences (inhibition) and to track and update recent responses (monitoring 
output) (see Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley et al., 1998; Jahanshahi et al., 1998). The neural 
substrate underlying RNG is most likely a network encompassing primarily the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Jahanshahi et al., 1998). Thus, RNG is considered 
to be at the controlled end of the controlled-automatic continuum (see also Jahan-
shahi et al., 2006). The lack of practice-related improvement between the two RNG 
sessions in our second study further emphasizes the key role of controlled executive 
functioning (see also Jahanshahi et al., 2006). The data presented in this manuscript 
give some tentative evidence that at least three different subfunctions contribute to 
RNG and that not only externally induced response pace, but also individual differ-
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ences in speed of processing affect the production of random series. 
 The limitations of the current studies deserve some comment. To begin with, 
given that our samples consisted largely of undergraduate students, most of whom 
were women, our samples had speciﬁc age constraints. Similarly, our studies relied 
on a highly speciﬁc clinical sample (i.e., schizophrenic patients), and so the useful-
ness of our data for normative purposes in clinical practice is limited. The effect of 
medication on randomization in clinical samples would also deserve further atten-
tion. Another limitation of psychometric studies like the present one is the multiple 
statistical testing, which raises the probability of experimenterwise errors. Where 
possible and appropriate, we tried to reduce that probability by applying Bonferroni 
corrections. Also our studies can best be seen as a ﬁrst step and the next steps could 
involve experimental manipulation (e.g., by dual tasks) of the RNG factors and their 
correlates that we identiﬁed. In future research, it may also be worthwhile to deter-
mine discriminant validity pertaining to constructs such as global intelligence and 
simple sustained attention. A ﬁnal limitation of our studies is that we employed the 
1-sec condition of the RNG task, which differs from the 1.5 sec condition in the Gins-
burg and Karpiuk study (1994; but see Jahanshahi et al., 2006). Indeed, parametric 
research in which response pace times are systematically varied in different samples 
(i.e., healthy and clinical) might be informative. 
 Summing up, the RNG task appears to be a promising task to measure inhibi-
tion, updating, and monitoring functions in normal as well as clinical populations. 
Failures in these functions are reliably tapped by the RNG task. Although it does not 
(yet) possess the psychometric properties of a clinical tool, as a research tool the 
RNG may help us understand nonrandom response biases in healthy humans and 
even more prominent deviations from randomness in clinical populations.
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CHAPTER [4] RECOLLECTING WORDS NEVER PRESENTED PART I
Mild executive dysfunctions in undergraduate students
An adjusted version of this chapter is published as: Peters, M.J.V., Jelicic, M., Haas, N., & Merckelbach, H. (2006). 
Mild executive dysfunctions in undergraduates are related to recollecting words never presented. International 
Journal of Neurosciene, 116, 1065-1077.
Abstract
The aim of this study was to explore whether individual differences in executive 
function in undergraduate students (n = 72) contribute to false recall and recogni-
tion as obtained with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Participants 
were administered the DRM paradigm and were also given a test designed to assess 
executive function –the Random Number Generation task (RNG). A relationship was 
found between heightened series on the RNG (indicating a deﬁciency in the abil-
ity to inhibit stereotyped cognitive schemes) and false recognition of non-presented 
critical lure words in the DRM paradigm. This suggests that individual differences in 
executive function do occur in a healthy population and that the reconstructive activ-
ity inherent to memory depends in part on executive functioning. 
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Introduction
Although the power of memory is evident in various daily life experiences (e.g., 
personal history, knowledge of facts and concepts, and learning of complex skills), 
memory also has its fallible side (Kopelman, 2002; Schacter, 1999). Beginning with 
Sir Frederic Bartlett’s (1932) reconstructive viewpoint, cognitive psychologists have 
developed experimental paradigms to elicit or identify memory errors, some of 
which involve pseudo-memories (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this context, a widely used 
method is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, initially developed by 
Deese (1959b) and later modiﬁed by Roediger and McDermott (1995). As described 
in Chapter 1, the crux of the DRM paradigm is that people try to remember lists of 
related words, such as bed, nap, pillow, and snooze, all of which are associated to a 
common word, in this particular example the word sleep. The word sleep, however, 
is never presented in the study list and serves as a critical lure word at test. Following 
each list presentation, participants are asked to recall the studied items. Once all lists 
have been presented and recalled, participants are given a recognition test compris-
ing the studied words, unrelated lures, and critical lures. Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) reported that on the average, participants falsely recognized 65-80 per cent of 
the non-presented critical lure words. These ﬁndings were replicated in a standardi-
zation study by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (1999) that explored which lists are 
most susceptible to elicit false recognition. In our Chapter 2, we presented similar 
results for a Dutch sample. 
 Following the introduction of experimental paradigms to elicit memory errors, 
research focused on the identiﬁcation of individual differences in susceptibility to 
these errors. Thus, personality traits like dissociation, suggestibility, and imagery 
vividness (e.g., Candel, Merckelbach, & Kuijpers, 2003; Horselenberg, Merckelbach, 
Muris, Rassin, Sijsenaar, & Spaan, 2000; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998) were 
studied to see whether they modulate performance on tasks that elicit memory er-
rors. While research along these lines has yielded important clinical insights, its theo-
retical contribution is limited. One approach that might shed more light on this issue 
is to look for neurocognitive functions that may explain why certain traits are related 
to false recollections. Recent aging and lesion studies suggest that neuropsycho-
logical factors (in particular executive functions such as monitoring and inhibition) 
play an important role in the creation of false recollections (see Dodson & Schacter, 
2002a; Kopelman, 1999, 2002; Melo, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1999). According to Mi-
yake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, and Howerter (2000) executive functions are gener-
al-purpose control mechanisms (e.g., inhibition of prepotent responses, monitioring, 
and updating of working memory representations) that modulate the operation of 
various cognitive subprocesses and its networks are primarily related to the frontal 
lobe. Several clinical studies have shown that impaired executive functions resulting 
from prefrontal lobe damage are associated with pathologically high false recogni-
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tion rates (e.g., Curran, Schacter, Norman, & Gallucio, 1997). Likewise, functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Event Related Potential (ERP) studies rely-
ing on neurologically healthy participants indicate that recognition of critical lure 
words in the DRM paradigm is related to late onset activity of the prefrontal cortex 
(e.g., Schacter, Buckner, Koutstaal, Dale, & Rosen, 1997).
 When retrieving encoded information from memory, the prefrontal cortex is 
involved in retrieval search strategies and the evaluation of their retrieval results 
(post-retrieval monitoring; e.g., Squire & Schacter, 2002). Its primary role is evaluat-
ing and monitoring relevant information and inhibiting irrelevant information during 
retrieval. The latter function can be described as cognitive inhibition, which serves 
to discriminate target memories from similar competing memories (inhibiting irrel-
evant schema information in favor of relevant schema information; e.g., Anderson 
& Spellman, 1995). Thus, the question arises whether less effective cognitive inhi-
bition could lead to an increase in false recollections during, for example, a recall 
or recognition phase in the DRM paradigm. After all, during this phase, a decision 
must be made about whether activated retrieval information reﬂects a veridical word 
recollection or whether it is an unrelated or critical lure intrusion. Ineffective cogni-
tive inhibition might lead to liberal criterion setting (i.e., less strict in discrimination 
of relevant and irrelevant information), resulting in less reliable retrieval (i.e., more 
false recollections). 
 A task that taps cognitive inhibition is the Random Number Generation (RNG) 
task (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994). In this task, participants are asked to produce long 
sequences of the numbers 1-10 in a random fashion. Successful performance on the 
RNG requires efﬁcient control of response generation and suppression, as people 
have to suppress their natural preference for counting in series (e.g., inhibition). The 
RNG has been effective in detecting loss of cognitive ﬂexibility in a number of neu-
rological diseases (e.g., Parkinson’s disease: Brown, Soliveri, & Jahanshahi, 1998; 
autism: Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Rinehart, 2002). Several indices have been pro-
posed to measure the various departures from randomness (Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 
1994; 1995; Chapter 3 of this dissertation). A factor analysis on RNG data revealed 
three clusters of random indices: repetition, seriation, and cycling related to output 
inhibition, inhibition of stereotyped cognitive schemes, and successful monitoring of 
previous output, respectively (Williams et al., 2002; see also Chapter 3). Nested un-
der these superordinate clusters are a number of reliable RNG indices (e.g., Giesbre-
cht, Merckelbach, Geraerts, & Smeets, 2004; Williams et al., 2002; Chapter 3), notably 
repetition and poker (factor repetition), series (factor seriation), and variance of digits 
(factor cycling). 
 As mentioned earlier, neuropsychological determinants of false recollections 
have only been studied in special populations, i.e., in patients with brain injury (Melo 
et al., 1999), older people (Lödvén, 2003), and children (Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, 
Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver, 2002). The link between executive functioning and sus-
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ceptibility to false recollections within a healthy group (e.g., undergraduate students) 
has received little attention. It is not too farfetched to assume that there are individual 
variations in executive functions in such samples. The aim of the current study was 
to explore whether executive function in undergraduates is linked to false recall and 
recognition as measured with the DRM paradigm. Because monitoring of memory 
retrieval does involve inhibition of competing schemata, we expected that individual 
differences in inhibition of stereotyped cognitive schemata assessed with the RNG 
would be related to false recollections in the DRM paradigm. 
Method
Participants
Participants were 72 undergraduate psychology students (18 men) who agreed to 
take part in the study in return for course credits. Mean age of the participants was 
19.10 years (SD = 2.52; Range: 18-33). 
 The data obtained in this study partly overlap with another study investigating 
the Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (see Chapter 2). Nev-
ertheless, we report the data of both studies separately because they have distinct 
research goals and draw upon a different body of literature.
Materials and Procedure
Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm. Participants were told that we were interested 
in memory functioning. They were administered a Dutch version of the Deese/ Roe-
diger-McDermott paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). We created 
64 word lists, of which 32 were translated from Stadler and colleagues (1999), while 
the other 32 were based on Dutch word association norms (Lauteslager, Schaap, & 
Schievels, 1986; Van Loon – Vervoorn, & van Bekkum, 1991; van der Made-van Bek-
kum, 1973). Each list consisted of 15 words semantically related to a non-presented 
critical lure. The 64 lists were randomly divided into 4 blocks of 16 lists. Each par-
ticipant was presented with one of the 4 blocks (16 lists per participant), with the 4 
blocks counterbalanced across participants. The lists were read out loudly one after 
the other. The words (spoken by a female voice) were presented for 1 sec with an 
inter-stimulus interval of 1 sec. After each list presentation, participants were given 
2 min to write down all the words they could remember. Participants were given a 
5 min ﬁller (arithmetic) task after the recall of the 16th list. They were then given an 
old-new recognition task consisting of 16 critical lures of the studied lists completely 
intermixed with 48 study words (the 1st, 8th and 10th word of each studied list) and 32 
unrelated lures taken from the list of the three non-presented blocks. Only the words 
that were unrelated to the words in the studied lists were used as unrelated lures. For 
each of these 96 words, participants had to indicate whether the word was old (i.e., 
had appeared on one of the 16 lists) or new.
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Random Number Generation. The DRM task was followed by the RNG task. In this 
task, participants were asked to generate random sequences of digits (numbers be-
tween 1 and 10, with 1 and 10 included), for a period of 100 sec, one digit each sec 
(rhythm was indicated by a metronome adjusted to 60 bpm). Participants were in-
structed to synchronize their responses with the pacing metronome tones, and to say 
out loud a number with each tone. The concept of randomness was explained using 
the analogy of picking numbers out of a hat. To establish an attention set for the rela-
tive timing of the pacing tones, participants were instructed to just listen to and not 
respond to the ﬁrst few tones. Scoring of RNG was based on parameters described 
by Ginsbrug and Karpiuk (1994) and Williams et al. (2002). We focused on 4 indices: 
Repetition and poker (repetition factor), series (seriation factor), and variance of dig-
its (cycling factor; see also Chapter 3).
Statistical analyses
Before collapsing the 64 word lists, data of the 32 translated word lists from Stadler 
and colleagues (1999) and the 32 word lists based on Dutch word association norms 
(Lauteslager et al., 1986; Van Loon – Vervoorn, & van Bekkum, 1991; van der Made-
van Bekkum, 1973) were compared as to their efﬁcacy to elicit studied words and 
critical lure words. To this end, independent samples t-tests were used. Statistical 
analyses were carried out with alpha = .05.
 Firstly, associations between RNG and DRM indices (i.e., recall and recognition 
of study words and critical lures) were explored using Pearson product-moment cor-
relation coefﬁcients. Next, using independent samples t-tests, we compared true and 
false recall and recognition in participants scoring either low or high on RNG (i.e., 
those with scores below the 25th or above the 75th percentile).
Results
In comparing the 32 word lists of Stadler and colleagues to the 32 word lists based 
on Dutch word association norms, no signiﬁcant differences were found in their ca-
pacity to elicit studied words or critical lure words (all p’ s > .05; two-tailed). In this 
respect, collapsing the two types of word lists was appropriate.
 Mean proportion scores on recall and recognition of study words and critical 
lures in the DRM paradigm are presented in TABLE 4.1. Two participants were excluded 
from further data analyses because of prior knowledge of the DRM procedure. The 
overall probability of recalling and recognizing a critical lure was .26 and .49, respec-
tively. Mean values for repetition, poker, series and digit variance were 1.80 (SD = 
2.97), 4.61 (SD = 3.70), 33.67 (SD = 7.12), and 7.80 (SD = 5.38), respectively.
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TABLE 4.1 MEAN PROPORTION SCORES OF AN UNDERGRADUATE SAMPLE (N = 70) FOR DRM RECALL OF STUDIED WORDS AND CRITICAL LURE WORDS, DRM 
RECOGNITION OF STUDIED WORDS AND CRITICAL LURE WORDS.
DRM M SD  RANGE
Recall studied words .64 .07 .48-.77
Recognition studied words .83 .10 .40-1.00
Recall critical lure .26 .18 .00-.75
Recognition critical lure .49 .27 .00-.94
 TABLE 4.2 presents Pearson correlations between recall and recognition of critical 
lures on the one, and repetition, series, variance of digits, and poker, on the other 
hand. No signiﬁcant correlations were found between either recall or recognition of 
the study words and the 4 different RNG parameters (all p’s > .05; two-tailed). Rec-
ognition of critical lures was signiﬁcantly correlated with series scores (r = .36, p < 
.01).1 Similarly, there was a borderline signiﬁcant correlation between recall of criti-
cal lures and series (r = .23, p = .08; two-tailed).
 When extreme groups were formed based on RNG indices (i.e., performance 
below the 25th or above the 75th percentile), no differences between these groups 
emerged in terms of recall or recognition of study words or critical lures (all p’s > .05; 
two tailed). There was one interesting exception: Those scoring low on series also 
had low recognition rates of critical lures compared to those scoring high on series, 
mean recognition rates being .37 (SD = .27) and .63 (SD = .24); t (36) = 3.15, p < .01). 
Likewise, participants scoring low on series had lower recall rates of critical lures 
relative to those scoring high on series, means being .19 (SD = .16) and .28 (SD = .16); 
t(36) = 1.70, p < .09.
TABLE 4.2 PEARSON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DRM RECALL AND RECOGNITION OF CRITICAL LURE WORDS AND RNG INDICES (REPETITION, SERIES, VARIANCE 
OF DIGITS, AND POKER) IN AN UNDERGRADUATE SAMPLE (N = 70). ONLY RELEVANT CORRELATIONS ARE SHOWN.
DRM RECALL DRM RECOGNITION
DRM Recall _____
DRM Recognition .68* _____
Repetition .11 .21
Series .23 .36*
Variance of digits .12 .24
Poker .10 .22
NOTES: * P ≤ .01 
Discussion
Our results show that even in a healthy sample of undergraduate students, individ-
ual differences in executive functions are related to experimentally induced pseudo-
memories. In the extreme groups of low and high RNG series, the raised false recall 
and recognition rates of those producing a relatively high number of series were not 
accompanied by heightened levels of true recall or recognition. Thus, our ﬁndings 
can not be attributed to a better learning effect in the high series group. The associa-
tion between RNG series and false recognition in the DRM paradigm indicates that 
reduced inhibition of stereotyped cognitive schemata is related to an enhanced sus-
ceptibility to false recollections. Given that undergraduates generally perform well 
on executive tasks, it seems likely that our participants with high RNG series scores 
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exhibited only subtle executive dysfunction. This might explain why we failed to ﬁnd 
other reliable associations between RNG parameters and false recollections in the 
DRM paradigm. Meanwhile, our ﬁndings are well in line with those of Alexander et 
al. (2002), Lödvén (2003), and Melo et al. (1999), who found associations between 
executive dysfunctions and false recollections in special samples. To our knowledge, 
the present study was the ﬁrst to explore whether individual differences in executive 
functions within a normal undergraduate sample are related to false recollection. 
 According to the theoretical framework proposed by Dodson and Schacter 
(2002a), the prefrontal cortex is involved in updating, suppression (i.e., inhibition), 
and monitoring of learned information. Their Constructive Memory Framework 
(CMF) proposes that false recollections are modulated by neuropsychological factors 
operating primarily during the encoding or retrieval stages of memory. There are two 
problems that have to be solved in order for the memory system to reconstruct accu-
rate memories of past events. Firstly, during encoding, features must be connected 
together to form a “coherent” representation (i.e., the feature binding process). It is 
also necessary to keep the bound representations separate from each other (pattern 
separation). During retrieval, the memory system must also solve binding and sepa-
ration problems in order to reconstruct relatively accurate memories of past events. 
Secondly, once memory representations have been retrieved, the memory system 
faces another problem, referred to by Johnson (1992) as the source monitoring prob-
lem. This phase of post-retrieval monitoring involves criterion-setting: Determining 
whether the memory representation is a veridical recollection of an experienced 
event or a fantasy. The CMF emphasizes that the prefrontal cortex sustains both re-
trieval focus and criterion-setting. Plainly, both processes involve cognitive inhibition 
of schema-related material. In our study, this aspect was tapped by a reduced ability 
to suppress stereotypical series of digits (e.g., 2, 3, 4). Such a lack of cognitive inhibi-
tion may lead to liberal criterion setting and an inability to suppress related informa-
tion, with the potential consequence of source misattributions. In the DRM paradigm, 
poor cognitive inhibition may underlie the acceptance of semantically associated 
critical lure words and subsequent pseudo-memories.
 Our failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between the DRM indices and the repeti-
tion and cycling indices of RNG might have to do with a reduced tendency of the normal 
group to engage in cycling and repetition (e.g., Williams et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1998). 
Meanwhile, a study by Brown and colleagues demonstrated that, like Parkinson patients, 
their normal control group showed biases in RNG, including a strong counting tendency 
(e.g., series) and repetition avoidance. Generation of random numbers requires the produc-
tion of a novel sequence of items, as well as the inhibition of previous responses, schemas, 
or strategies, such as counting. Excessive repetition may indicate an inability to suppress 
previous responses effectively. This process of output inhibition involves suppressing the 
mental representation or initiation of a previous motor response. In contrast, excessive 
series may suggest a deﬁciency in the ability to inhibit a stereotyped schema (e.g., 1, 2, 3). 
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 In comparing the false recall and recognition rates (26% and 49%, respectively) 
that we obtained to those obtained in other studies using the DRM paradigm, our 
rates appear to be relatively low. In the ﬁrst experiment by Roediger and McDermott 
(1995), the non-presented associates were recalled 40% of the time. In their second 
experiment, false recall and recognition of the critical item were even higher (55% 
and 76%, respectively). A possible explanation for this discrepancy could be a greater 
variance of our lists in probability to elicit the critical lure. In our experiment, we used 
64 lists, comparing to 6 lists in the ﬁrst and 24 lists in the second experiment of Roe-
diger and McDermott (1995). When looking at our lists with the highest probability 
of eliciting the critical lure word, mean probabilities for recall and recognition of the 
critical lure word were 52% and 75%, respectively.
 Although the current study highlights interesting questions for future re-
search, some limitations need to be discussed. In our study, the inhibition function 
was measured using the RNG task. One could argue that as a measure of inhibition, 
this task is of restricted value. Past studies, however, have demonstrated that poor 
performance on RNG is not attributable to a misconception of randomness (Badde-
ley, 1998; Wagenaar, 1970), or short term memory problems. Rather, using dual-task 
paradigms, it has been shown that this task taps the ability to inhibit prepotent re-
sponses and cognitive schemas (Towse & Valentine, 1997; Williams et al., 2002). More 
speciﬁcally, Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, and Duncan (1998) pointed out that inhibition 
and switching of retrieval plans are the crucial components of RNG. The RNG has 
been effective in detecting loss of cognitive ﬂexibility in a number of neurological 
(e.g., Parkinson’s disease: Brown et al.,1998; autism: Williams et al., 2002; dementia 
of the Alzheimer type: Brugger, Monsch, Salmon, & Butters, 1996), psychiatric popu-
lations (e.g., depression: Watkins & Brown, 2002; schizophrenia: Artiges et al., 2000), 
and normal populations (Joppich, Däuper, Dengler, Johannes, Rodriguez-Fornells, & 
Münte, 2004; Van der Linden, Beerten, & Pesenti, 1998). The RNG therefore appears 
to be an appropriate measure of the inhibition function. 
 Another obvious limitation of the current study is its correlation approach. 
While our results are consistent with the notion that mild inhibitory deﬁcits linked 
to frontal lobe functioning contribute to false recollections, we cannot exclude other 
causal interpretations. Clearly, this causal issue needs to be addressed by further 
studies. One way to do this is to expose healthy participants who vary in their execu-
tive efﬁciency to a dual task and to examine how increased cognitive load affects 
their susceptibility to memory errors. Another point that warrants further study is 
how executive efﬁciency is related to individual difference measures that are known 
to be involved in false recollections (e.g., dissociation, fantasy proneness; Winograd 
et al., 1998).
 To sum up, a bulk of research has shown that a variety of false recollection 
phenomena can be observed in both patients who have suffered frontal lobe dam-
age (see for reviews Kopelman, 1999; Parkin, 1997) and older adults (Kensinger & 
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Schacter, 1999). In this study, we found mild executive dysfunction in undergradu-
ates to be related to remembering words that were never presented. The current 
ﬁndings demonstrate that it might be worthwhile to look at how neuropsychologi-
cal factors may contribute to healthy people’s false recollections. We used the DRM 
paradigm in undergraduate students, but future research may focus on generalizing 
these ﬁndings to other experimental paradigms (e.g., imagination inﬂation; Garry 
et al., 1996) and clinical populations with a speciﬁc deﬁcit in inhibitory aspect of 
executive functioning (e.g., schizophrenia, Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder). 
Research on this ﬁeld is important because it might provide a starting point for new 
insights to the factors contributing to the fallibility of our memory, using 
performances on neuropsychological tests.

[5]
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CHAPTER [5] RECOLLECTING WORDS NEVER PRESENTED PART II
Poor working memory capacity in undergraduate students
An adjusted version of this chapter is published as: Peters, M.J.V., Jelicic, M., Verbeek, H., & Merckelbach, H. (2007). 
Poor working memory predicts false memories. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 19, 213-232.
Abstract
Two studies investigated whether individual differences in simple span verbal work-
ing memory and complex working memory capacity are related to memory accu-
racy and susceptibility to pseudo-memory development. In study 1, undergraduate 
students (n = 60) were given two simple span working memory tests: Forward and 
backward digit span. They also underwent a memory task that is known to elicit pseu-
do-memories of non-presented words, the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) para-
digm. Poor simple span working memory (as reﬂected by suboptimal backward digit 
span scores) was related to elevated levels of false recognition. Study 2 replicated 
this ﬁnding in that suboptimal backward digit span performance of undergraduates 
(n = 65) was found to be predictive of false recognition. However, complex working 
memory capacity (Operation span) was not related to false recognition. This pattern 
suggests that even in a homogenous sample of undergraduates, poor working mem-
ory is associated with the susceptibility to recollect words never presented. 
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Introduction
During memory retrieval, various encoded pieces of the memory trace need to be 
integrated into a reconstructive recollection of an event. This memory binding pro-
cess has been the object of much research and has been ascribed to a neural net-
work encompassing posterior brain regions, the hippocampus, and the prefrontal 
cortex (e.g., Kroll, Knight, Metcalfe, Wolf, & Tulving, 1996; Moscovitch, 2000; see also 
Chapter 1). Apart from their role in accurate retrieval, various researchers have ar-
gued that neurocognitive functions related to this neural network (working memory, 
monitoring, executive control) are also involved in the creation of distortions (e.g., 
remembering a blue car, when the colour of the car was red) and pseudo-memories 
(remembering events that never took place; e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002a; Gon-
salves & Paller, 2002; Kopelman 1999, 2002; Marsch, Balota, & Roediger, 2005; Melo, 
Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1999; Parkin, 1997; Schacter, 1999; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). 
One important antecedent of pseudo-memories is a breakdown in what has been 
termed source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Source monitor-
ing refers to the mechanism that allows people to determine the source of memory 
information. It is a mechanism that serves as a screening and controlling device for 
memory at retrieval, in which distinctive perceptual information plays an important 
role in labelling events as veridical. 
 The crux of working memory is the maintenance and manipulation of informa-
tion, both during memory storage and retrieval from long-term store (e.g., Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974; D’Esposito & Postle, 2002; Kane & Engle, 2002). Working memory is 
closely connected to executive functioning and the prefrontal cortex (e.g., D’Esposito 
& Postle, 2002). There are also good reasons to believe that working memory sub-
serves source monitoring (e.g., Hedden & Park, 2003; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & 
Greene, 2004; Moscovitch, 2000; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004). Studies that support this 
line of reasoning were carried out by Mitchell and colleagues (2004) and Reinitz and 
Hannigan (2004). Mitchell et al. (2004) conducted a study to identify the neural cor-
relates related to maintaining memory representations active in working memory 
for subsequent source memory evaluations. In three functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) experiments, a memory paradigm was used in which participants 
were exposed to series of four items presented sequentially for 1 sec each. To cre-
ate source conditions, two of the items were presented as words, two were black-
and-white line object drawings (format condition), and each of these item types was 
presented on the left or the right side of the screen (location condition). To maximize 
working memory involvement, participants were probed immediately after each trial 
(consisting of four items) to make source and familiarity judgments. The researchers 
found that this working memory paradigm yielded greater activation in the lateral 
prefrontal cortex for source memory judgments compared to familiarity judgments. 
Further support for the link between working memory and source monitoring comes 
from a study by Reinitz and Hanningan (2004). In one of their three experiments, the 
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effect of working memory overload (by dividing attention during a digit monitor-
ing task) on subsequent pseudo-memory development for compound words was 
investigated. The authors found that when participants had to monitor speciﬁc digits 
(total number of even digits) that were simultaneously presented with compound 
words (e.g., toothpaste, headache), they more often tended to later falsely remember 
never presented compound words (e.g., toothache), thus misattributing these sepa-
rate words to their wrong source. Thus, it can be hypothesized that through increased 
susceptibility to source monitoring errors, poor working memory (either tested direct 
by working memory tasks or indirect by using dual-tasks) may lead to an increase in 
pseudo-memories. 
 One important mechanism to distinguish veridical from pseudo-memory 
traces is the amount of perceptual detail, with veridical memory traces exhibiting 
more of this distinctive information (Johnson et al., 1993). This issue is further sup-
ported by recent neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies that suggest that 
sensory activation is greater for true compared to false recognition (see for a review 
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). When making source monitoring judgments, these per-
ceptual details serve as landmarks in evaluating a memory trace as trustworthy, i.e., 
veridical. A source monitoring problem may arise when during encoding of speciﬁc 
event information, this perceptually based information supporting source monitor-
ing at time of retrieval is poorly encoded. This can happen when working memory 
capacity is overloaded, either indirectly, when situational circumstances put increas-
ing demands on working memory (i.e., remembering telephone number and simul-
taneously your shopping list of tonight; dual tasks) or directly when working memory 
resources are poor for neurobiological reasons. Thus, reduced, overloaded or sub-
optimal working memory processing would lead to poor encoding of perceptually 
based information, resulting in a lower level of active maintenance of information 
(e.g., source information). This could undermine performance on cognitive challeng-
ing tasks that require such active maintenance. After all, encoding and retrieval of 
an accurate memory representation requires information about the source of the 
representation (Johnson et al., 1993; see the activation-monitoring framework for a 
comparable line of reasoning; McDermott & Watson, 2001), in order to make memory 
attributions (i.e., “Does this memory representation originate from an event or from 
a dream?”). 
 The connection between deﬁcits in speciﬁc neurocognitive functions (work-
ing memory, executive functions) and pseudo-memories has been primarily studied 
in neurological patients (e.g., Melo et al., 1999), older people (Lödvén, 2003), and 
children (Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver, 2002; Ruffman, 
Rustin, Garnham, & Parkin, 2001). Yet, it is not unreasonable to assume that even 
in healthy undergraduate samples, there is individual variation in the efﬁcacy of 
neurocognitive functions that might affect their susceptibility to pseudo-memories. 
Surprisingly, only a few studies explored individual differences in speciﬁc neuro-
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cognitive functions sustained by the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus that may 
contribute to pseudo-memory development. In an earlier study (see Chapter 4), we 
explored whether mild executive dysfunctions (closely related to working memory) 
in undergraduate students are linked to false recall and recognition of semantical-
ly related words. To this end, we employed the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM: 
Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm. Apart from this paradigm, 
participants in our study were given a test designed to assess executive function 
–the Random Number Generation task (RNG; see Chapter 3). In the study described 
in Chapter 4, we found that participants with high series scores on the RNG exhibited 
higher false recognition rates of the DRM critical lures than those with low series 
scores. High series scores reﬂect a lack of inhibition of stereotyped cognitive sche-
mata and, thus, subtle executive dysfunctions.
 A recent study by Watson, Bunting, Poole, and Conway (2005) was the ﬁrst to 
investigate whether individual differences in complex span working memory capac-
ity (WMC) are related to pseudo-memories for non-presented critical lure words in 
the DRM paradigm. In two experiments, undergraduate participants were initially 
screened with the Operation span task (O-span task; La Pointe & Engle, 1990). In this 
task, participants are required to read aloud a math problem, followed by a to-be-
remembered word, e.g., “Is (8/4) + 5 = 7? SEA.” After several trials of these equation-
word pairs, participants are prompted to recall all of the words presented during the 
trials in the correct order. Operation span is deﬁned as the sum of the correct recalled 
words across all individual trials. Based on a screening with the O-span task, 50 high 
and 50 low O-span participants were selected from the upper and lower quartiles of 
span score distribution. These participants were subjected to the DRM paradigm. Half 
of the high and low span participants received prior to encoding an explicit warning 
instruction about the potential of the DRM paradigm to elicit pseudo-memories and 
were encouraged to avoid recalling the critical lure word for each of the associative 
lists. The remaining half of high and low span participants were not given any warn-
ing (experiment 1). The results of this experiment showed that undergraduates with 
low WMC (low O-span) more often falsely recalled critical lure words than individuals 
with high WMC (high O-span), but only so when participants had received a warning 
about the DRM paradigm. These ﬁndings suggest that individual differences in WMC 
inﬂuence encoding of distinctive information, thereby affecting later post-retrieval 
monitoring and the ability to actively maintain task goals. In case of poor working 
memory capabilities, this may result in an enhanced susceptibility to pseudo-memo-
ries in young adults. 
 Inspired by Watson and colleagues (2005), we conducted two studies to further 
disentangle the relationship between source monitoring, individual differences in 
working memory, and pseudo-memory development in a healthy student sample. 
Given that (a) source monitoring is important for accurate performance on the DRM 
and (b) working memory plays an important role in encoding and retrieving distinc-
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tive information necessary for accurate post-retrieval monitoring, one would expect 
higher levels of pseudo-memories when working memory performance is poor. How-
ever, in contrast to Watson and colleagues (2005) who only used a complex working 
memory capacity task, we wanted to ﬁnd out if this line of reasoning also holds for 
different measures (i.e., aspects) of working memory (simple vs. complex working 
memory capacity). Therefore, study 1 examined whether individual differences in 
simple span verbal working memory are linked to pseudo-memory development as 
measured by the DRM paradigm. The study by Watson and colleagues (2005) did not 
combine recall and recognition memory tasks, and therefore we decided to include 
both DRM parameters in study 1. The forward and backward digit span subtasks of 
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1997; for a Dutch translation, see 
Stinissen, Willems, Coetsier, & Hulsman, 1970) are widely used measures of simple 
span verbal memory in neuropsychological research and clinical practice (see Iver-
son & Tulsky, 2003 for normative data). Both tasks require immediate, serial recall 
of a list of digits that are read out loud and, typically, the length of the digit string is 
increased until the participant consistently fails. The two tasks tap different aspects 
of working memory (Baddeley, 1996). Of most interest in this study is the backward 
digit span task, because this task is believed to rely to a large extent on the central 
executive component of Baddeley’s model (Gerton et al., 2004). The central executive 
serves as a controlling device for the two slave systems: phonological loop (forward 
digit span) and visuo-spatial sketchpad. If working memory (encoding of distinctive 
features) subserves source monitoring, we expect that even in a relatively homoge-
neous sample of undergraduates, performance on the simple span verbal working 
memory test (backward digit span) would be related to false recall and recognition 
in the DRM paradigm. We anticipated that forward digit span (non-executive) perfor-
mance would not or to a lesser degree be associated with false recollections in this 
paradigm. 
Study 1
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 60 psychology undergraduate students (43 women) at 
Maastricht University. They received course credits in return for participation. Mean 
age of the participants was 19.6 year (SD = 2.86; Range: 18-38). Exclusion criteria 
were psychiatric disorders, brain injury, or language difﬁculties. 
Procedure and materials
The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology of Maastricht Uni-
versity. Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. Upon arrival, participants were asked 
to sign an informed consent form. Instructions, manipulations, and stimulus materials were given on paper.
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Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm. Participants were subjected to a Dutch ver-
sion of the Deese/ Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm used in the current study consisted of 10 
selected word lists drawn from a Dutch normative study (see Chapter 2). Each list 
consisted of 15 words semantically related to a non-presented critical lure word. 
The lists were read aloud one after the other. The words (spoken by a female voice) 
were presented for 1 sec with an inter-stimulus interval of 1 sec. Unlike the study 
by Watson and colleagues (2005), participants did not receive a warning manipula-
tion. After each list presentation, participants were given 2 min to write down all 
the words they could remember. The completion of the 10 lists was followed by the 
digit span task (see below). Participants were then given an old-new recognition task 
consisting of 10 critical lures of the studied lists completely intermixed with 30 study 
words (the 1st, 8th and 10th word of each studied list) and 20 unrelated lures taken from 
non-presented lists. Only words unrelated to the words in the studied lists served as 
unrelated lures. For each of these 60 words, participants had to indicate whether the 
word was old (i.e., had appeared on one of the 10 lists) or new.
Forward and backward digit span. Following the DRM recall task, participants were 
given the digit span test to assess verbal working memory. It was taken from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; for a Dutch translation see Stinissen et al., 
1970). The test consisted of two subtests: forward and backward digit span. Strings 
of digits were read aloud (e.g., 2 4 7), each string increasing in length (from 2 digits 
to 8 digits). After every string, the participant was asked to repeat the string. The test 
consisted of 12 strings in the normal front to back order (forward) and 12 strings in 
the back to front order (backward). Each subtest (forward and backward) was stopped 
when a participant incorrectly reproduced two successive strings. The number of cor-
rectly reproduced strings was used as a measure of verbal working memory. 
Data analysis
Data analyses were carried out with alpha = .05; two-tailed. The following six DRM in-
dices were derived: mean proportion accurate recall, false recall of critical lure words, 
false recall of unrelated lures, mean proportion of correctly recognized old words, 
recognition of critical lure words, and recognition of unrelated lures. Because we 
were primarily interested in pseudo-memories, we focused on recall and recognition 
of critical lure words. First, Pearson correlations were calculated between forward 
and backward digit span and the six DRM parameters. Multiple regression analy-
ses (Enter method) were conducted with forward and backward digit span scores as 
independent measures and mean proportion recall and recognition of critical lure 
words as dependent variables. 
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Results and discussion
TABLE 5.1 summarizes data of the six DRM parameters. The overall probability that par-
ticipants recalled the critical lure was .47 (SD = .19), while that for recognizing the 
critical lure was .87 (SD = .15). The mean proportion score for recognizing unrelated 
lures as old was .03 (SD = .04).
TABLE 5.1 MEAN PROPORTION SCORES (INCLUDING SD AND RANGE) FOR RECALL OF STUDIED AND CRITICAL LURE WORDS, AND UNRELATED LURES. MEAN 
PROPORTION SCORES FOR RECOGNITION OF STUDIED WORDS, CRITICAL LURE WORDS, AND UNRELATED WORDS ARE ALSO SHOWN. FORWARD AND BACKWARD 
DIGIT SPAN PERFORMANCES ARE EXPRESSED AS MEAN OVERALL SCORES.
ITEM TYPE M SD RANGE
Recall
Recall studied words .61 .07 .39
Recall critical lures .47 .19 .80
Recall unrelated lures* .03 .02 .07
Recognition
Recognition studied words .79 .11 .47
Recognition critical lures .87 .15 .60
Recognition unrelated lures .03 .04 .20
Digit Span
Forward digit span 6.10 1.21 4.00
Backward digit span 4.65 1.05 5.00
*EXPRESSED AS PROPORTION OF ALL RECALLED WORDS THAT WERE UNRELATED LURES [RECALL UNRELATED LURES DIVIDED BY TOTAL RECALL 
SCORE (SUM RECALL STUDIED WORDS, CRITICAL LURES AND UNRELATED LURES)].
 Forward and backward digit span performance scores were not signiﬁcantly 
related to each other (r = .22, p > .05), showing that they tap more or less independent 
aspects of working memory. Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated 
between the six DRM indices and forward and backward digit span scores. No sig-
niﬁcant correlations were found between recall and recognition of the studied words 
on the one, and the digit span task, on the other hand (recall hits: rforward = .11, p = .40; 
rbackward = .19, p = .15; recognition hits: rforward = .09, p = .52; rbackward = .16, p = .21). Neither 
were there signiﬁcant correlations between recall/ recognition of unrelated lures and 
the two digit span parameters (recall unrelated lures: rforward = .06, p = .62; rbackward = -.07, 
p = .62; recognition unrelated lures: rforward = .05, p = .70; rbackward = -.05, p = .69). How-
ever, there was a borderline signiﬁcant correlation between recall of critical lures and 
backward digit span (r = -.23, p = .08; two-tailed). Similarly, proportion recognition of 
critical lures was signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with backward digit span (r = 
-.40, p < .01).1 Correlations between recall/ recognition of the critical lure and forward 
digit span remained non-signiﬁcant (respectively r = -.05, p > .05 and r = -.15, p > 
.05).
 Two multiple linear regression analyses were carried out to determine how 
much variance in recall and recognition of critical lures was explained by forward 
and backward digit span scores. The results are shown in TABLE 5.2. Both forward and 
backward digit span were entered in the model (Enter method) to explain the vari-
ance in recall of the critical lure word. Neither forward nor backward digit span con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to the model. A second regression model to explain the vari-
ance in recognition of critical lures by entering both forward and backward digit span 
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showed that only backward digit span accounted signiﬁcantly for the tendency to 
falsely recognize the critical lure word as old. In this model, 16% of the variance was 
explained (R² = .16). 
TABLE 5.2 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING FALSE RECALL AND FALSE RECOGNITION OF CRITICAL LURE WORDS (N = 60)
VARIABLE B SE B ß t
Recall
Forward digit span 3.27 .02 .00 .00
Backward digit span -.04 .02 -.23 -1.70
Recognition
Forward digit span -.01 .02 -.06 -.51
Backward digit span -.06 .02 -.39 -3.10*
NOTE. R² = .051 FOR RECALL; R² = .16 FOR RECOGNITION. 
B = UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; SE B = STANDARD ERROR UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; ß = STANDARD-
IZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; T = T-VALUE
* P < .01
 The main results of our study can be summarized as follows. Backward digit 
span was signiﬁcantly and negatively related to the recognition of critical lures. That 
is, poor backward digit span performance was associated with heightened levels of 
false recognition. A similar pattern was evident for false recall of critical lures, but 
this effect reached only borderline signiﬁcance. Thus, compared to participants with 
relatively high backward digit span scores, those with relatively low backward digit 
span scores made more critical lure intrusion errors, indicating a higher susceptibil-
ity to pseudo-memories (as measured by the DRM paradigm). In more general terms, 
then, our results show that even in a healthy sample of undergraduate students, 
individual differences in backward simple span working memory predict the occur-
rence of pseudo-memories. This supports the hypothesis that when working memory 
processing is suboptimal, it will affect encoding and later retrieval of distinctive infor-
mation, such that source monitoring errors occur. 
 Given that undergraduates generally perform well on simple span verbal work-
ing memory tasks, lowered scores on the digit span tests in the present study should 
not be considered indicative of neuropsychological impairments. Mean scores on 
the forward and backward digit span tasks (see TABLE 5.1) are well in line with those 
reported by Iverson and Tulsky (2003). These authors found in their standardisation 
sample (aged 18-19) mean scores for forward and backward digit span of 6.7 (SD = 
1.3) and 5.0 (SD = 1.5), respectively. The proportions of critical lures elicited by the 
DRM paradigm in the current study (being 47% and 84% for recall and recognition, 
respectively) were comparable to those reported by Roediger and McDermott (1995). 
In their ﬁrst experiment, Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that the non-pre-
sented critical lures were recalled 40% of the time. In their second experiment, false 
recall of the critical lure was even higher (i.e., 55%), while the false recognition rate 
was 76%. 
 Our results are in line with those reported by Watson and colleagues (2005), 
who also failed to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between recall of critical lure words 
and a working memory task. However, contrary to these authors, we found that, even 
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without warning, a negative relationship did emerge between executive simple span 
verbal working memory and false recognition of critical lures at testing. 
Study 2
Watson and colleagues (2005) found an association between the O-span task and 
false recall in the DRM paradigm, but only after participants had been warned of 
the capability of the DRM paradigm to elicit false recall. Such a warning imposes 
increased demands on working memory, leading to reduced encoding of distinctive 
information. In our study, no warnings were given and nevertheless a correlation 
was found between the backward digit span task and false recognition in the DRM 
paradigm. There are two explanations for these discrepant ﬁndings. Firstly, reliance 
on different working memory tests, simple span vs. complex span, might account 
for the discrepancy. It could well be the case that different WMC indices (tapping 
different working memory loads) would have a differential effect on source monitor-
ing. Secondly, we tested for false recognition after our participants had been given a 
free recall test. Thus, the recognition scores of our participants may be contaminated 
by prior free recall performance. To explore these two possibilities, we conducted 
a second study in which three different working memory measures were included: 
forward digit span and backward digit span as simple span tasks and O-span as a 
complex span task. In this second study, it was further investigated whether different 
working memory indices contribute differentially to source monitoring judgments. 
In addition, participants were given a DRM recognition task, without prior recall. We 
hypothesized that, since participants were not given a warning during DRM recogni-
tion, we would ﬁnd no association between O-span and false recognition. However, 
as in study 1, we did expect to ﬁnd a negative correlation between backward digit 
span and false recognition. 
Method
Participants
Sixty-ﬁve (16 men) psychology undergraduate students took part in this study. They 
received course credits in return for participation. Mean age of the participants was 
18.9 years (SD = 1.13; Range: 17-22). Exclusion criteria were identical to study 1.
Procedure and materials
The procedure used was similar to that in study 1 with the exception that no free 
recall was obtained and that we included the O-span task. Participants were tested 
individually in a quiet laboratory room. After signing the informed consent form, 
participants underwent the DRM paradigm, the two digit span tasks, and the O-span 
task.
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Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm. In this study, the 10 lists of the ﬁrst study were 
extended with 6 further lists to reduce the probability of ceiling effects. The 16 word 
lists were drawn from a Dutch normative study (see Chapter 2). As in study 1, each 
list consisted of 15 words semantically related to a non-presented critical lure word. 
The procedure of list presentation was similar to study 1, but this time the recall 
phase after each list was omitted. Lists were presented one after another with a 2 
sec interlist interval. After the 16 word lists had been presented, digit span tasks and 
the O-span task were administered (order of working memory tasks was counterbal-
anced; see below). Participants were then given an old-new recognition task consist-
ing of 16 critical lures of the studied lists completely intermixed with 48 study words 
(the 1st, 8th and 10th word of each studied list) and 32 unrelated lures taken from non-
presented lists. Only words unrelated to the words in the studied lists were used as 
unrelated lures. For each of these 96 words, participants had to indicate whether the 
word was old (i.e., had appeared on one of the 16 lists) or new.
Forward and backward digit span. The digit span tasks were the same as those used 
in study 1. 
Operation span task (O-span task). The O-span task, as described by Engle, Cantor, 
and Carullo (1992) and Turner and Engle (1989) is a measure of complex working 
memory capacity. In this task, participants are presented with operation-word pairs 
(i.e., operation strings). In the present experiment, the version of Engle et al. (1992) 
was used. The operation part is a mathematical equation which the participant has to 
read aloud. Next, he/she has to verify whether the proposed solution of the equation 
is correct or incorrect. The mathematical equation consists of 2 simple operations: a 
multiplication or division problem and an addition or subtraction problem. An ex-
ample would be: (8/4) + 5 = 7. Participants are not allowed to use pen and paper or 
to make the intermediate calculations aloud. When the participant has veriﬁed the 
equation, he/she has to read aloud the to-be-recalled word that stands behind the 
equation and press the space bar as quickly as possible. In the current study, only 
words that did not appear in the DRM task were used in the O-span task. Following 
this, another word-equation item was administered. The number of operation strings 
(i.e., set size) in a trial increased from two to ﬁve with three trials at each set size. 
Set size varied pseudorandomly. There were three practice trials each containing two 
operation strings and 12 experimental trials. After the last operation in a trial, the par-
ticipant saw a set of three question marks centred on the screen. Participants were 
then asked to write down the words, in correct order, that followed the operation 
strings. O-span score was calculated according to the partial-credit-unit weighted 
(PCU) procedure as described in Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, and 
Engle (2005). When a participant had fewer then 85% of the equation items correct, 
his or her O-span data were excluded.
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Data analysis
Analyses were similar to those carried out in study 1. Alpha was set at .05; two-tailed. 
Three DRM indices were derived: mean proportion recognition of old words, recog-
nition of critical lure words, and recognition of unrelated lures. 
Results and discussion
TABLE 5.3 shows the mean proportions of accurately recognized old words, falsely rec-
ognized critical lures and unrelated lures, and mean scores on digit span tasks (for-
ward and backward) and O-span task. As can be seen, the data are well in line with 
the proportions found in study 1. Thus, the hit rate for recognizing studied words was 
.75 (SD = .10), while the false alarm rate for critical lures was practically identical to 
the hit rate (M = .79, SD = .18). 
TABLE 5.3 MEAN PROPORTION SCORES (INCLUDING SD AND RANGE) FOR RECOGNITION OF STUDIED WORDS, CRITICAL LURE WORDS, AND UNRELATED WORDS. 
FORWARD AND BACKWARD DIGIT SPAN SCORES AND OPERATION SPAN SCORES ARE GIVEN AS MEAN OVERALL SCORES.
ITEM TYPE M SD RANGE
Recognition
Recognition studied words .75 .10 .44
Recognition critical lures .79 .18 .88
Recognition unrelated lures .17 .12 .53
Digit Span
Forward digit span 5.50 1.02 4.00
Backward digit span 4.50 .81 4.00
Operation Span* .79 .09 .41
* AS INDEXED BY PARTIAL-CREDIT-UNIT WEIGHTED (PCU) SCORE. SEE CONWAY ET AL. 2005)
 Pearson correlations between both backward and forward digit span, on the one 
hand and the O-span task on the other, were non-signiﬁcant (both r’s < .15, both p’s > 
.05; two-tailed), showing that they measure different aspects of working memory. The 
correlation between forward and backward digit span task was signiﬁcant, although its 
magnitude was comparable to that found in study 1 (r = .27, p = .03). Pearson product-
moment correlations were calculated between the three DRM indices, forward and 
backward digit span scores, and O-span scores. Replicating the ﬁndings of study 1, 
no signiﬁcant correlations were found between recognition of the studied words on 
the one, and the two digit span tasks and O-span task, on the other hand ( r forward = .02, 
p > .05; two-tailed; r backward = -.16, p > .05; two-tailed; r O-span = -.07, p > .05; two-tailed). 
Neither were there signiﬁcant correlations between recognition of unrelated lures, the 
two digit span parameters, and the O-span task (similar direction of relationship; all r’s 
< .15, all p’s > .05). However, as in study 1, false recognition of critical lures was signiﬁ-
cantly and negatively correlated with backward digit span (r = -.49, p < .01; two-tailed). 
Forward digit span task and the O-span task were not signiﬁcantly related to false rec-
ognition of critical lure (respectively r = -.17, p = .18 and r = -.01, p = .93). FIGURE 5.1 shows 
the scatterplot of backward digit span scores and false recognition of critical lures. As 
can be seen, the signiﬁcant correlation between these two variables is not explained 
by outliers, an impression that is conﬁrmed by Cook’s distance (Range = .25).2
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 As in study 1, multiple linear regression analysis was carried out to determine 
the amount of variance in the false recognition of critical lures explained by forward 
and backward digit span scores and O-span performance. The results are shown in 
TABLE 5.4. When entering forward and backward digit span, and O-span (Enter method) 
to explain variance in critical lure recognition, neither forward digit span, nor O-span 
contributed signiﬁcantly to the model. Only backward digit span was found to con-
tribute signiﬁcantly, with the amount of variance explained by this model being 23.8 
% (R² = .238).
FIGURE 5.1 SCATTER PLOT DISPLAYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BACKWARD DIGIT SPAN SCORE AND FALSE RECOGNITION OF CRITICAL LURE. THE CENTRAL 
LINE DISPLAYS THE REGRESSION LINE. THE TWO OUTER LINES DISPLAY THE PREDICTION INTERVALS OF THE REGRESSION LINE FOR SINGLE OBSERVATIONS. THE 
TWO LINES MOST CLOSELY TO THE REGRESSION LINE DISPLAY THE PREDICTION INTERVALS OF THE MEAN PREDICTED RESPONSES.  
 As was the case in study 1, we found in study 2 a negative correlation between 
backward digit span and false recognition of critical lure words. Replicating and ex-
tending the ﬁndings of Watson and colleagues (2005), we failed to ﬁnd a link be-
tween the O-span task and false recognition. This could indicate that different work-
ing memory tasks (simple vs. complex WMC) may have a differential effect on source 
monitoring errors.
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TABLE 5.4 SUMMARY OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR VARIABLES PREDICTING FALSE RECOGNITION OF CRITICAL LURES (N = 65)
VARIABLE B SE B ß t
Recognition
Digit Span forward -.01 .02 -.04 -.36
Digit Span backward -.11 .03 -.48 -4.12*
Operation Span .04 .23 .02 .20
NOTE. R² = .238 
B = UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; SE B = STANDARD ERROR UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; ß = STANDARD-
IZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT; T = T-VALUE; * P < .01
General discussion
In the current studies, we employed several working memory tasks to test the idea 
that poor working memory capacity predicts susceptibility to pseudo-memories. In 
the ﬁrst study, the working memory tasks differed with respect to the amount of 
executive functioning that they required, with the backward digit span task requiring 
more executive functioning than the forward digit span task. In the second study, the 
tasks differed in terms of executive function involvement (i.e., backward versus for-
ward digit span tasks). Yet, they also differed in terms of complexity (i.e., the number 
of parallel processes they required), with the O-span task tapping more processes 
(verbal and arithmetic) than the simple digit span tasks. The results of the two stud-
ies converge on the conclusion that, under certain circumstances, one particular type 
of simple span working memory, namely backward digit span, is linked to pseudo-
memory. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that even in a homogeneous sample of under-
graduates, small variations in working memory are linked to individual differences 
in pseudo-memory proneness. Reduced working memory capacity may undermine 
episodic encoding of the different word lists, thereby reducing the set of distinctive 
perceptual information needed to differentiate semantically related critical lure words 
from presented words. As a consequence, source monitoring errors will occur.
 In general, our results are in line with those of Watson et al. (2005), but they 
also differ in some important respects. Like Watson and co-workers (2005), we were 
unable to detect a straightforward relationship between working memory capacity 
and false recall (study 1). In study 2, we extended the ﬁndings by Watson et al., in that 
we found no link between O-span and false recognition in a standard DRM paradigm. 
However, unlike Watson et al. (2005) who found a relationship between poor working 
memory and pseudo-memory only when participants were given a warning, we did 
ﬁnd that the executive index of simple span working memory task predicted false 
recognition in a standard DRM paradigm, even when no warning instruction was 
given. 
 A question that arises is whether the discrepancy in ﬁndings between the 
Watson et al. (2005) study and our studies can be attributed to the use of different 
working memory tasks. Put in more general terms, do different working memory 
aspects (depending on different loading demands) differentially contribute to source 
monitoring? Working memory can be seen as a multi-component system that is re-
sponsible for active maintenance of information in the face of ongoing processing 
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demands and/or distraction (e.g., Conway et al., 2005). Non-executive simple span 
tasks (i.e., tasks which only present to-be-recalled items; e.g., forward digit span) use 
a limited amount of resources and thus have a limited amount of loading demands, 
executive simple span tasks (i.e., tasks which present to-be-recalled information, but 
also require additional transformations; e.g., backward digit span) employ more re-
sources (higher loading capacity), and executive-attention working memory capac-
ity tasks (e.g., Operation span task) require a substantial amount of resources with 
higher loading capacity (Conway et al., 2005; Gerton et al., 2004; Oberauer, Süß, 
Schulze, Wilhelm & Wittmann, 2000; Turner & Engle, 1989). The current ﬁndings as 
well as those of others (Watson et al., 2005) suggest that when processing demands 
are high (as with warning instruction along with the DRM task in the Watson et al. 
study), complex working memory capacity will predict source monitoring failures. 
When one has poor complex WMC in a high processing demand environment, WMC 
is easily overloaded, leading to reduced encoding of distinctive features of the to 
be remembered information (e.g., semantically related words). When one has to re-
trieve this information, these distinctive features can not be used, leading to reliance 
on more general features such as semantic-relatedness, which in turn would result in 
source monitoring errors. On the other hand, when speciﬁc tasks do not require high 
processing demands (e.g., standard DRM procedures used in the present studies), 
simple span working memory will predict source monitoring failures. However, we 
do not know whether simple span working memory (non-executive and executive) is 
related to source monitoring failures under high processing demand circumstances 
(e.g., warning manipulation in the DRM paradigm). This issue warrants further re-
search.
 Several limitations of the current study deserve some comment. To begin with, 
our ﬁnding that working memory is negatively related to pseudo-memories was 
most evident for the backward version of the digit span and the recognition modality 
of the DRM. Note that in homogeneous samples like the present ones, strongest ef-
fects are expected to occur for the most sensitive index of pseudo-memories, namely 
recognition of critical lures (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler, Roediger & 
McDermott, 1999). In line with this, one has to be cautious for ceiling effects in the 
recognition task. Calculating corrected false recognition measure could help solving 
this problem. Also, the backward task is believed to be the purest measure of central 
executive working memory (e.g., Gerton et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the backward digit 
span is a subtask of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and therefore this variable 
overlaps with full-scale IQ. Thus, one could argue that our results reﬂect a link be-
tween pseudo-memory and low intelligence rather than poor working memory. How-
ever, recent research exploring the factor structure of the WAIS in a mixed patient 
sample and a neurological patient sample (Ryan & Paolo, 2001; Ryan, Paolo, Miller, & 
Moris, 1997) identiﬁed a distinct “working memory factor”, which incorporated prima-
rily the digit span task. It should be noted further that we tested ﬁrst year psychology 
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undergraduate students and thus one may assume that the full-scale IQ did not vary 
much in this homogeneous sample.
 Secondly, one could argue that the digit span tasks we used can be considered 
rather crude measures of working memory. However, given the frequent use of these 
tests in neuropsychological research and clinical practice (see for example Gerton et 
al., 2004; Iverson & Tulsky, 2003; Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004), digit span tasks 
have become standard measures of working memory for which clear normative data 
are available. 
 The current ﬁndings as well as those of Watson et al. (2005) provide strong sup-
port for the idea that subtle variations in executive functions and working memory 
of the prefrontal areas contribute to the reconstructive aspects of our memory. Our 
ﬁndings also accord well with previous work in our lab showing that mild executive 
dysfunctions in undergraduates reliably predict the extent to which they remember 
words never presented (Chapter 4). These ﬁndings are important because they might 
shed light on neuropsychological factors that make individuals susceptible to pseu-
do-memories. Similarly, they may help to explain why certain personality traits are 
intimately linked to pseudo-memories. There are a number of traits, notably dissocia-
tive tendencies and depression (or negative affectivity), which seem to predispose to 
pseudo-memories (e.g., Candel, Merckelbach, & Kuijpers, 2003; Eisen & Lynn, 2001). 
The connection between these traits and pseudo-memories is, however, far from 
robust (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, Sijsenaar, & Spaan, 2000). Per-
haps, then, these traits serve as antecedents of pseudo-memories to the extent that 
they are accompanied by subtle disturbances in executive functions of the prefrontal 
areas. Indirect support for this line of reasoning comes from studies reporting a cer-
tain amount of overlap between poor working memory and dissociation (Giesbrecht, 
Merckelbach, Geraerts, & Smeets, 2004). Clearly, the precise connection between dis-
sociative tendencies, depression, and executive functions deserves further study.
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CHAPTER [6] ACTION SOURCE MONITORING, SCHIZOTYPAL TRAITS, 
AND WORKING MEMORY
An adjusted version of this chapter is accepted as: Peters, M.J.V., Smeets, T., Giesbrecht, T., Jelicic, M., & Merckel-
bach, H. (accepted). Confusing action and imagination: Action source monitoring in individuals with schizotypal 
traits. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 
Abstract 
To explore whether schizotypal traits may undermine source monitoring for actions, 
67 undergraduate participants (21 men) completed the Schizotypal Personality Scale 
(STA) and were then given a source monitoring task in which some speciﬁc acts 
had to be performed, while others only had to be imagined. Next, participants had 
to complete an old-new recognition task and ascribe the source, i.e., whether they 
had performed or only imagined the items (i.e., source monitoring). Participants also 
completed a working memory capacity task (i.e., Operation Span task). We found 
that the higher the STA scores, the poorer recognition and source attribution scores. 
Relative to participants with low levels of schizotypal traits (i.e., controls), those with 
higher levels of schizotypal traits more often falsely claimed to have performed ac-
tions when in fact they had only imagined them. Although participants high and low 
in schizotypical traits did not differ in their working memory capacity, poor working 
memory capacity was related to source misattribution (i.e., increase false alarms). 
The present ﬁndings indicate that schizotypal traits undermine source monitoring for 
action in a healthy population.
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Introduction
Most people have occasionally experienced difﬁculties in determining whether they 
have actually performed an action or only thought about performing that action in 
the past (Anderson, 1984; Johnson et al., 1993). However, such source monitoring dif-
ﬁculties (i.e., source misattributions) are especially prominent in schizophrenia (e.g., 
Brébion et al., 2000). Indeed, a number of recent studies have consistently shown 
that schizophrenic patients tend to make internal-internal source misattributions 
(e.g., claiming that you have said something when in fact you only thought about 
saying it; Nienow & Docherty, 2004) and internal-external source misattributions 
(e.g., claiming that you did something when in fact someone else did it; Moritz et al., 
2003). In an attempt to explain these memory aberrations in schizophrenia, Brébion 
et al. (2005) found that such source misattributions are related to the presence of 
positive symptomatology (e.g., hallucinations). 
 When conceptualizing schizophrenia in terms of a continuum model (Clar-
idge, 1997), it is an interesting question to ask whether source misattributions are 
also present in participants with high albeit non-clinical levels of schizotypal traits. 
Remarkably, little is known as to whether these schizotypal traits are related to a 
heightened susceptibility to source misattribution. Recently, Larøi and colleagues 
(2005) found that non-clinical individuals with hallucination proneness (measured 
by the Launay Slade Hallucination Scale; Launay & Slade, 1981) were more prone to 
make source misattributions. This is a ﬁrst indication that these non-clinical schizo-
typal traits may lead to a perturbation in the control of internally generated cognitive 
events and thus could inform theories about how people make accurate source mon-
itoring decisions (Johnson et al., 1993). These theories stress that encoding of per-
ceptual features is necessary for correct source attribution at retrieval. The presence 
of non-clinical schizotypal traits may thus lead to problems in encoding or retrieving 
distinctive perceptual features of to-be-remembered events, thereby contributing to 
source misattributions. 
 A facet of memory that is related to source monitoring is working memory 
capacity (WMC). As said before, the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 
1993) assumes that the encoding of perceptual details is critical for subsequent cor-
rect source monitoring decisions. Watson et al. (2005) but also our studies in Chapter 
5 found that WMC is an important antecedent of the encoding of perceptual details. 
These studies employed the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this paradigm, participants are asked to re-
member lists of semantically related words, such as bed, nap, pillow, and snooze, all 
of which are associated with a theme word, in this particular example the word sleep. 
This theme word is never presented and serves as a critical lure during recall/recog-
nition. Both Watson et al. (2005) and our studies in Chapter 5 found that undergradu-
ates with low WMC were more prone to make source misattributions as measured by 
an increased tendency to recall or recognize non-presented critical lure words. 
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Since prominent WMC deﬁcits in all modalities have been documented in schizo-
phrenia (see for a recent meta-analysis Lee & Park, 2005) and clinical high-risk popu-
lations (i.e., prodromal schizophrenia; Lencz et al., 2006), an interesting question to 
raise is whether poor WMC is also present in healthy participants with high levels of 
schizotypal traits and whether this may also be related to source misattributions.
 Many source monitoring studies have relied on word list paradigms (e.g., DRM 
paradigm; cf. supra). Some have argued that the generalizibility to real life situations 
of such paradigms is limited (Henquet et al., 2005; Parks, 1997). Recent studies by, 
for example, Hornstein and Mulligan (2004) and Larøi et al. (2005) offer more natu-
ralistic source monitoring paradigms. In these studies, simple actions were either 
performed or imagined, followed by a source monitoring task. 
 The aims of the present study were twofold. Firstly, we wanted to examine 
whether source misattributions are related to schizotypal traits in a non-clinical 
sample. To this end, we employed an action source monitoring task based on an 
adapted procedure described by Parks (1997) in which simple actions either had to 
be performed or imagined. We hypothesised that participants with high levels of 
schizotypal traits would make more source misattributions compared to those low in 
schizotypal traits. A second aim was to explore whether poor WMC could account for 
source misattributions in participants with schizotypal traits.
Method
Participants
Sixty-seven undergraduate students (21 men) from Maastricht University and Ho-
geschool Zuyd volunteered to participate in the study. No incentive was offered for 
participation. Exclusion criteria were diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder in the past 
three years, history of neurological deﬁcit (e.g., traumatic brain injury), and sub-
stance abuse. Two participants were excluded; one participant did not complete the 
schizotypal trait questionnaire, while the other participant did not understand the 
source monitoring task. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 65 participants. Their mean age 
was 21.01 years (SD = 2.08), with no signiﬁcant differences between male and female 
participants [t (63) = 1.31, p > .05], means being 21.55 (SD = 2.26) and 20.81 (SD = 
1.98), respectively. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of the 
Faculty of Psychology of Maastricht University.
Materials and procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. Upon arrival, par-
ticipants were asked to sign an informed consent form. Instructions, description of 
action items, and stimulus materials were given on paper (questionnaire and recog-
nition task) or on a computer screen (action source monitoring task and Operation 
span task).
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 The study involved 2 sessions, with approximately 24 hrs between sessions. 
All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the study. The study was presented 
as one in a series of studies investigating the relationship between cognitive func-
tions, personality characteristics, and learning of simple motor actions. During the 
ﬁrst session, participants completed the Schizotypal Personality Scale (STA; Claridge 
& Broks, 1984) and were administered a working memory capacity task (Operation 
span task; Engle et al., 1992; Turner & Engle, 1989). Participants were also given the 
study phase of the action source monitoring task. Tasks were counterbalanced to ex-
clude order effects. The second session consisted of a surprise recognition task that 
took place 24 hrs after the initial study phase. 
Schizotypal Personality Scale. The STA questionnaire (Claridge & Broks, 1984; Cron-
bach’s α = .86) is designed to measure schizotypal traits in normal (healthy) popu-
lations. The STA consists of 37 dichotomous items that are closely related to the 
DSM-III-R criteria description of schizotypal personality disorder. This scale has been 
found to load on the “positive” symptoms factor of schizotypy, a factor that primarily 
consists of unusual perceptual experiences and psychotic-like ideation (Bentall et al., 
1989; Rawlings et al., 2001). A sample item is “Are you sure that other people can tell 
what you think?” Total STA score is obtained by summing up “Yes” answers across 
all items. High scores indicate higher frequencies of non-clinical schizotypal traits 
(positive symptomatology). 
Operation span task (O-span). The O-span task (Engle et al., 1992; Turner & Engle, 
1989) is a measure of complex working memory capacity. The present study employed 
Engle and co-workers’ (1992) version. During this task, participants are presented 
with operation-word pairs (i.e., operation strings). The operation part is a mathemati-
cal equation that the participant has to read aloud. The mathematical equation con-
sists of 2 simple operations: a multiplication or division problem and an addition or 
subtraction problem. An example would be: (8/4) + 5 = 7. Next, he/she has to verify 
whether the solution that is offered for the equation is correct or incorrect. Partici-
pants are not allowed to use pencil or paper or to make the intermediate calculations 
aloud. When the participant has given an answer to the equation, he/she has to read 
aloud the to-be-recalled word that is shown immediately after the equation and to 
press the space bar as quickly as possible. Following this, another operation string 
appears. The number of operation strings (set size) within a trial increases from two 
to ﬁve. Every set size is employed thrice. Set size is varied pseudorandomly. Three 
practice trials are presented, each containing two operation strings. The O-span task 
consists of 12 trials. At the end of each trial, the participant is presented with three 
question marks centred on the screen. They are then asked to write down in correct 
order the words that followed the operation strings. 
 O-span score was calculated according to the partial-credit-unit (PCU) 
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weighted procedure as described in Conway et al. (2005). If accuracy for the process-
ing component (mathematical equation) of the task fell below a certain level (i.e., if 
participant had fewer then 85% of the equation items correct), his or her O-span data 
were excluded (see Conway et al., 2005). 
Action source monitoring task. The action source monitoring task was based on a pro-
cedure described by Parks (1997) and replicated by Henquet and co-workers (2005) 
in schizophrenic patients. In one of Parks’ studies, a card depicting questions (e.g., 
“When were you born?”) was shown to participants for a period of 5 sec, followed 
by a blank card for 2 sec. After this card, participants received the instruction “Answer 
out loud” on it or a card that gave the following phrase in the series. Participants 
were instructed to read each card in silence and to be prepared to say the answer out 
loud without actually verbalizing the words unless they were speciﬁcally told to do 
so. After the study phase and a 5 min ﬁller task, a forced-choice recognition task was 
presented. This task consisted of the original questions, each being paired with a new 
question with similar content, for which participant had to make old-new discrimina-
tions and source attributions (i.e., imagined or spoken). In the current paradigm, we 
replaced the question phrases with descriptions of simple actions that either had 
to be performed or imagined to be performed. The action items described simple 
non-intrusive acts like for example “Break a toothpick into three pieces” and “Open 
a newspaper”. The items were derived from previous experiments (Goff & Roediger, 
1998; Hornstein & Mulligan, 2004; Larøi et al., 2005). Action items were presented on 
a 15 inch computer screen using PowerPoint (Microsoft Corporation) with font type 
“Times New Roman”, font size 36. 
 The action source monitoring task involved 40 trials. On half of them, single 
actions were presented. On the other half, two actions were presented, with one ac-
tion being located at the top half and the other at the bottom of the screen. The order 
of single and dual presentation modes was quasi-random and two counterbalanced 
versions were used, to which participants were randomly allocated. After each ac-
tion presentation, participants had to imagine performing the action(s) presented on 
the screen. Preparation time varied between participants but never took longer than 
8 sec. When the participant indicated that he/she had imagined the action, a blank 
screen appeared for 3 sec. Next, an instruction appeared on the screen indicating 
“Do” for single action presentations and “Do top” or “Do bottom” for dual action 
presentations. Thus, for dual action trials participants had to imagine both actions, 
but actually perform only one. This resulted in 40 performed actions and 20 covertly 
prepared but non-performed actions. 
 In case certain objects or materials were needed to perform the actions (e.g., 
toothpick, paper, etc.), the experimenter provided participants with them after the 
imagination period. On the dual action trials, materials to carry out both actions were 
given. On dual action trials, half of the actions that had to be performed were pre-
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sented at the top, and the other half at the bottom of the screen. Immediately after 
the action had been completed, all objects were removed from view. Objects were 
hidden from the participants’ view at all times, except when in use. An experimenter 
was present to monitor whether participants actually performed the actions. All par-
ticipants were capable of performing the actions. At the end of the study phase, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how easy-difﬁcult it was for them overall to create a 
mental image for the presented actions based on a 5-point scale, (anchors: 1 = very 
easy to imagine; 5 = very difﬁcult to imagine).
Recognition session. During the recognition task, the 60 old action items were paired 
with 60 new action items that were roughly similar in content and form. For example: 
“Break the toothpick in three pieces” was paired with “Break the toothpick in two 
pieces”. For each pair, the participant was asked to make an old-new discrimination 
(i.e., correct recognition). Furthermore, when participants classiﬁed an action item 
as old, they had to indicate whether they had performed the actions or only thought 
about performing these actions (i.e., source attribution).
Statistical analyses
For all analyses alpha was set at .05.  Proportion of correct recognition (old-new 
discrimination) was calculated by dividing the number of correctly identified old 
items in the recognition test by 60, the total number of old items. Proportion cor-
rect source attribution was defined as the number of old items that participants 
correctly classified as verbalized or covertly prepared divided by 60, the total 
number of source attributions that had to be made. Moreover, we calculated 
proportion false alarms (i.e., number of erroneous claims of imagined actions 
that had been performed divided by 20, which is the total number of imagined 
actions) and proportion misses (i.e., number of erroneous claims that performed 
actions had only been imagined divided by 40, which is the total number of per-
formed actions).
 In order to explore the relationships between schizotypal traits, action 
source monitoring, and WMC, Pearson product-moment correlations (two-tailed) 
were calculated between STA scores, action source monitoring parameters (i.e., 
proportion correct recognition, source attribution, false alarms and misses), 
and O-span task. Furthermore, following Larøi et al. (2005), participants were 
grouped according to their STA scores, selecting those participants with the 25% 
highest (n =17) and 25% lowest (n = 17) STA scores. Independent samples t-tests 
were carried out to determine whether these groups differed in action source 
monitoring parameters and WMC. 
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Results 
Ease of imagination
Participants rated the imagination difﬁculty on a 5-point scale. The mean difﬁculty 
score was 1.70 (SD = .74), which indicates that it was relative easy to imagine the ac-
tion items. Thus, participants did not have any difﬁculties in preparing the actions. 
STA and O-span scores
Mean scores on the STA and O-span task were 10.11 (SD = 6.09; Range: 1-23) and .81 
(SD = .08; Range: .67-1.00), respectively. These scores are similar to those reported 
elsewhere (e.g., Engle et al., 1992; Muris & Merckelbach, 2003) for undergraduate 
students. Distribution of STA and O-span scores showed no marked deviation from 
normality (Skewness = .45 and .59, respectively). Men and women did not differ with 
regard to mean STA and O-span scores; both t’s (63) < 1.0, both p’s > .05.
Correct recognition of actions
Mean proportion of correct recognition was .89 (SD = .07; Range: .53-.98). As TABLE 6.1 
shows, a signiﬁcant negative correlation emerged between STA and correct recogni-
tion scores (r = -.27, p < .05), indicating that those with heightened STA scores had 
poorer memory function. For WMC, correlations with STA and correct recognition 
remained non-signiﬁcant.
Action source monitoring
Overall, participants were quite accurate in their source attributions (M = .81, SD = 
.09; Range: .45-.97). Mean proportion false alarms and misses were .18 (SD = .07; 
Range: .10-.40) and .09 (SD = .06; Range: .00-.38), respectively. As TABLE 6.1 shows, STA 
scores were negatively related to correct source attribution (r = -.36, p < .01), indicat-
ing that the higher participants scored on STA, the lower their number of correct 
source monitoring decisions. Conversely, a positive relationship emerged between 
STA and false alarms (r = .27, p < .05). As to the WMC, a signiﬁcant negative correla-
tion was found between O-span scores and false alarms (r = -.30, p < .05). All other 
correlations remained non-signiﬁcant. 
Extreme groups and source monitoring
Two extreme subgroups were formed on the basis of their STA scores (see Larøi et 
al., 2005). The subgroup high in schizotypical traits consisted of 17 participants in the 
top 25th percentile (STA score > 16), while the control group (i.e., low in schizotypal 
traits) consisted of 17 participants who scored in the lower 25th percentile (STA score 
< 5). Participant characteristics for both groups can be found in TABLE 6.2. As can be 
seen, participants in both groups did not differ with regard to age, gender distribu-
tion, and O-span score.
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TABLE 6.1 PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY SCALE (STA), WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY (O-SPAN SCORE), 
CORRECT RECOGNITION, CORRECT SOURCE ATTRIBUTION, FALSE ALARMS, AND MISSES OF THE ACTION SOURCE MONITORING TASK. ONLY RELEVANT CORRELA-
TIONS ARE SHOWN.
STA O-SPAN #
O-span -.09 ---
Correct recognition -.27* .09
Correct source attribution -.36** .14
False alarms .27* -.30*
Misses .17 -.01
* P < .05
** P < .01
# AS INDEXED BY PARTIAL-CREDIT-UNIT WEIGHTED (PCU) SCORE. SEE CONWAY ET AL., 2005)
 As can also be seen in TABLE 6.2, control participants outperformed those high 
in schizotypal traits on correct recognition and correct source attribution; both t’s 
(32) > 2.60, both p’s ≤ .01. Thus, participants scoring high on STA were poorer in re-
membering which actions they had seen 24 hrs earlier and they were also impaired 
in ascribing the correct source for these actions, compared to participants with low 
STA scores. The effect sizes for these differences (in terms of Cohen’s d) were in the 
large to very-large effect size Range (both d’s > .90). In addition, participants high in 
schizotypical traits made more misses and false alarms; both t’s (32) > 2.00, both p’s 
< .05. Again, effect sizes were in the large-effect Range (both d’s > .78).
TABLE 6.2 DEMOGRAPHIC, STA, AND MEMORY DATA OF PARTICIPANTS HIGH AND LOW IN SCHIZOTYPAL TRAITS. STANDARD DEVIATIONS ARE GIVEN IN 
PARENTHESES.
PARTICIPANTS HIGH IN 
SCHIZOTYPAL TRAITS (n = 17)
CONTROL PARTICIPANTS
 (n = 17)
STATISTICS
Age 21.41 (1.58) 21.12 (2.23) t (32) = .44, n.s.
Gender (men/women) 5/12 6/11 χ2 (1) = .13, n.s.
Average STA score  18.53 (2.53) 3.18 (1.42) t (32) = 21.82, p <.001
Average O-span score .80 (.09) .81 (.05) t (32) = .20, n.s.
Correct recognition .87 (.06) .92 (.05) t (32) = 2.60, p = .01
Correct source attribution .77 (.09) .86 (.06) t (32) = 3.46, p < .01
False alarms .21 (.07) .16 (.06) t (32) = 2.08, p < .05
Misses .10 (.06) .06 (.04) t (32) = 2.20, p < .05
Discussion
The main results of the present study can be summarized as follows. Firstly, sig-
niﬁcant negative correlations were found between STA scores, correct recognition, 
and source attribution scores, indicating poorer memory functioning and more 
source misattributions (i.e., false alarms) with increasing levels of schizotypal traits 
in healthy undergraduates. Secondly, this conclusion is further substantiated by ex-
treme group analyses based on STA scores. These analyses showed that participants 
high in schizotypal traits performed poorly in correctly recognizing previously pre-
sented actions (see also Laws & Bhatt, 2005). Furthermore, in line with prior research 
(Larøi et al., 2005), compared to controls, high STA participants made more errone-
ous claims of imagined actions as performed and vice versa. This shows that high 
levels of schizotypal traits are not only associated with poor recognition memory, 
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but also with a profound tendency to make source misattributions. On the other 
hand, participants with high and low levels of schizotypal traits did not differ in their 
scores on the working memory indices. Meanwhile, working memory was negatively 
related to source misattributions, in that low WMC was accompanied by an increase 
in false alarms (i.e., claiming that one performed an action when, in fact, it was only 
imagined).
 We found that participants high in schizotypal traits exhibited a deﬁciency in 
internal source attribution (e.g., “Did I do this or did I only imagine this?”), which is 
in line with the results of Larøi and co-workers (2005), who found that hallucination-
prone (i.e., non-clinical positive symptomatology) participants made signiﬁcantly 
more internal source misattributions. Moreover, we also showed that high schizo-
typal and control participants did not differ in their working memory performance. 
In line with these ﬁndings, Lenzenweger and Gold (2000) also failed to ﬁnd speciﬁc 
working memory disruptions in schizotypal trait individuals. How can these results 
best be explained? One important prerequisite for efﬁcient source monitoring is the 
encoding and/or retrieval of a sufﬁcient amount of perceptual detail and contextual 
information (Johnson et al., 1993). It is plausible to assume that carrying out an ac-
tion offers more perceptual, sensory, and spatiotemporal information than just imag-
ining actions. Thus, in the former case, the production of a distinct memory trace is 
more probable. Perhaps, then, speciﬁc cognitive and/or personality factors (but not 
working memory) contribute to difﬁculties in encoding and retrieving such action 
information in participants with high levels of schizotypal traits, thereby making the 
memory traces of these actions less distinctive which, in turn, could lead to source 
misattributions.
 During encoding, perceptual and contextual features of an experience (e.g., 
performing a speciﬁc action) need to be bound together efﬁciently. WMC is a neces-
sary function for holding these memory representations online, updating, assign-
ing memory for temporal order, manipulating information, and selective attending 
to-be-stored information during encoding. In the present study, we found a signiﬁ-
cant negative association between working memory and false alarms. These ﬁndings 
underscore previous ﬁndings of Watson and co-workers (2005) and our studies in 
Chapter 5 showing a robust relationship between (poor) working memory capacity 
and (poor) source monitoring performance. One explanation for the intimate link 
between working memory and source monitoring is that poor working memory re-
stricts the encoding of distinctive information. This, in turn, may interfere with source 
monitoring during retrieval. 
 During retrieval, the encoded memory representations need to be retrieved 
and source monitoring decisions must be made to discriminate between previously 
executed actions and imagined actions. Therefore, inhibition of irrelevant informa-
tion (e.g., fantasizing about imagined actions) is needed. Interestingly, previous 
studies have found that participants with high levels of schizotypal traits show dif-
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ﬁculties in actively inhibiting irrelevant information (e.g., Moritz & Mass, 1997). Thus, 
participants high in schizotypical traits may be inundated with an increased array of 
percepts or “loose” associative (i.e., fantasizing) links. Failing inhibition then leads 
to increased reliance on these general similarities or fantasies, which may provide 
optimal conditions for source misattributions to arise. More speciﬁcally, a source 
misattribution and in particular a tendency to treat imagined events as having a real/
performed origin (i.e., false alarm) may convey a sense of realness to unusual sen-
sations, paranoid ideation, and idiosyncratic beliefs and perceptions. In this way, 
source misattributions arise between internal experiences that are tagged with “non-
self” characteristics. This line of reasoning may also apply to explaining paranormal 
experiences which are often reported in relation to schizotypal traits (e.g., Goulding, 
2004; Lange & Houran, 1998).
 Another related possibility is that, compared to others, individuals with high 
levels of schizotypal traits deeply encode the characteristics of imagined actions, 
which could also lead to source misattributions. One argument in favour of this pos-
sibility is that schizotypy and fantasy proneness overlap substantially (e.g., r = .60; 
Merckelbach, Rassin, & Muris, 2000). Fantasy prone individuals tend to have very in-
tense and detailed imaginations, and this can contribute to source misattributions. 
 Our ﬁndings may have relevance to schizophrenia spectrum disorders. How-
ever, caution must be exercised when linking the present results to, for example, 
people with schizotypal personality disorder (SPD), prodomal individuals, or schizo-
phrenic patients. That is, relations between schizotypal traits, SPD, prodrome, and 
schizophrenia are complex and ﬁndings are mixed in the literature. Thus, cognitive 
impairments in people with non-clinical schizotypal traits are very different from 
those in schizophrenic patients with distinct aetiologies and prodrome states, as was 
the case for working memory capacity difﬁculties in our study (e.g., Lee & Park, 2005; 
Lencz et al., 2006; Lenzenweger & Gold, 2000). Furthermore, the participants in our 
study were not prodromal individuals nor did they show clinical symptomatology. 
As it stands, the connection between schizotypal traits and schizophrenia spectrum 
states is not fully understood. Future research could shed light on this relationship, 
thereby including larger and more diverse samples for a direct comparison between 
the groups in question. 
 In sum, then, our data as well as those of others (e.g., Larøi et al., 2005) clearly 
imply that people high in schizotypal traits have profound source monitoring difﬁcul-
ties, but why this is the case remains unclear. Future studies should focus on whether 
encoding deﬁciencies, inhibition difﬁculties, or intense imagination related to fanta-
sy proneness underlies this phenomenon. One limitation of the current study is that 
it relied on a homogeneous sample of undergraduates. Another limitation is that it 
did not include further personality measures or cognitive indicators such as fantasy 
proneness, thought action fusion, inhibition, etc. Follow up studies relying on larger 
heterogeneous samples and fantasy proneness and inhibition measures would be 
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able to disentangle the antecedents of source misattributions in participants with 
high levels of schizotypal traits. 
 In conclusion, the present study found evidence of poor correct recognition 
and source monitoring in individuals high in schizotypal traits. Our results are, how-
ever, silent about the causal status of source monitoring, which can best be estab-
lished in future longitudinal studies.
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CHAPTER [7] SUPPRESSION OF STEREOTYPES LEADS TO FALSE 
RECOLLECTIONS
Inﬂuence of inhibition instruction on memory accuracy
An adjusted version of this chapter is published as: Peters, M.J.V., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. (2006). When 
stereotypes backﬁre: Trying to suppress stereotypes produces false recollections of a crime. Legal and Criminologi-
cal Psychology, 11, 327-336. 
Abstract
This study examined whether participants’ memories of a racially neutral crime story 
are inﬂuenced by stereotypes and the instruction to suppress (i.e., inhibit) stereotypes 
while reading the crime story. We expected that participants who saw a photograph 
of a foreign group (negative stereotype prime) and who were given the instruction 
to suppress stereotypes before reading a crime story would make signiﬁcantly more 
stereotype-consistent errors on a recognition test than participants who received 
a neutral prime and a suppression instruction. Participants were 88 undergradu-
ate students (59 women) who were randomly allocated to the cells of a 2 (negative 
stereotype vs. neutral prime) x 2 (thought suppression vs. control) between-subjects 
design. The dependent variables were recognition of accurate items, stereotype-con-
sistent items, and confabulation items. The critical stereotype x suppression interac-
tion was statistically signiﬁcant for false recognition of non-presented stereotype-
consistent items. Simple effect analyses showed that in the suppression condition, 
participants who were primed with a negative stereotype made more stereotype-
consistent recognition errors than those who had been exposed to a neutral prime. 
Stereotypes not only make cognitive processing easier, but might also contribute to 
recognition errors when people do what they often are told to do in the legal arena: 
suppress stereotypical thinking.
116
Introduction
A stereotype is a widely held belief about a certain social group (Graham & Lowery, 
2004; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Different theories, ranging from sociobiological 
to cultural accounts (e.g., for an overview see Hinton, 2000; Schneider, 2004), have 
been proposed to understand how stereotypes are formed and why we use them. 
It appears that our tendency to rely on stereotypes is highly useful. In the words of 
Schneider (2004; p. 563): “We use them all the time. To deny ourselves the use of 
generalizations about people would result in intellectual and social chaos.” 
 Although stereotypes may be helpful in processing complex information (e.g., 
Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994a), an extensive body of research has shown 
that under some circumstances, stereotypes lead to negative evaluation and dis-
criminatory judgments about outgroup members (e.g., Graham & Lowery, 2004; Van 
Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, & Vermeulen, 1999). A similar ambiguity is seen when it 
comes to the inﬂuence of stereotypes on memory. Stereotypes facilitate encoding 
and retrieval of stereotype-consistent information, but they may also lead people to 
remember stereotype-consistent details that were never present (Araya, Ekeham-
mar, & Akrami, 2003; Koriat, Goldsmith & Pansky, 2000; Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, 2001; 
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997). False stereotype-consistent information 
is especially likely to be reported when people are instructed to deliberately suppress 
stereotypes. Germane to this issue is a study by Araya and colleagues (2003). These 
authors employed the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959b; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Brieﬂy, in the DRM paradigm participants are pre-
sented with a list of semantically related words (e.g., pin, sharp, point), all associated 
with a non-presented critical lure word (e.g., needle). The typical outcome during a 
subsequent memory test is that participants more often falsely recall and recognize 
the critical lure than non-critical lures that were never presented in the study phase 
(e.g., car). Araya and colleagues (2003) had their participants study stereotypical 
and non-stereotypical words, either with an initially activated social category (im-
migrant prime) or with no social category (neutral prime). Participants were then 
instructed to either forget or remember the studied words. This was followed by a 
recognition test. Participants in the immigrant, but not in the neutral prime condi-
tion more often falsely recognized non-studied stereotypical words, but only after 
they had previously been given instructions to forget them (see also Lenton et al., 
2001). This ﬁnding ﬁts nicely with studies demonstrating that attempts to suppress 
unwanted stereotypical thoughts ironically result in an increased accessibility of the 
unwanted thoughts (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994b; Macrae et al., 
1997; but see also Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002; Monteith, Sher-
man, & Devine, 1998a; Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998b). For example, Macrae et 
al. (1994b) showed their participants a photograph of a male skinhead. Next, par-
ticipants were asked to describe how a typical day of this individual might look like. 
Half of the participants were given the instruction to actively suppress/avoid think-
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ing about stereotypical ideas about skinheads while engaging in the task. The other 
half did not receive this instruction. Following this, participants were told they were 
going to meet the skinhead. While awaiting the arrival of the skinhead, they were 
asked to take a seat. Participants had the opportunity to choose between 7 seats. The 
8th seat was evidently occupied by the skinhead, as a jacket and bag were on it. The 
two dependent measures were the frequency of stereotypes in the description of a 
typical day of the skinhead and preferred seating position. Participants in the sup-
pression condition described less stereotypes in a typical day of the skinhead than 
did controls. However, suppression participants preferred to sit further away from 
the skinhead’s personal belongings than control participants. Thus, this study found 
evidence for a backﬁre or rebound effect. That is, compared to control condition, 
suppression leads to an enhanced accessibility of stereotypes (see also Cook, Arndt, 
& Lieberman, 2004). It should be noted here that recent research by Monteith et al. 
(1998b; 2002) has identiﬁed individual differences such as level of prejudice of par-
ticipants, feelings of guilt, and motivation that may affect activation and application 
of stereotypes. These individual difference factors appear to moderate stereotype 
rebound effects after suppression. Yet, by and large, this research domain has yielded 
results that underline the paradoxical effects of suppression ﬁrst described by Weg-
ner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987; see for a recent review, Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000).  
 The literature on suppression and its rebound effects bear relevance to the legal 
arena. So far, researchers have mainly looked at how mock jurors weight evidence 
that they were told to disregard. Again, the evidence suggests that such inadmissible 
evidence becomes hyperaccessible (Kassin & Sukel, 1997). Nonetheless, many other 
questions remain open to discussion. For example, trying to suppress stereotypical 
information makes this information hyperaccessible to most persons, but what are 
the consequences of this for eyewitness memory? One possibility is that suppression 
and subsequent enhancement of stereotypical information leads to stereotypical-
consistent errors in memory (Macrae, Schloerscheidt, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 2002). 
In the current experiment, we sought to examine whether an instruction to suppress 
stereotypes while reading a racially neutral crime story leads to pseudo-memories 
of and confabulations about non-presented, stereotypical information. Inspired by 
the Araya et al. study (2003), we predicted that participants who are primed with a 
foreign group photograph (negative stereotype) and who are instructed not to think 
of stereotypes while reading a crime story will produce more pseudo-memories of 
stereotype-consistent information on a delayed forced-choice recognition task, rela-
tive to participants who are primed with a photograph of typical Dutch people and 
who are given the instruction to suppress stereotypes.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 88 undergraduate students (59 women) from Maastricht Universi-
ty. Fifty-six were psychology students; the others were enrolled at other faculties. All 
participants had a Dutch/ European background and mastered the Dutch language. 
Participants received course credit for participation. Mean age of the participants was 
21.3 (SD = 2.25; Range: 17-27). The experiment was approved by the standing ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology, Maastricht University. 
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (negative stereotype vs. neu-
tral prime) x 2 (thought suppression vs. control) between-subjects design. Scores on 
a recognition task served as dependent variable. There were three types of recog-
nition items: accurate items (information in the crime story), stereotype-consistent 
items (information not in the crime story, but consistent with the triggered racial 
stereotype), and confabulation items (information not in the crime story). 
Procedure and materials
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. Upon arrival, par-
ticipants were asked to sign an informed consent form. Instructions, manipulations, 
and stimulus materials were given in writing. Students were told that they would 
ﬁrst participate in an unrelated experiment on facial assessment. To activate a nega-
tive stereotype, half of the participants were primed with a photograph of a group of 
immigrants (i.e., foreign group photograph). This photograph showed a group with 
a Surinamese background (4 faces of coloured individuals, 3 men and 1 woman) 
interacting with each other at a party. As an aside, we note that in Dutch society, 
Surinamese people are viewed as a well-integrated minority group. The other half of 
the participants was exposed to a neutral prime consisting of a photograph of typi-
cal Dutch youngsters (2 men and 4 women). Photographs were presented in colour 
(10 by 10 cm) on a white background and were shown for 1 min. To cover up the true 
purpose of the photographs, participants were asked to rate each face on the photo-
graph on a sympathy scale ranging from 1 (not at all friendly) to 8 (very friendly). The 
mean sympathy scores for each picture (averaging the individual face scores) were 
written down and used as a manipulation check. 
Thought suppression procedure. After the priming, participants in both priming condi-
tions were assigned to a thought suppression or control (i.e., no thought suppression) 
condition. Before reading the crime story (see below), participants in the thought sup-
pression condition were instructed not to think of speciﬁc stereotypes such as race, 
age, and gender (following Wegner et al.’s thought suppression procedure; 1987). Con-
trol participants were merely told that they were going to read a story about a crime.
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Crime story. The story was a media article about a group of young people engaging 
in pointless violence against a victim. Race or ethnic background of offenders and 
victim were left unstated. The story was presented on paper (double spaced, consist-
ing of 694 words, comprising two pages). Based on average reading time in a pilot 
study (n = 6), time given to read the story was ﬁxed (3.5 min).
Distraction task. After reading the story, participants were given a brief distraction 
task consisting of two pairs of highly similar pictures that were presented to each 
participant. Each pair of pictures differed on 10 critical points. Participants were told 
to look for 10 differences between each pair of pictures within 5 min.
Forced-choice recognition task. The distraction task was followed by a forced-choice 
recognition task about the crime story. Participants were given the instruction to think 
about all the details presented in the story (including gender, race, age, etc.) and to 
be as accurate as possible. Participants were asked to make old-new discriminations 
for 60 statements about the crime story, by indicating yes (present in the story) or 
no (not present in the story). The recognition test consisted of 20 accurate items, 20 
racial stereotype-consistent items, and 20 confabulation items. Accurate items re-
ferred to details that were present in the crime story (e.g., “The victim was last seen 
on Sunday the 18th of January”). Stereotype-consistent items pertained to details not 
present in the crime story, but that were consistent with racial stereotypes triggered 
by the photograph (e.g., “The main suspect was of foreign origin”). Confabulation 
items were items not present in the story and that were unrelated to stereotypes 
(e.g., “The left hand of the suspect was swollen”). The order of item presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants. After ﬁnishing the forced-choice recognition 
task, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed.
Statistical analysis
Three parameters were derived from the forced-choice recognition performance: 
Proportion correct recognition, proportion stereotype-consistent pseudo-memories, 
and proportion confabulations. These three parameters were subjected to a 
2 (stereotype vs. neutral prime) x 2 (suppression vs. control) Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA). We were particularly interested in a potential interaction effect of stereo-
type priming and suppression on recognition of false stereotype-consistent items. 
Such an interaction would reﬂect a backﬁre effect.
Results
Manipulation check
Neither age nor education was statistically signiﬁcant related to recognition outcome 
measures; all r’s < .20, p’s > .05; two-tailed. To examine whether the two prime condi-
tions did, indeed, elicit speciﬁc stereotypes, we compared mean sympathy scores 
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for faces in both conditions. The mean sympathy score for faces in the Dutch group 
photograph was signiﬁcantly higher than that for faces in the foreign group photo-
graph [t (86) = 4.97, p < .01], means being 5.9 (SD = .86) and 5.1 (SD = .44). Men and 
women did not differ with regard to their mean sympathy scores. This was true when 
sympathy data of both prime conditions were collapsed, [t (86) < 1.0], but also when 
Dutch or foreign photograph conditions were considered separately; both t ‘s (42) < 
1.0, both p ‘s > .05. This indicates that our manipulation of eliciting speciﬁc stereo-
types was successful.
Relations among recognition measures
We computed Pearson product-moment correlations between the three recognition 
parameters for the entire sample. Proportion accurate recognition was not related to 
proportion of stereotype-consistent pseudo-memories or proportion of confabula-
tion (both r‘s < 0.15, both p’s < .30). However, we did ﬁnd a positive correlation (r = 
.65, p < .01; two-tailed) between stereotype-consistent false recognition and confabu-
lation. 
Forced-choice recognition
The proportion of accurate, stereotype-consistent, and confabulation responses are 
shown in TABLE 7.1. A 2 (priming) x 2 (thought suppression) ANOVA performed on rec-
ognition of accurate items did not reveal signiﬁcant main effects of priming [F (1, 84) 
= 1.83, p = .18] or thought suppression; F (1, 84) < 1.0. Neither was there a signiﬁcant 
interaction effect; F (1, 84) < 1.0. 
 When recognition of false stereotype-consistent items was subjected to an 
ANOVA, no main effects of priming [F (1, 84) = 1.74, p = .19] or thought suppression [F 
(1, 84) < 1.0] were found. However, the critical interaction effect of priming x thought 
suppression did emerge; F (1, 84) = 5.57, p = .02. Simple effects analysis showed that 
in the suppression condition, participants who had been primed with a foreign group 
photograph made more stereotype-consistent recognition errors (M = .25) than par-
ticipants who had seen a neutral prime (M = .14); F (1, 42) = 5.35, p = .03, d = .74. In the 
control (i.e., no suppression) condition, participants who had been primed with a for-
eign group photograph or a neutral photograph did not differ from each other with 
regard to proportion stereotype-consistent recognition errors, means being .18 and 
.21; F (1, 42) < 1.0. Although participants who had been primed with a foreign group 
photograph and subsequently engaged in suppression made more stereotype-con-
sistent recognition errors (M = .25) than non-suppressing participants (M = .18), this 
difference fell short of signiﬁcance; F (1, 42) = 1.84, p = .17, d = .42. 
 While an ANOVA performed on confabulatory responses revealed no main ef-
fect of priming [F (1, 84) < 1.0] or thought suppression [F (1, 84) < 1.0], a marginally 
signiﬁcant interaction effect was found for endorsement of confabulatory items; F (1, 
84) = 3.59, p = .06.
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TABLE 7.1 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON MEASURES PROPORTION RECOGNITION OF ACCURATE ITEMS, FALSE STEREOTYPE-CONSISTENT ITEMS, AND 
CONFABULATION ITEMS IN THE THOUGHT SUPPRESSION AND THE CONTROL (I.E., NO THOUGHT SUPPRESSION) CONDITION (N = 88).
STEREOTYPE PRIME
M SD
NEUTRAL PRIME
M SD
Thought suppression
Accurate .85 .16 .79 .16
Stereotype .25 .19 .14 .09
Confabulation .21 .17 .14 .13
No thought suppression
Accurate .81 .10 .80 .14
Stereotype .18 .10 .21 .13
Confabulation .16 .13 .20 .14
 Simple effects analyses indicated that in the suppression condition, partici-
pants who had been primed with a foreign group photograph tended to make more 
confabulation errors relative to participants who had been exposed to a neutral 
prime; F (1, 42) = 2.66, p = .10, d = .46. All other comparisons fell short of signiﬁcance; 
F (1, 42) < 1.0.
Discussion
Early December 2004, the Dutch police showed an en face portrait of Mohamed B. on 
prime time television. A few weeks earlier, Mohamed B. had been arrested for killing 
the Dutch ﬁlm director and writer Theo van Gogh. Immediately after the murder, an 
intense, public debate ensued in which opinion leaders warned each other for preju-
dices and stereotypes. It was in this context that the police showed the portrait of 
Mohamed B. and asked eyewitnesses to inform the police on his social network and 
background. Our ﬁndings suggest that this was a risky procedure as suppression of 
stereotypes (e.g., about Muslims) may facilitate false recognition of stereotype-con-
sistent details (e.g., involvement in terrorism networks). 
 To be sure, in the psychological literature, backﬁre effects of instruction to sup-
press or avoid certain information (e.g., inadmissible evidence) have been described 
extensively (e.g., Cook et al., 2004; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). 
However, relatively little is known about backﬁre effects on memory. We hypothesized 
that priming participants with a foreign group photograph and asking them to sup-
press their thoughts about stereotypes while reading a crime story would lead to ov-
erendorsement of non-presented, stereotype-consistent information in a subsequent 
forced-choice recognition task. Our results demonstrate that when given instructions 
to suppress stereotypes, participants who have been primed with a foreign group 
photograph produce more stereotype-consistent errors on a subsequent recognition 
task than do participants who have been primed with a neutral photograph. Further-
more and somewhat to our surprise, we found that in the suppression condition, 
participants who had been exposed to a foreign group photograph tended to make 
more confabulation errors in comparison to participants who had been given a neu-
tral prime. This latter ﬁnding is of interest, as it suggests that participants who have 
been engaged in thought suppression of stereotypes not only show elevated expec-
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tancy-consistent false recognitions (i.e., more stereotype-consistent errors; see for 
similar ﬁndings Macrae et al., 2002; Woll & Graesser, 1982), but also tend to accept 
other types of non-presented details. Accordingly, the overall correlation between 
stereotype-consistent and confabulation errors was signiﬁcant. Further research is 
needed to replicate and clarify the nature of this correlation. One interpretation that 
suggests itself is that this correlation reﬂects liberal criterion setting during source 
monitoring activities (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). Thus, it may well 
be the case that the combination of stereotypes and suppression encourages lib-
eral criterion setting (e.g., Macrae et al., 2002). Source misattributions of schemat-
ic (i.e., stereotypical) knowledge may be a mechanism through which stereotypes 
about particular individuals or groups may be maintained and retrieved. In particular, 
when people receive the instruction to inhibit stereotypes, active inhibition (i.e., cog-
nitive control) may lead to a decrease in focus on the source of information during 
encoding due to limited cognitive capacities (i.e., increased cognitive load). During 
retrieval, one may be more likely to rely on primed (negative stereotype) schematic 
knowledge. The thought suppression instruction can be seen as an active inhibition 
instruction. For thought suppression instructions, recent research has identiﬁed the 
prefrontal cortex as neural correlate in a network involved in inhibition. In a recent 
fMRI study, Wyland, Kelley, Macrae, Gordon and Heatherton (2003) found that sup-
pression of a particular thought or all conscious thoughts, when compared to the 
free-thought control condition, was accompanied by increased activation of the neu-
ral network of the anterior cingulate and the insula of the prefrontal cortex. A central 
function of the anterior cingulate is conﬂict monitoring in cognitive control; inhibit-
ing to be suppressed information (Wyland et al., 2003).
 Our ﬁndings are well in line with previous work by Araya and colleagues 
(2003), Kimball and Bjork (2002), and Lenton and colleagues (2001). These authors 
also noted that pseudo-memories are fostered by forget/suppression instructions. In 
line with the ﬁndings of Araya et al. (2003), we found that in the suppression condi-
tion (cf. forget condition in the Araya et al. study), participants primed with a stereo-
type but not participants primed with neutral material falsely recognized 
stereotype-consistent items. And like the Araya et al. (2003) study, we found that in 
the control (i.e., non-suppression) condition, participants primed with stereotypes or 
neutral material did not differ with regard to false recognition proportions. Another 
issue that is worthy of note is our failure to obtain an overall (i.e., main) effect of sup-
pression instructions. Thus, it was not the case that suppression instructions produce 
heightened levels of recognition errors, irrespective of primes. One could argue that 
this is inconsistent with the so-called rebound effect (Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). However, previous studies have described rebound effects primarily 
in terms of accessibility (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987) or overt behaviour (Macrae et al., 
1994b), while work on suppression and memory has been scarce. The current ﬁnd-
ings suggest that it is the combination of suppression and stereotypes rather than 
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either suppression or stereotypes alone that produces memory errors that one could 
interpret as a rebound.
 In this study, signiﬁcant differences were found between conditions in the rec-
ognition of non-presented stereotype-consistent items. However, the proportion of 
falsely recognized stereotype-consistent items remained relatively low. This indicates 
that our results were probably not due to a lenient response criterion when partici-
pants encountered stereotype-consistent items during the recognition task (Macrae 
et al., 2002). If this had been the case, the proportion of falsely recognized stereotype-
consistent items would have been substantially higher.
 Several limitations of the current study deserve some comment. One limitation 
concerns the triggering of stereotypes. The manipulations we used might not have 
triggered stereotypes in all participants. On the other hand, there is reason to believe 
that overall, our manipulation did evoke such a stereotype. Germane to this is that 
faces in the foreign group photograph were rated as signiﬁcantly less friendly than 
those in the Dutch group photograph.
 One could argue that in our study, the unequal men-women distribution in the 
photographs that served as primes is a confounder. The foreign group prime showed 
a group of immigrants of whom 3/4 were men. The neutral prime showed a group of 
typical Dutch youngsters of whom 2/3 were women. Since we only obtained mean 
sympathy scores, the possibility that the primes elicited stereotypes about men and 
women rather than immigrant stereotypes cannot be excluded. However, we did not 
ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in sympathy ratings that men and women gave to the 
photographs, showing that both men and women evaluated the primes in a similar 
way. Related to this is the fact that the forced-choice recognition task included stere-
otype-consistent items that referred to immigrants rather than gender issues. To fur-
ther clarify this important point, we conducted a pilot study in which we edited the 
primes using Adobe ® Photoshop 6.0 so as to obtain a men/women ratio of 2/1 for 
both of the priming photographs. If gender rather than immigrant stereotypes would 
drive sympathy scores, one would expect to ﬁnd no differences between these two 
primes. We gave these 2 critical as well as 3 ﬁller primes to 20 students (5 men) and 
asked them for sympathy scores.1 A paired samples t-test revealed that the mean 
sympathy rating given to the foreign prime was signiﬁcantly lower than that given to 
the Dutch prime; t (19) = 6.48, p < .001.
 In this study, we used photographs of a foreign group of youngsters and a 
Dutch group of youngsters. One could argue that the foreign group, like the skinhead 
used in the Macrae et al. (1994b) study, is an example of a group for which there 
are few cultural and personal prohibitions against stereotyping. Thus, participants 
may not be motivated to suppress their stereotypes effectively (e.g., Monteith et al., 
1998a,b). We ﬁnd this line of argumentation in the case of our primes not very con-
vincing. In the Netherlands, the opposition against a multicultural society is not very 
strong (See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005). Also, 
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there are many young foreign Surinamese (i.e., ex-colonial) immigrants in the Neth-
erlands, even in the upper working class. Thus, a widespread and overt acceptance 
of stereotypes about this group is not very likely.
 As mentioned before, recent work by Monteith and colleagues (e.g., 1998a, b; 
2002) shows that not everyone is susceptible to the same degree of stereotype activa-
tion, suppression, and subsequent backﬁre effects. In a series of experiments, these 
researchers demonstrated that level of prejudice, motivation to control stereotyping, 
amount of experience or practice with stereotype control, replacing thoughts, reli-
ance on individuating information, and the extent of automatic stereotype activation 
could moderate the degree to which stereotype suppression leads to subsequent 
backﬁre effects. For example, Monteith and colleagues (1998b) found that relative to 
participants with strong prejudices, participants with low prejudice attitudes towards 
homosexuals were not prone to rebound effects in terms of stereotype use and 
stereotype activation. In our experiment, we did not include such individual differ-
ences measures. With the results of Monteith and co-workers (1998a, b; 2000) in 
mind, one could expect to ﬁnd the highest level of stereotype-consistent memory 
errors in a high prejudice group, since this group cannot exert control over their 
stereotypes. In future research on stereotypes and pseudo-memories, it would be 
worthwhile to address this issue.
 To what extent can we trust eyewitnesses in courtroom settings when nega-
tive stereotypes are likely to be triggered? Our ﬁndings suggest that exposure to a 
stereotype (e.g., seeing a non-Caucasian suspect in the courtroom) combined with 
the instruction not to think of stereotypical information (e.g., disregarding evidence 
concerning race) might undermine memory accuracy. Stereotypes not only make 
cognitive processing easier, but might also lead to the creation of entirely new (and 
pseudo-) memories. This especially seems to be the case when people are asked to 
suppress stereotypically related information.
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CHAPTER [8] MEMORY EFFICIENCY, SOURCE ATTRIBUTIONS, AND 
EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTIONS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA
An adjusted version of this chapter is accepted, pending revision as: Peters, M.J.V., Cima, M., Smeets, T., Vos de M., 
Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. (pending revision). Did I say that word or did you? Executive dysfunctions in schizo-
phrenic patients affect memory efﬁciency, but not source attributions. 
Abstract
Schizophrenic patients have difﬁculties in recognizing previously presented verbal 
information and identifying its sources. The antecedents of these recognition and 
source misattributions are, however, largely unknown. The current study examined to 
what extent schizophrenic patients’ lack of memory efﬁciency, their memory errors, 
and their source misattributions are related to neurocognitive deﬁcits (i.e., execu-
tive dysfunctions). Twenty-three schizophrenic patients and 20 healthy controls were 
administered an adapted version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task from 
which parameters of memory efﬁciency, memory errors, source misattributions, and 
two-high threshold measures were derived. Furthermore, two neurocognitive tasks 
tapping executive functions were administered: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) and the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS). 
Using multiple linear regression analyses, we examined whether these neurocogni-
tive measures predicted various memory parameters. Patients with schizophrenia 
showed poorer memory efﬁciency and were more prone to make internal-exter-
nal source misattributions with high conﬁdence. However, they did not more often 
falsely recognize critical lure words than controls. Executive dysfunctions predicted 
memory efﬁciency, but not source misattribution performance. Our ﬁndings provide 
further evidence that schizophrenic patients’ memory impairments are intimately re-
lated to fundamental neurocognitive deﬁcits.
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Introduction
Schizophrenia is known for its prominent cognitive deﬁcits (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 
1998). While memory performance of schizophrenic patients exhibits a wide range 
of impairments (Aleman, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 1999; McKenna, Ornstein, & 
Baddeley, 2002), it is especially characterized by omission errors (i.e., misses). That 
is, schizophrenic patients have a tendency to omit or miss information when asked 
to recall or recognize speciﬁc verbal or nonverbal material (e.g., McKenna, Tamlyn, 
Lund, Mortimer, Hammond, & Baddeley, 1990; Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, 
& Watson, 2004; see Aleman et al., 1999, for a meta-analysis). However, because such 
omission errors can be observed in many psychiatric patients, recent research has 
tried to pinpoint memory aberrations that are more speciﬁc for schizophrenia (Ale-
man et al., 1999; McKenna, McKay, & Laws, 2000). One memory aspect that seems to 
be markedly impaired in schizophrenia is source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993). This refers to the ability to identify the source of remembered infor-
mation, i.e., source attribution. Schizophrenic patients consistently show a deﬁciency 
in internal source attribution (e.g., “Did I do this or did I only imagine this?” Nienow 
& Docherty, 2004) and reality monitoring (e.g., “Did I say this or did someone else 
say this to me?” Brébion, Amador, David, Malaspina, Sharif, & Gorman, 2000; Bré-
bion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina, & Sharif, 2002; Keefe, Arnold, Bayen, & Harvey, 
1999; Moritz, Woodward, & Ruff, 2003; Vinogradov, Willis-Shore, Poole, Marten, Ober, 
& Shenaut, 1997). Moritz and colleagues (2003) reported that, apart from their ten-
dency to make source misattributions, schizophrenic patients also show exaggerated 
conﬁdence in their source judgment capabilities.
 Interestingly, recent studies (Elvevåg, Fisher, Weickert, Weinberger, & Gold-
berg, 2004; Moritz et al., 2004; Weiss, Dodson, Goff, Schacter, & Heckers, 2002) not-
ed that schizophrenic patients’ memory is superior to that of control individuals in 
one particular respect: Schizophrenic patients are less susceptible to experimentally 
induced pseudo-memories (i.e., false alarms of critical lures). For example, using 
the standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) to elicit such false alarms, Moritz and co-workers (2004) found 
that compared to healthy controls, patients with schizophrenia produce relatively 
few false alarms when confronted with semantically related lures in a recognition 
task (e.g., they less often falsely recognize the never presented word sleep among 
a list of previously presented semantic associates like bed, rest, tired, and so on). 
However, in accordance with other studies, Moritz and co-workers also reported that 
schizophrenic patients tend to make many misses on the DRM task, while showing 
an increased conﬁdence in these errors. 
 How can this pattern of memory aberrations typical for schizophrenia best be 
explained? A plethora of research has demonstrated a speciﬁc link between clinical 
symptomatology (positive and negative symptoms) and susceptibility to source mis-
attributions (e.g., Brébion et al., 2000; Brébion et al., 2002; Brébion, Gorman, 
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Malaspina, & Amador, 2005; see also Nienow & Docherty, 2004, for similar ﬁndings). 
Moreover, recent studies demonstrated that source misattribution performance is 
partly dependent on intellectual ability (Vinogradov et al., 1997) and cognitive func-
tions (e.g., verbal memory performance; Elvevåg et al., 2004; Moritz et al., 2003; 
Moritz et al., 2004). In an attempt to integrate these ﬁndings, Brébion and colleagues 
(2005) investigated the relationships between verbal memory impairments, source 
misattribution, and automated cognitive functions, on the one hand, and clinical 
symptomatology, on the other. The authors looked at two memory systems: memory 
efﬁciency and memory errors. Memory efﬁciency refers to the number of correct re-
sponses and can be further subdivided into superﬁcial and deep memory processing. 
Brébion and co-workers found that processing speed and selective attention serve 
as the primary antecedents of memory efﬁciency. Memory errors (false alarms to 
critical lures or new words) were found to be associated with positive and negative 
symptoms. These authors also noted that source misattributions affected memory 
errors directly and indirectly via positive symptomatology. 
 There are good reasons to believe that distinct neuropsychological deﬁcits re-
lated to schizophrenia also affect memory efﬁciency and memory errors (see Chapter 
1 for a review). Indeed, Brébion and colleagues (2005) argued that as memory deﬁ-
cits (e.g., omission errors) observed in schizophrenia resemble those seen in patients 
with damage to the medial temporal lobe, schizophrenic patients have difﬁculties 
with deep memory processing during encoding (e.g., inefﬁcient memory strategy). 
Alternatively, memory deﬁcits in schizophrenia may be caused by executive dysfunc-
tions. After all, an important aspect of executive functioning, which is subserved by 
a neural network encompassing primarily the prefrontal cortex, is monitoring the 
retrieval of encoded events in memory (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Johnson et 
al., 1993; Chapter 1). Because schizophrenic patients exhibit marked deﬁcits on both 
executive and memory tasks (see McKenna et al., 2002; Weinberger et al., 2001), 
executive dysfunctions may explain memory impairments in schizophrenia over and 
above the contribution of symptomatology and medial temporal lobe dysfunctions 
(see Moritz et al., 2003; Vinogradov et al., 1997).
 Most of the studies cited above looked at isolated memory dysfunctions in schizophren-
ic patients. That is, they speciﬁcally focused on schizophrenic patients’ memory efﬁciency, 
memory errors or source misattributions. The current study relied on a paradigm that allowed 
examining all these different memory dysfunctions simultaneously. We also explored how cer-
tain neurocognitive impairments are related to these dysfunctions because this may inform 
theories about the origins of schizophrenic patients’ memory aberrations.  More speciﬁcally, 
we explored whether executive control and working memory measured by the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993) and planning of behaviour indexed 
by the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson, Alderman, Bur
gess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) predict memory efﬁciency, memory errors, and source misattri-
butions in schizophrenic patients and healthy controls. 
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 A shortcoming of many previous studies in this domain (Moritz & Woodward, 
2002; Moritz et al., 2003, but see Moritz et al., 2004) is that they elicited low levels 
of experimentally induced pseudo-memories (i.e., false alarms). Hence, a laboratory 
task was employed that is known to elicit high levels of pseudo-memories, even in 
healthy controls. To this end, we used an adapted version of the DRM paradigm to 
simultaneously tap memory efﬁciency, memory errors, and source misattributions.
 In keeping with previous work, we expected that relative to controls, schizo-
phrenic patients would display a decrease in memory efﬁciency and more source 
misattributions, while showing an increased conﬁdence for these errors. Conversely, 
control participants were expected to commit more experimentally induced pseudo-
memories (i.e., false alarms for critical lures) together with an increased conﬁdence 
for the critical lure words. Most importantly, we tested whether executive dysfunc-
tions related to the prefrontal cortex might statistically predict memory aberrations 
in schizophrenia.
Method
Participants
Twenty-three inpatients (18 men, 5 women) with a DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) diagno-
sis of schizophrenia were recruited from two Belgian psychiatric hospitals: Medical 
Centre Sint-Jozef, Munsterbilzen and Public Psychiatric Centre, Rekem. Diagnoses 
were made by a panel of experienced psychiatrists on the basis of extensive diag-
nostic interviews, but prior to neurocognitive assessment. Socio-demographic infor-
mation and clinical data are presented in TABLE 8.1. All patients were on ﬁxed doses of 
antipsychotic medication, either typical (86%) or atypical (14%). Based on a thorough 
screening of the medical records, they were excluded if they had a history of severe 
neurological disorders, substance abuse, or another co-morbid axis 1 disorder. 
 Twenty healthy control participants (18 men, 2 women) were recruited from a 
pool of volunteers from Maastricht University and through advertisements in a local 
newspaper. Control participants were matched for age, gender, and level of educa-
tion. They were screened with a semi-structured interview to rule out a psychiatric 
history, neurological disorders, alcohol abuse or drug addiction. None of the control 
participants had a ﬁrst-degree relative with a history of schizophrenia. Socio-demo-
graphic characteristics of the control group are also shown in TABLE 8.1. All participants 
gave informed consent before participation. They were paid € 10 (approximately 12.5 
US dollars) per hour. The study was approved by the standing ethical committee of 
the Faculty of Psychology, Maastricht University.
133
MEMORY FUNCTIONING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA | chapter 8
TABLE 8.1 DEMOGRAPHIC, SYMPTOMATOLOGICAL, AND NEUROCOGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHIZOPHRENIC AND CONTROL PARTICIPANTS. STANDARD 
DEVIATIONS ARE GIVEN IN PARENTHES.
SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS 
 (n = 23)
CONTROL PARTICIPANTS
(n = 20)
STATISTICS
Age 36.30 (13.13) 35.20 (9.71) t (41) = .31, n.s.
Gender (men/women) 18/5 18/2 χ2 (1) = 1.08, n.s.
Education level* 4.74 (1.18) 5.35 (.99) t (41) = 1.83, n.s.
Intelligence level 104.45 (13.75) 110.75 (10.30) t (41) = 1.67, n.s.
Number of hospitalizations 2.43 (1.40) --- ---
Length of illness (in years) 6.96 (7.38) --- ---
BPRS
        Positive syndrome 9.17 (4.29) --- ---
        Negative syndrome 5.30 (2.12) --- ---
        Disorganization 4.13 (1.71) --- ---
        Total 32.65 (8.52) --- ---
Executive function
       BADS
Total score** 14.04 (4.01) 20.05 (2.04) t(41) = 5.83, p<.01
       WCST
N categories** 2.83 (1.80) 5.45 (1.05) t(41) = 5.72, p<.01
Perseverative errors # 54.67 (19.79) 21.10 (16.31) t(41) = 5.91, p<.01
* ACCORDING TO VERHAGE (1964; WHERE 1 = LOWER EDUCATION; 7 = UNIVERSITY DEGREE)
** LOWER SCORES INDICATING POORER EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
# HIGHER SCORES INDICATING POORER EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING
Materials
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS). We used the 18-item BPRS to measure current 
symptomatological status of the schizophrenic patients (Overall & Gorham, 1988). 
Each BPRS item is rated from 1 (not present) to 7 (extremely present). This scale 
was originally developed for identifying schizophrenic symptoms, but also includes 
items tapping, for example, depression. The BPRS was administered by three cli-
nicians who were blind as to the neurocognitive status of the patients. Summing 
items across subscale yields separate scores for negative, positive, and disorganized 
thought symptomatology. Thus, a negative symptomatology score is obtained by 
summing scores for the “emotional withdrawal”, “motor retardation”, and “blunted 
affect” items. A positive symptomatology score is obtained by summing across 
the “unusual thought content”, “grandiosity”, “suspiciousness”, and “hallucinatory 
behavior” items. The disorganized symptomatology subscale comprises only two 
symptoms: “conceptual disorganization” and “mannerisms and posturing” (Moritz 
et al., 2001a).
Premorbid intelligence. Premorbid intelligence was measured with the Dutch Adult 
Reading Test (Schmand, Lindeboom, & Harskamp, 1992), which is the Dutch version 
of the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982). This task asks participants to 
read aloud 50 words with irregular spelling. The total score is the number of words 
that the participant articulates with a correct pronunciation. To estimate premorbid 
intelligence, scores are compared against normative data.
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Adapted Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. We developed an adapted 
version of the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) so as to 
tap memory efﬁciency, memory errors, and source attributions. Participants were 
administered a Dutch version of the DRM paradigm consisting of 8 selected word 
lists drawn from a normative study (Chapter 2). Each list consisted of 15 words (e.g., 
bed, nap, pillow, snooze) semantically related to a non-presented critical lure word 
(e.g., sleep). The lists were read aloud one after the other. To create an internal-exter-
nal source attribution condition during encoding of word lists, 4 lists were presented 
by the experimenter and 4 by the participant (each read aloud). This was done in 
an alternating sequence, such that the experimenter read the ﬁrst list, followed by 
the participant reading the second, then again the experimenter who read the third 
and so on. For each participant, lists were randomized across this sequence. Words 
were presented on a Dell 15-inch laptop computer using PowerPoint. Each word was 
presented for 1 sec with an inter-stimulus interval of 1 sec. After the 8 lists had been 
presented, participants were asked to complete a ﬁller task. Next, participants had 
an old-new recognition task consisting of the 8 critical lures of the studied lists com-
pletely intermixed with 24 study words (the 1st, 8th and 10th word of each studied list) 
and 16 unrelated (i.e., new) lures taken from non-presented lists. Only words that 
were in no way associated with the words in the studied lists were used as unrelated 
lures. For each of the 48 recognition task items, the participant was instructed to pro-
vide three responses: (a) old-new decision; (b) source attribution: That is, when the 
word was recognized as old, participants had to determine who had read this word 
aloud: the experimenter or the participant; (c) memory conﬁdence: Here, participants 
were asked to rate on an 11- point scale (anchors: 0 = I really don’t know; 10 = ab-
solutely convinced) how conﬁdent they were concerning their old-new and source 
attribution decisions.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). To tap executive functions, participants were ad-
ministered a computerized version of the WCST (128 test trials; Heaton et al., 1993). 
This task was used to measure executive control and working memory (Hartman, 
Steketee, Silva, Lanning, & Andersson, 2003). Stimulus material was presented on a 
Dell 15-inch laptop using E-prime software (www.pstnet.com; Psychology Software 
Tools). In this task, participants have to sort a deck of cards into four piles, each 
marked by a key card. Each card consists of one of four designs that appear in one of 
four different colours (red, green, yellow, or blue), and in one of four forms (triangles, 
crosses, stars, or circles). Although each card can be sorted according to one of the 
three dimensions (colour, form or number) at any given point in the test, only one 
dimension is correct. The sorting rule must be inferred from feedback provided on the 
computer screen (either “correct” or “incorrect”) given after each card. This sorting 
rule changes without warning after 10 consecutive correct sorts and the test contin-
ues until each sorting rule is used twice (in the order colour, form, and number). In 
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the present study, we calculated the WCST parameters “categories completed” (0-6), 
and “number of perseverative errors”.
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS). The BADS (Wilson 
et al., 1996; see Krabbendam & Kalff, 1998, for a Dutch version) is a well-established 
method for assessing executive functions in schizophrenic patients (Krabbendam, de 
Vugt, Derix, & Jolles, 1999). It presents the participant with a series of 6 unstructured 
tasks that are designed to reﬂect daily situations. These tasks intend to measure plan-
ning of behaviour in the face of competing information. The BADS comprises the 
Rule Shift Cards Test (requiring shifts from simple to complex rules), the Action Pro-
gram Test (practical problem solving), the Key Search Test (searching strategies), the 
Temporal Judgment Test (time judgments), the Zoo Map Test (route planning), and 
the Modiﬁed Six elements Test (ability to plan, organize, and monitor behaviour). 
For each of the tasks, a summary proﬁle score is obtained (Range: 0-4) and these are 
summed up to obtain a total proﬁle score (maximum = 24), with higher scores indi-
cating better planning capacities. This total proﬁle score will be used in the present 
experiment. 
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Before testing, all participants 
received a semi-structured interview to verify the absence of exclusion criteria. Sub-
sequently, participants were administered the BPRS (patients only), NART, WCST, 
and BADS. Next, participants were given the following instruction: “In the current 
experiment, I will present some lists of words to you. Half of the lists will be read by 
me. For the other half of the lists, I would like you to read aloud the words presented 
on the computer screen. I will start with the ﬁrst list, after which you will have to read 
aloud the next list, followed by a list read aloud by me and so on.” This was followed 
by a ﬁller task (unrelated questionnaire) and ﬁnally the recognition test of the DRM 
was presented.
Statistical analyses
Three different categories of memory indices were derived: memory efﬁciency, 
memory errors, and source attributions. Memory efﬁciency was deﬁned as the pro-
portion hits. Proportion hits was obtained by dividing the number of recognized old 
words by the total number of old words on recognition test (i.e., 24). We also calcu-
lated proportion false alarms (memory errors), which was deﬁned as number of new 
words recognized as old divided by 24. For both categories of new words (i.e., new 
unrelated words and critical lure words), a false alarm index was also separately 
calculated. Attributing old words presented by either the experimenter or participant 
to their correct source was deﬁned as correct source attribution. Accordingly, source 
misattributions (i.e., incorrect source attributions) were deﬁned as self-presented 
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items that were misattributed to the experimenter (self to experimenter) or experi-
menter-generated items that participants misattributed to themselves (experimenter 
to self).
 Following the Two-High Threshold theory (Corwin, 1994, Snodgrass & Corwin, 
1988), we calculated discrimination index (memory efﬁciency; Pr) and response bias 
index (memory errors; Br), as measures of accurate and biased discrimination be-
tween targets (i.e., old items) and distractors (i.e., new items), respectively. These 
indices were also calculated for the source attribution measures (source Pr and Br). 
In doing so, we took the number of erroneous answers into account. Thus, discrimi-
nation index was deﬁned as: (number of hits+ .5/number of targets+1)-(number of 
false alarms+ .5/number of distractors+1). Response bias was deﬁned as: (number of 
false alarms+ .5/number of discractors+1)/(1-discrimination index). 
 For all analyses, signiﬁcance level was set at 5 %; two-tailed. As there was no 
dependency between recognition variables, two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
with group (control vs. schizophrenia) as between-subject factor and recognition state 
(hits vs. false alarms critical lures vs. false alarms new) as within-subject factor were 
carried out. These were followed by independent samples t-tests. When dependency 
was present, independent samples t-tests were carried out to compare groups with 
regard to the different memory indices and conﬁdence ratings. A two-way ANOVA 
was also carried out for Pr indices for the different recognition states, with group sta-
tus (control vs. schizophrenia) as between-subject factor and discrimination indices 
(Pr hits-false alarm critical lures vs. Pr hits-false alarms new vs. Pr false alarms criti-
cal lures- new) as repeated measure factor. A similar analysis was carried out for the 
response bias indices (Br hits-false alarm critical lures vs. Br hits-false alarms new vs. 
Br false alarms critical lures-new) Furthermore, for the subsample of schizophrenic 
patients, correlation analyses (Pearson-product moment) were carried out between 
BPRS scores and the different memory indices. Multiple linear regression analy-
ses (Enter method) were performed to explore the contribution of neurocognitive 
functions (BADS, WCST) to memory efﬁciency (hits and Pr indices), memory errors 
(false alarms and Br indices), and source attributions (incorrect source attribution, 
source Pr, and source Br). As measures of effect size, Cohen’s d (t-tests) and partial 
eta squared (ηp²; Analysis of Variance) were calculated.
Results
Demographic data
As can be seen in TABLE 8.1, patients and controls did not differ in terms of gender dis-
tribution, age, premorbid intelligence level, and educational level. Test scores of the 
neurocognitive measures (WCST, and BADS) are also shown.
Encoding conditions
Before pooling the data across the two encoding conditions (experimenter read vs. 
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participant read word lists), the potential confounding effect of encoding conditions 
on recognition performance of schizophrenic and control participants was tested. A 
signiﬁcant interaction between group and encoding condition, with schizophrenic 
patients being more sensitive to differences in encoding conditions compared to 
controls would be evidence for such a confounding effect. To test this, two 2 (group 
status) x 2 (experimenter read vs. participant read word lists) ANOVA’s with repeated 
measures on the last factor were carried out for memory efﬁciency (hits) and memory 
errors (total false alarms). The critical interactions remained non-signiﬁcant [both F’s 
(1,41) < 2.0, both p’s > .05], indicating that the two encoding conditions did not pro-
duce differential effects on memory efﬁciency and errors for patients and controls. 
For this reason, pooling the data across encoding conditions was appropriate. 
Memory efﬁciency and memory errors
A 2 (group status) x 3 (recognition state: hits vs. false alarms critical lures vs. false 
alarms new) ANOVA was carried out with repeated measures on the last factor. This 
yielded a signiﬁcant main effect of group status [F (1,41) = 6.42,  p = .01, ηp² = .14] 
and recognition state [F (2,82) = 577.49, p < .001, ηp²= .93]. The interaction effect of 
group by recognition state was also signiﬁcant [F (2,82) = 10.34, p < .001, ηp² = .20; 
see FIGURE 8.1]. These were followed by independent samples t-tests for the memory 
efﬁciency and error indices. As can be seen in TABLE 8.2 (including t-values and Cohen’s 
d), schizophrenic patients made signiﬁcantly fewer hits than controls. These patients 
also more often made false alarms for new unrelated words as compared to con-
trol participants. On the other hand, control participants more often accepted critical 
lures compared to schizophrenic participants. 
Discrimination index (Pr) and response bias index (Br)
Discrimination indices (Pr) and response bias indices (Br) were calculated for hits vs. false alarms 
critical lures, hits vs. false alarms new, and false alarms critical lures vs. false alarms new (based 
on Hudon, Bellevile, Souchay, Gély-Nargeot, Chertkow, & Gauthier, 2006). These indices were 
analyzed using a 2 (group status) x 3 (discrimination state: Pr hits-false alarms critical lures vs. Pr 
hits-false alarms new vs. Pr false alarm critical lures-new) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the last factor, yielding a signiﬁcant main effect of group [F (1,41) = 24.57, p < .001, ηp² =  .38] and 
discrimination state [F (2,82) = 327.74, p < .001, ηp²  = 89]. However, the interaction effect remained 
non-signiﬁcant. This analysis was followed up by independent samples t-tests. Groups differed 
with regard to Pr hits vs. false alarms new and Pr false alarm critical lures vs. new, in that patients 
were signiﬁcantly worse at discriminating between these memory indices (see TABLE 8.2).
 For the response bias indices, a similar 2 (group status) x 3 (response bias state: Br hits-
false alarms critical lures vs. Br hits-false alarms new vs. Br false alarm critical lures-new) ANOVA 
was analyzed. A signiﬁcant main effect emerged for the response bias state [F (2,82) = 202.32, p < 
.001, ηp²  = .83]. For the group status, a marginal signiﬁcant main effect emerged [F (1,41) = 3.71, 
p = .06, ηp²  = .08].
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TABLE 8.2. MEAN PROPORTION SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF MEMORY EFFICIENCY, MEMORY ERROR, AND SOURCE ATTRIBUTION INDICES FOR SCHIZO-
PHRENIC PATIENTS AND HEALTHY CONTROL PARTICIPANTS. STATISTICS (T-VALUES) AND EFFECT SIZES (COHEN’S D) ARE ALSO GIVEN.
SCHIZOPHRENIC 
PATIENTS
CONTROL 
PARTICIPANTS
(n = 23) (n = 20)
M (SD) M (SD) STATISTICS
    t (41) = COHEN’S d
Memory efﬁciency
Hits .71 (.16) .88 (.11) 4.09, p < .001 1.24
Discrimination index (Pr)
  Pr hits vs. false alarm critical lures -.04 (.17) .03 (.13) 1.54, p > .05 .46
  Pr hits vs. false alarm new .59 (.17) .81 (.11) 4.96, p < .001 1.54
  Pr false alarm critical lures vs. new .64 (.17) .78 (.16) 2.86, p < .01 .85
Memory errors
False alarm critical lures * .78 (.16) .88 (.17) 2.02, p = .05 .61
False alarm new ** .09 (.11) .03 (.04) 2.10, p = .04 .72
Total  false alarm *** .32 (.10) .32 (.07) .10, p > .05 .11
   Bias index (Br)
Br hits vs. false alarm critical lures .72 (.12) .86 (.12) 3.97, p < .001 1.17
Br hits vs. false alarm new .27 (.20) .35 (.20) 1.37, p > .05 .40
Br false alarm critical lures vs. new .30 (.21) .33 (.20) .48, p > .05 .15
Source attribution
   Correct source attribution .39 (.13) .64 (.15) 5.68, p < .001 1.78
   Incorrect source attribution .32 (.12) .24 (.11) 2.17, p =.04 .69
 Source false alarms Self-Exp. .42 (.19) .30 (.13) 2.36, p = .02 .74
   Source false alarms Exp.-Self .21 (.17) .18 (.15) .71, p > .05 .19
  Source Pr .08 (.19) .39 (.23) 4.80, p < .001 1.47
  Source Br .35 (.09) .41 (.07) 2.55, p = .02 .74
* NUMBER OF FALSE RECOGNITION CRITICAL LURES / 8
** NUMBER OF FALSE RECOGNITION NEW / 16
*** (NUMBER OF FALSE RECOGNITION CRITICAL LURES +NUMBER OF FALSE RECOGNITION NEW) / 24
  The interaction between group status and response bias state remained non-
signiﬁcant. Overall, both groups showed a liberal response bias (Br) when compar-
ing hits vs. false alarms of critical lures. However, controls displayed a more liberal 
Br than schizophrenic patients (see TABLE 8.2). For the other two response biases (Br hits 
vs. false alarms new and Br false alarms critical lures vs. new), both groups showed 
a more conservative response bias. However, there were no differences between the 
two groups on these indices. 
Source attribution
 TABLE 8.2 shows source attribution data of both groups, including statistics (t-values) 
and effect sizes (Cohen’s d). Overall, control participants were signiﬁcantly better 
in attributing the correct source to the old items than were patients. Total incorrect 
source attribution differed between the groups. When differentiating between self-
presented and experimenter-presented words, schizophrenic patients more often at-
tributed self-presented words to the experimenter, compared to control participants. 
The groups did not differ in attributing words presented by the experimenter to 
themselves. Groups also differed with regard to Source Pr and source Br. Relative to 
controls, patients were signiﬁcantly worse at discriminating between source targets 
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and distractors (source Pr). However, source response bias (source Br) was signiﬁ-
cantly more liberal for the control group as compared to the schizophrenic group.
FIGURE 8.1 MEAN PROPORTION SCORES FOR HITS, FALSE ALARMS OF CRITICAL LURES AND FALSE ALARMS NEW FOR SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENTS AND CONTROL 
PARTICIPANTS. STANDARD ERRORS OF MEAN (SEM) ARE PRESENTED IN T BARS. 
Relationship between memory efﬁciency, memory errors, source attribution, and 
BPRS
None of the symptom scores as measured by the BPRS showed signiﬁcant correla-
tions with hits. For memory errors, a marginally signiﬁcant correlation was found 
between BPRS disorganization and false alarms of new words (r = .34, p = .05, one-
tailed). None of the other memory efﬁciency, memory errors, or source attribution 
parameters were related to the BPRS subscales (all r’s < .20, all p’s > .05).
Conﬁdence ratings
As can be seen in TABLE 8.3 (including t-values and Cohen’s d), relative to patients, con-
trol participants had more conﬁdence in their hits. For memory errors, control par-
ticipants showed signiﬁcantly more conﬁdence in false alarms for critical lure words 
compared to schizophrenic patients. As for conﬁdence in source decisions, schizo-
phrenic patients showed higher conﬁdence in falsely attributing old words presented 
by themselves to the experimenter, whereas controls showed more conﬁdence in 
correct source attribution. All other comparisons remained non-signiﬁcant. None of 
the conﬁdence parameters correlated with BPRS symptom scores. 
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TABLE 8.3 MEANS (SD) FOR SOURCE ATTRIBUTION CONFIDENCE IN SCHIZOPHRENIC AND CONTROL PARTICIPANTS.
SCHIZOPHRENIC 
PATIENTS (n = 23)
M (SD)
CONTROLS
(n = 20)
M (SD)
STATISTICS
t (41), p
COHEN’S 
d
Conﬁdence memory efﬁciency
Hits 6.90 (2.18) 8.30 (1.25) 2.60, p < .01 .79
Correct rejection 5.27 (3.73) 3.83 (1.87) 1.56, n.s. .49
Conﬁdence memory errors
                      False alarm critical lure 5.37 (2.03) 7.16 (1.82) 2.97, p < .005 .92
                      False alarm new 2.32 (2.72) 1.08 (1.61) 1.77, n.s. .55
Total false alarm 4.35 (1.84) 5.15 (1.35) 1.57, n.s. .50
Misses 6.99 (2.27) 5.33 (3.21) 1.97, n.s. .60
Conﬁdence source attribution
                     Correct source attribution 6.71 (2.08) 8.11 (1.20) 2.51, p < .02 .78
Incorrect source attribution 6.85 (1.91) 6.04 (1.86) 1.40, n.s. .43
Source false alarms Self-Exp. 7.86 (2.69) 5.21 (1.17) 4.06, p < .001 1.28
Source false alarms Exp.-Self 5.84 (3.30) 6.29 (3.80) .42, n.s. .13
Neurocognitive deﬁcits and memory functioning
As can be seen in TABLE 8.1, schizophrenic patients performed worse on the executive 
function tasks (i.e., WCST and BADS) than controls (all t’s (41) > 5.00, all p’s < .001), 
all d’s > 1.75. 
 We included the neurocognitive measures (i.e., WCST perseverative errors and 
BADS total score)1 into multiple regression analyses (Enter method) to test whether 
these measures would predict memory efﬁciency, memory errors, and source attri-
butions (see TABLE 8.4). Data of both groups were pooled and then regression analyses 
were conducted. The analyses were restricted to memory efﬁciency (hits, Pr hits-false 
alarms new, Pr false alarm critical lures-new), memory errors (false alarms critical 
lures, false alarms new, and Br hits-false alarms critical lures), and source misattri-
bution (incorrect source attribution, source Self-Experimenter, source Pr, and source 
Br). The results demonstrated that for hits, WCST perseverative errors and BADS to-
tal score were signiﬁcant predictors. The relationship with perseverative errors was 
negative, indicating that an increase in perseverative errors was associated with a de-
crease in memory efﬁciency. For the BADS test, higher executive functioning scores 
were associated with an increase in memory efﬁciency. When these predictors were 
entered in the regression analysis, the model accounted for 51 % of the variance. The 
discrimination index (Pr hits vs. false alarms new) was predicted by the BADS total 
score and WCST perseverative errors. For the BADS score, better executive scores 
were associated with superior discrimination. For the WCST perseverative errors, 
heightened perseverative errors were accompanied by poor discrimination. This re-
gression model accounted for 58% of the variance. None of the executive functioning 
measures entered the regression equations for the other false alarms and source 
misattribution scores.
 When multiple regression analyses were carried out for both groups separate-
ly, signiﬁcant predictors of memory efﬁciency only emerged in the schizophrenic 
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patient sample. For hits, WCST perseverative errors (negative) and BADS total score 
(positive) were found to be signiﬁcant predictors, accounting for 48 % of the vari-
ance. Furthermore, BADS total score was a signiﬁcant predictor of discrimination 
index (Pr hits vs. false alarms new), with higher BADS scores predicting higher Pr 
values, accounting for 47% of the explained variance. For memory errors and source 
attribution indices, no signiﬁcant neurocognitive predictors were identiﬁed in both 
groups. 
TABLE 8.4 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSES PREDICTING MEMORY EFFICIENCY (HITS, PR HITS VS. FALSE ALARMS NEW, AND PR HITS VS. FALSE ALARMS 
CITICAL LURE VS. NEW), MEMORY ERRORS (FALSE ALARMS CRITICAL LURES, FALSE ALARMS NEW, BR HITS VS. FALSE ALARMS CRITICAL LURES), AND SOURCE 
MISATTRIBUTION (INCORRECT SOURCE ATTRIBUTION, SOURCE PR, AND SOURCE BR) SCORES ON THE BASIS OF EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTIONS (WCST PERSEVERA-
TIVE ERRORS, BADS TOTAL SCORE) FOR BOTH GROUPS. ALL INDEPENDENT MEASURES WERE ENTERED.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE VARIABLES ENTERED AT p < .05 B SE B ß R ²
Memory efﬁciency
Hits Perseverative errors -.05 .02 -.36 .51
BADS total score .35 .14 .42
Pr hits vs. false alarms new Perseverative errors -.002 .001 -.35 .58
BADS total score .02 .01 .47
Pr false alarms critica lures vs. new No variables entered
Memory errors
False alarm critical lures No variables entered 
False alarm new No variables entered
Br hits vs. false alarms critical lures No variables entered
BADS total score
Source attribution
Incorrect source attribution No variables entered
Source Self-Experimenter No variables entered
Source Pr No variables entered
Source Br No variables entered
Discussion
We found that patients with schizophrenia, relative to controls, showed poorer mem-
ory efﬁciency. Their hit rates were accompanied by a lowered conﬁdence in compari-
son to the control group. As to false alarms of critical lures, in line with prior research 
(e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Elvevåg et al., 2004; Moritz et al., 2004), both 
groups showed a substantial number of such false alarms, and also demonstrated at 
chance performance for discrimination levels between hits and false alarms of criti-
cal lures. However, and again replicating previous work (Moritz et al., 2004; Weiss et 
al., 2002), it was the control group that had the highest level false alarms of critical 
lures. This was accompanied by heightened conﬁdence. On the other hand, schizo-
phrenic patients more often made false alarms for new lures than controls, therefore 
also showing decreased discrimination between hits and false alarms for new words. 
As to the individual source misattribution indices, our ﬁndings concur with previous 
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research by Keefe et al. (1999), Moritz et al. (2003), and Vinogradov et al. (1997) in 
that relative to healthy controls, schizophrenic patients were more prone to recog-
nize self-presented words as presented by the experimenter (internal-external source 
misattribution) with increased conﬁdence ratings. This misattribution tendency was 
clearly reﬂected in the source discrimination index, which was signiﬁcantly lower 
in the schizophrenic patients than controls (see also Brébion et al., 2002; Henquet, 
Krabbendam, Dautzenberg, Jolles, & Merckelbach, 2005). Another important ﬁnding 
of the current study is that executive functioning indices (i.e., WCST perseverative 
errors and BADS total score) serve as signiﬁcant predictors of memory efﬁciency. 
Yet, none of these neurocognitive measures accounted for source misattributions or 
memory error scores. As well, in schizophrenic patients, but not in controls, execu-
tive dysfunctions predicted memory efﬁciency.
 When overall performance accuracy was taken into account, controls showed 
a more liberal response bias tendency than schizophrenic patients for hits vs. false 
alarms of critical lures. For source Br, the magnitude of this bias index is similar 
to those reported in previous research using similar samples (e.g., Brébion et al., 
2002; Henquet et al., 2005). However, previous studies did not detect signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in response bias between schizophrenic patients and healthy controls. The 
fact that we did ﬁnd such differences is probably related to the DRM version that we 
employed. Thus, the high levels of false alarms of critical lures in particularly controls 
is most likely the result of a more liberal response bias in this group promoted by 
the semantically related stimulus material. In contrast, schizophrenic patients’ higher 
false alarm levels for new lures might reﬂect overall inaccuracy of source monitoring 
performance, as a more conservative response bias was found for these measures. 
 As to pseudo-memories, schizophrenic patients did not falsely recognize criti-
cal lures more often than healthy controls. As a matter of fact, the opposite was true. 
Several studies have described spreading activation in semantic networks as a key 
feature in eliciting experimentally induced pseudo-memories (e.g., Roediger, Balota, 
& Watson, 2001). When presented a list of semantically associated words, semanti-
cally related, but non-presented critical lure words will also be activated. It may well 
be the case that this spreading activation is less marked in schizophrenic patients, re-
sulting in only weak activation of the semantic associate and, as a consequence, re-
duced levels of false recognition of critical lures (see also Moritz et al., 2004; Elvevåg 
et al., 2004). A closely related view is that the lower levels of pseudo-memories in 
schizophrenic patients have to do with their difﬁculty in dealing with context and re-
dundant information (e.g., Waters, Maybery, Badcock, & Michie, 2004). Thus, control 
participants would proﬁt from the context of semantically related material, but the 
other side of the coin is that this makes them vulnerable to this speciﬁc class of pseu-
do-memories. To the extent that schizophrenic patients can not proﬁt from semantic 
context, this makes them relatively immune to this category of pseudo-memories. 
Still another possibility may be that encoding deﬁcits not only lead to a decrease 
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in correct recognition of old words, but may also reduce semantically related false 
recognition, because lack of stable memory representations means that the weak 
memory traces can not converge onto the critical lure word. 2
 As for source misattributions, we found that relative to controls, schizophrenic 
patients more often identiﬁed self-presented words as presented by the experiment-
er. This externalizing tendency has also been found in earlier work (e.g., Moritz et 
al., 2003). Replicating Moritz et al. (2003), this source misattribution was not cor-
related with positive symptoms or poor executive functioning. It is true that control 
participants also committed source misattributions. However, their lowered conﬁ-
dence ratings indicate that they attached some sort of “non-trustworthiness” tag to 
their misattributions. Another antecedent of controls’ misattributions might be their 
source response bias. In contrast, schizophrenic patients make more source misattri-
butions and they do this with high conﬁdence. One important antecedent in making 
correct source attributions is the amount of perceptual detail/contextual informa-
tion that is encoded, with correct memory traces exhibiting many distinctive features 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). Schizophrenic patients show clear deﬁcits in the encod-
ing of distinctive perceptual features (Brébion et al., 2005). Meanwhile such features 
serve as landmarks in classifying an event as presented by themselves or by external 
sources. In schizophrenic patients, these landmarks are lacking, making them more 
vulnerable to this speciﬁc type of source misattribution.
 Previous research by Brébion et al. (2005) found poor correct recognition in 
schizophrenia to be related to slower processing speed and impaired selective atten-
tion. These impairments in automated cognitive functions may undermine efﬁcient 
encoding, thereby impeding serial learning and semantic organization of, for exam-
ple, word lists. The present study shows that executive control, as an effortful 
process, also plays a role in recognition memory. Although this factor signiﬁcantly 
predicted memory efﬁciency when both subsamples were pooled, its predictive val-
ue was mainly carried by the group of schizophrenic patients. Executive dysfunctions 
(increase in perseverative errors during WCST and poor planning function during 
BADS) in schizophrenic patients have been well documented and there is every rea-
son to suspect that they originate from reduced activity in the prefrontal cortex (e.g., 
Li, 2004; Seidman et al., 1994). Interestingly, damage to the prefrontal regions - re-
ﬂected in executive dysfunctions and working memory impairments - results in poor 
recollection of the contextual details (distinctive perceptual features) of previously 
learned information (e.g., Chapter 1). Indeed, the most parsimonious explanation 
for the pattern found in the current study is that schizophrenic patients’ problems 
with executive control and planning leads to poor binding and difﬁculties in holding 
online the set of semantic associates in the word lists. Eventually, this results in poor 
encoding (superﬁcial processing) of the word lists. Indeed, executive control and 
working memory are important in organizing and clustering networks of semantic 
associates. Problems with executive control and working memory will subsequently 
144
lead to lower memory efﬁciency. Thus, our ﬁndings show that an extension of the 
current model by Brébion and co-workers (2005) is required in that not only auto-
mated cognitive functions (i.e., slower processing speed and selective attention) af-
fect memory efﬁciency, but also effortful neurocognitive functions (i.e., executive 
dysfunctions). 
 In the current study, we found that poor executive functioning, as indexed by 
WCST and BADS, was linked to poor memory efﬁciency. It might well be the case 
that this link is highly speciﬁc. That is to say, performance on the WCST and BADS 
critically depends on semantic processing (e.g., Heaton et al., 1993), and thus one 
could argue that poor semantic processing, rather than poor executive functioning 
per se, accounts for the link between performance on our executive functioning tasks 
and memory efﬁciency. Clearly, this point warrants further study.  More precisely, 
future research could proﬁt from including semantic processing measures (e.g., se-
mantic ﬂuency tests) along with executive functioning tasks to further delineate the 
speciﬁc contributions of poor semantic processing abilities and executive deﬁcits to 
schizophrenic patients’ memory aberrations.
 In contrast to previous research (Brébion et al., 2000, 2002), we did not ﬁnd 
a signiﬁcant relationship between positive symptomatology and speciﬁc (source) 
memory errors. This could be due to the fact that schizophrenic patients in this study 
were mostly stabilized chronic patients. As a group, patients exhibited little variabil-
ity in BPRS scores. Future research on how positive symptoms relate to source mis-
attributions, with larger and more diverse samples, seems to be necessary. 
 One limitation of the present study was that all our schizophrenic patients 
were receiving psychotropic medication. Theoretically, differences in memory perfor-
mance between patients and healthy controls could be confounded by medication. 
However, research on the impact of medication status on episodic memory has pro-
duced mixed results, with most recent studies reporting no signiﬁcant effect (e.g., 
Aleman et al., 1999; Mortimer, 1997) or even cognitive beneﬁts (Hagger, Buckley, 
Kenny, Friedman, Ubogy, & Meltzer, 1993).
 A second limitation is that we compared memory performance of schizophren-
ic patients to that of healthy controls. There are other clinical groups that are known 
to exhibit memory dysfunctions (e.g., memory distrust in obsessive-compulsive dis-
ordered patients; Radomsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006). Thus, further research in 
this domain should preferably include other clinical groups, although the practical 
difﬁculties of this are obvious.
 Finally, one could argue that in combination with the small sample, our proce-
dure of  8 word lists subdivided into two encoding conditions, might not have been 
sensitive enough (i.e., was underpowered) to detect group differences in all types of 
false alarms. However, when comparing our ﬁndings with previous studies looking 
at memory functioning in schizophrenia (e.g., Elvevåg et al., 2004; Keefe et al., 1999; 
Moritz et al., 2003, 2004; Vinogradov et al., 1997; Weiss et al., 2002), the similarities 
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in the pattern of memory aberrations (i.e., lowered efﬁciency, fewer false alarms of 
critical lures, internal-external source misattributions) documented for schizophrenic 
patients is striking. Nonetheless, it would be wise to increase sample size and the 
number of word lists and related lure words in future research.
 To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that made an attempt to document 
the full range of memory aberrations of schizophrenic patients with one paradigm. 
Recognition memory (efﬁciency, errors, and source attribution) was found to be 
markedly impaired in patients with schizophrenia, with executive dysfunctions better 
predicting memory efﬁciency than symptomatology. These ﬁndings provide further 
evidence for explaining schizophrenics’ memory impairments in terms of fundamen-
tal neurocognitive deﬁcits like executive dysfunctions. 
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CHAPTER [9] REMEMBERING PREVIOUS LIVES AND SOURCE 
MONITORING
An adjusted version of this chapter is published as: Peters, M.J.V., Horselenberg, R., Jelicic, M., & Merckelbach, H. 
(2007). The false fame illusion in people with memories about a previous life. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 
162-169. 
Abstract 
The present study examined whether individuals with full-blown memories of highly 
implausible events are prone to commit source monitoring errors. Participants re-
porting previous-life memories and those without such memories completed a false 
fame task. This task provides an index of source monitoring errors (i.e., misclassify-
ing familiar non-famous names as famous names). Participants with previous-life 
memories had a greater tendency to judge the names of previously presented non-
famous people as famous than control participants. The two groups did not differ 
in terms of correct recognition of new non-famous names and famous names. Al-
though dissociation, cognitive failures, sleep-related experiences, depressive symp-
toms, and signs of psychological distress were all signiﬁcantly higher in participants 
with previous-life memories than in controls, these variables did not predict the false 
fame illusion. 
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Introduction
A plethora of research has demonstrated that adults can create autobiographical 
memories for events that never occurred (e.g., Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzen-
weger, & Pitman, 2002; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001). Ac-
cording to Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999), the development of such pseudo-memo-
ries is dependent on different cognitive processes, which can interact with each other. 
For example, whether pseudo-memories occur is partly dependent on the plausibil-
ity of the suggested event (e.g., Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997; Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004; Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). Once 
an event is perceived as plausible, individuals may start to believe that the event has 
happened to them. Another process in the road to a pseudo-memory is repetition of 
an assertion/ plausible event, which can increase the conﬁdence in the truth of this 
assertion/ event. This is known as the “illusion of truth.” (Bacon, 1979; Hasher, Gold-
stein, & Toppino, 1977; Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997). A next possible step 
is that individuals interpret their thoughts and fantasies about the ﬁctitious event 
as real memories (Mazzoni et al., 2001; see also Scoboria et al., 2004; Smeets et al., 
2005). In the pathway to a pseudo-memory, source monitoring errors (i.e., failure 
to attribute the correct source to information) are a decisive factor and can creep in 
anywhere along the way (e.g., Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993).
 Using well-researched laboratory paradigms to elicit false recall of e.g., words 
(the Deese/Roediger-McDermott task; see below), several studies have shown that 
women reporting recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse are more prone to 
memory distortions than control participants (e.g., Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & Pit-
man, 2000; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, & Merckelbach, 2005). However, 
in studying these populations, it is very difﬁcult to establish the ground truth, i.e., to 
determine whether the recovered memories in these samples are genuine or false. 
Thus, one can never be certain that their susceptibility to memory distortions is a 
function of cognitive impairments related to a history of abuse or the manifestation 
of a trait-like tendency to develop pseudo-memories (see also Clancy et al., 2002). 
For this reason, researchers have tried to ﬁnd speciﬁc groups of people who report 
memories of events that seem very implausible to have happened. A case in point 
is a series of studies by Clancy and co-workers (2002; see also McNally & Clancy, 
2005; McNally, Lasko, Clancy, Macklin, Pitman, & Orr, 2004), who examined whether 
people claiming to be abducted by aliens are more likely to commit source moni-
toring errors than people without such memories. Participants with alien abduction 
experiences and control participants were given a variant of the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott paradigm (DRM paradigm; Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) 
to examine their propensity to falsely recall and recognize critical lure words that 
had never been presented. Brieﬂy, in the DRM paradigm participants are given lists 
of semantically related words (e.g., bed, pajama) that refer to non-presented critical 
lure words (e.g., sleep). In subsequent memory tests, some participants claim to re-
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member the non-presented critical lure words. The most likely explanation for this is 
that they mistake internally generated associations for memories of real words. Thus, 
the DRM task taps source monitoring errors. Clancy and colleagues (2002) found that 
participants reporting memories of alien abduction or the belief that they had been 
abducted exhibit a greater tendency to falsely recall and recognize non-presented 
critical lure words in the DRM paradigm than control participants. Speciﬁc cognitive 
characteristics like hypnotic suggestibility, depressive symptoms, and schizotypal 
features were found to be signiﬁcant predictors of false recall and false recognition. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that people with this particular type of implausible 
autobiographical memories have source monitoring problems.
 Another class of autobiographical memories that are highly implausible are 
hypnotically induced memories about previous lives. Although spontaneous previ-
ous-life memories are in some countries part of a broad culture (e.g., Sri Lanka; Har-
aldsson, 2003), in modern Western societies such memories are often elicited under 
hypnosis (e.g., Spanos, Menary, Gabora, DuBreuil, & Dewhirst, 1991).
 The current study aimed at a conceptual replication of Clancy et al.’s (2002) 
ﬁndings. Focussing on a different type of implausible memory and relying on a dif-
ferent type of source monitoring task (see below), we tried to replicate the basic ﬁnd-
ings of Clancy et al. (2002) that reports of implausible memories are associated with 
a tendency to commit source monitoring errors. To this end, we examined source 
monitoring errors in people reporting hypnotically induced previous-life memories 
and control participants. The paradigm we employed was the false fame paradigm 
(Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989). In this paradigm, participants are ﬁrst 
asked to read out aloud a series of non-famous names. The next day, participants 
receive a list of names, consisting of the old non-famous names, new non-famous 
names, and also names referring to famous people (e.g., actors, writers, politicians). 
Participants are instructed to make fame judgments for each presented name. A 
standard ﬁnding in this paradigm is that participants falsely identify previous studied 
(old) non-famous names as famous names (Jacoby et al., 1989). This illusion stems 
from participants’ tendency to mistake the familiarity of an old non-famous name as 
an indication that the person must be famous.
 A subsidiary aim of our study was to explore to what extent certain personality 
traits predict the false fame illusion. Previous research has shown that traits like ab-
sorption (Clancy et al., 2002), fantasy proneness (e.g., Spanos et al., 1991), dissocia-
tion (Eisen & Lynn, 2001), and sleep disruptions (McNally & Clancy, 2005) are more 
pronounced in people who are susceptible to pseudo-memories. To explore the rela-
tionship between these traits and source monitoring errors in participants with pre-
vious-life memories, we administered measures of dissociation, fantasy proneness, 
cognitive failures, sleep experiences, and general psychopathology to our sample.
152
Method
Participants
Previous-life participants were recruited through contacts with 6 reincarnation thera-
pists in the Maastricht area, which is the most southern part of the Netherlands. 
Thirteen clients (2 men) claiming previous-life memories volunteered to participate 
in our study. Mean age of these participants was 44.7 years (SD = 9.70; Range: 29), 
with mean years of education being 14 years (SD = 1.40). The control group, which 
was recruited through advertisement in local newspapers, consisted of 11 women 
and 2 men, matched as much as possible on age (mean age = 44.9, SD = 9.20; Range: 
30) and years of education (M = 14.2, SD = 1.40); both t’s (24) < 1.0. Before participants 
completed the questionnaires and the false fame task (see below), both groups were 
given a set of questions concerning their beliefs in previous lives and reincarnation 
therapy. In the previous-life group, reincarnation therapy comprised of hypnosis-like 
sessions, in which the patients were asked to lay down and concentrate on their in-
ner feelings. On average, previous-life participants had had 20.1 regression therapy 
sessions (Range: 4-95 sessions). Sixty-nine percent of those previous-life participants 
had clear, detailed, and vivid memories of their previous lives, with all of the previ-
ous-life participants believing that previous lives do exist. None of these participants 
had, prior to therapy, any memory about their previous lives. The previous-life partic-
ipants recovered at least 5 distinct previous lives. Sixty-one percent of the previous-
life accounts were highly aversive and pertained to negative events (e.g., murder, 
torture, war). In contrast to the previous-life participants, none of the control partici-
pants believed in the existence of previous-life experiences or had been subjected to 
reincarnation therapy.
Materials and procedure
The experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology, Maastricht University. Participants were tested individually in a quiet 
laboratory room. Upon arrival, participants were asked to sign an informed consent 
form. Instructions, manipulations, and stimulus materials were given on paper, ex-
cept for the false fame paradigm, which was presented via a computer. Participants 
completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES; Cronbach’s α = .90; Bernstein 
& Putnam, 1986), Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; Cronbach’s α = .81; 
Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Muris, 2001), Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; 
Cronbach’s α = .90; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982), Iowa Sleep Ex-
periences Scale (ISES; Cronbach’s α = .85; Watson, 2001), and the Symptom Check 
List-90 (SCL-90; Cronbach’s α = .87; Derogatis, Richels & Rock, 1976). Participants also 
underwent an adapted version of the false fame task (Jacoby et al., 1989). To control 
for order and fatigue effects, questionnaires and false fame task were counterbal-
anced across participants.
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Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES). The DES is a 28 item self-report measuring 
dissociative phenomena like feelings of depersonalization, derealization, and psy-
chogenic amnesia. Participants are asked to indicate on 100 mm visual-analog scales 
(VAS; anchors: 0 = not at all; 100 = very much) to what extent they experience these 
phenomena on a daily basis. A total DES score is derived by averaging the scores 
across individual items (Range: 0 – 100), with higher total DES scores indicating 
stronger dissociative tendencies.
Creative Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ). The CEQ consists of 25 true/false items. 
CEQ items were derived from the extensive case descriptions of fantasy proneness 
provided by Wilson and Barber (1982). An illustrative item is “My fantasies are so 
vivid that they are like a good movie”. A total score (Range: 0 – 25) is obtained by 
summing the true-answers, with higher scores indicating higher levels of fantasy 
proneness.
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ). The CFQ consists of 25 items measuring the 
frequency of everyday failures of memory, attention, action, and perception. Partici-
pants have to indicate on a 5-point scale how often they experience particular cogni-
tive lapses and blunders (e.g., forgetting appointments; anchors: 0 = never; 4 = very 
often). Scores are summed to obtain a total CFQ score, with higher scores indicating 
a higher frequency of self-reported cognitive failures.
Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale (ISES). The ISES is an 18-item questionnaire that asks 
participants to rate the frequency of various sleep- and dream-related experiences 
(e.g., nightmares, etc.) on a 7-point scale (anchors: 1 = never; 7 = several times a 
week). A mean score can be obtained by summing across all items.
Symptom Check List-90 (SCL-90). A Dutch version of the SCL-90 was used. This scale 
comprises 90 items and is a self-report measure of current psychological symptoms. 
Each item taps one of 9 clinical domains (e.g., anxiety, depression, somatization, in-
sufﬁciency, etc.). Items describe symptoms and participants rate on a 5-point scale to 
what extent they have experienced the symptoms in the last week (anchors: 1 = not 
at all; 5 = extremely). A total SCL-90 score can be derived by summing across items. 
This total SCL-90 score is an index of general psychopathology.
False Fame Task. An adapted version of the Jacoby et al. (1989) false fame task was used. 
In extensive studies in our lab, we documented that this version elicits the false fame illu-
sion in a non-trivial minority of healthy participants (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Wessel, 
Verhoeven, & Zeles, 2006). In our version of the task, participants are given the second 
part of the false fame paradigm 2 hrs after the study part (see below) rather than 24 hrs 
after the study part as was the case in the original experiment (Jacoby et al., 1989).
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 Participants were informed that they would participate in a pronunciation test. 
Next, they went through the study phase of the task, during which they were asked 
to read a series of 40 non-famous names (hereafter referred to as old non-famous 
names), speaking aloud in a microphone placed in front of them. During this phase, 
no responses were recorded. Selection of names was based on extensive pilot work. 
In total, a set of 160 names was selected. Half of them referred to non-famous per-
sons, while the other half referred to moderately famous Dutch persons. Both name 
types were matched on length of ﬁrst and family name and on gender. Names were 
presented on a Dell computer running Experimental Run Time System (ERTS; Ber-
inger, 1996) on a Philips Brilliance 17 ’ screen. Names were presented for 2 sec in 
lowercase letters with the initial letters of the ﬁrst and family name in capitals. This 
was followed by a 2 sec interstimulus interval. The second phase was a test phase 
(famous/non-famous discrimination task) and took place 2 hrs after the study phase. 
Participants were explicitly instructed that old non-famous names would be present-
ed along with new non-famous names and famous names. Participants were told 
that they did not have to provide a reason for their subjective fame-judgments.  After 
16 practice trials, they were exposed to a series of 160 names: 40 old non-famous 
names, 40 new non-famous names, and 80 famous names. By pressing either the 
right or left shift key of the keyboard, participants indicated for each name whether 
it was a famous or non-famous name. Names (ﬁrst name and family name) were 
selected quasi-randomly from the pool of 160 names. Presentation of each name was 
contingent upon participants pushing one of the shift keys. The name disappeared 
from the screen as soon as the participant responded. This was followed by a 1 sec 
blank screen before the next name appeared. The computer recorded each fame 
judgment.  Within the previous-life and control group, shift keys (i.e., left vs. right) 
and sequence of the three types of names were counterbalanced. We calculated pro-
portions of old and new non-famous names that participants misclassiﬁed as famous 
(i.e., dividing the number of non-famous names judged as famous by 40).
Results
Mean proportions of old and new non-famous names misclassiﬁed as famous in 
each group is shown in FIGURE 9.1. A 2 (group: previous-life vs. control) x 2 (false fame: 
old vs. new non-famous names) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with repeated mea-
sures on the last factor yielded a signiﬁcant false fame effect [F (1, 24) = 9.70, p = 
.005, MSE = 17.16, η² = .29] and a borderline signiﬁcant main effect of group; F (1, 
24) = 3.18, p = .08, MSE = 23.99, η² = .19. Most importantly, the critical group x false 
fame interaction was signiﬁcant [F (1, 24) = 5.03, p = .03, MSE = 17.16, η² = .17], due 
to the fact that compared to controls, previous-life participants misinterpreted more 
old non-famous names as famous. Thus, our data show that the previous-life group 
displayed a stronger false fame illusion than the control group. Another way to ap-
proach this issue is by calculating a false fame index. This index can be obtained by 
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subtracting the proportion of new non-famous names judged as famous from the 
proportion old non-famous names judged as famous (Range: -.58 to .10; see Rybash, 
Rubenstein, & DeLuca, 1997). Again, the difference between the previous-life group 
and control group was signiﬁcant; t (24) = 2.3, p = .034; Cohen’s d = .82.  Participants 
with previous-life experiences did not differ signiﬁcantly from controls with regard 
to the proportion hits (famous names judged as famous), means being .86 (SD = .09) 
and .87 (SD = .11), respectively; t (24) < 1.
 TABLE 9.1 shows mean scores on the self-report questionnaires. The previous-life 
group scored signiﬁcantly higher on the DES [t (24) = 2.70, p < .01; two-tailed], CFQ 
[t (24) = 2.40, p = .02; two-tailed], ISES [t (24) = 3.15, p < .01; two-tailed], and SCL-90 
[t (24) = 3.50, p = .002; two-tailed]. Furthermore, previous-life participants scored sig-
niﬁcantly higher on all SCL-90 subscales (e.g., depression, anxiety, etc.; see TABLE 9.1) 
[all t’s (24) > 2, p < .05; two-tailed], except for hostility and sleeplessness; both t’s (24) 
<1.0, both p’s >.05. As for the CEQ, previous-life participants had marginally higher 
scores than control participants; t (24) = 1.70, p = .09.
FIGURE 9.1 PROPORTION OF OLD AND NEW NON-FAMOUS NAMES MISCLASSIFIED AS FAMOUS FOR THE PREVIOUS-LIFE MEMORIES GROUP AND THE CONTROL 
GROUP (SEM’S ARE GIVEN IN T-BARS; N = 26).
156
 To explore the relationship between personality traits and the false fame in-
dex, Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated for data collapsed across 
groups and for both groups separately. As can be seen in TABLE 9.2, when the two groups 
were collapsed, only the Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale was marginally associated 
with the false fame index. None of the trait measures were signiﬁcantly related to the 
hit rate (famous names as famous); all r’s < .40, all p’s > .05; two-tailed. When looking 
at each group separately, Pearson product-moment correlations between the false 
fame index and the various personality traits remained non-signiﬁcant; all r’s < .40, 
all p’s > .05; two-tailed. 1 Similarly, non-signiﬁcant correlations were found between 
hit rate and personality traits.
TABLE 9.1 MEAN SCORES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY MEASURES OF THE PREVIOUS-LIFE AND CONTROL GROUP.
PREVOUS-LIFE
(n = 13)
M SD
CONTROLS
(n = 13)
M SD
Dissociative Experiences Scale 18.90 11.70 9.70 4.90
Creative Experiences Questionnaire 9.20 4.20 6.30 4.40
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 41.60 12.60 30.50 10.60
Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale 50.38 11.81 36.00 11.51
Total score SCL-90 141.90 37.80 101.90 19.60
     SCL-90 Agoraphobia 9.08 2.50 7.46 0.97
     SCL-90 Anxiety 17.69 6.91 11.77 2.52
     SCL-90 Depression 28.23 7.39 20.23 4.85
     SCL-90 Somatization 20.08 6.09 14.69 2.98
     SCL-90 Insufﬁciency 17.38 5.61 12.85 4.14
     SCL-90 Sensitivity 33.54 12.80 22.92 4.97
     SCL-90 Hostility 8.23 2.09 6.92 1.50
     SCL-90 Sleeplessness 7.61 4.07 5.31 2.78
NOTE: DES = DISSOCIATIVE EXPERIENCES SCALE (BERNSTEIN & PUTNAM, 1986; RANGE: 43); CEQ = CREATIVE EXPERIENCES QUES-
TIONNAIRE (MERCKELBACH ET AL., 2001; RANGE: 16); CFQ = COGNITIVE FAILURES QUESTIONNAIRE (BROADBENT ET AL., 1982; RANGE: 
50); ISES = IOWA SLEEP EXPERIENCES SCALE (WATSON, 2001; RANGE: 44); SCL-90 = SYMPTOM CHECK LIST-90 (DEROGATIS ET 
AL., 1976; RANGE: 177) 
TABLE 9.2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY MEASURES, FALSE FAME INDEX AND HIT RATES ON FAMOUS NAMES, COLLAPSED 
ACROSS GROUPS.
FALSE FAME INDEX HIT RATE FAMOUS
r p r p
DES .05 .80 -.03 .88
CEQ .20 .32 .04 .83
CFQ -.29 .15 -.15 .47
ISES .37 .06 -.09 .65
SCL-90 .29 .14 -.09 .67
NOTE: DES = DISSOCIATIVE EXPERIENCES SCALE; CEQ = CREATIVE EXPERIENCES QUESTIONNAIRE; CFQ = COGNITIVE FAILURES 
QUESTIONNAIRE; ISES = IOWA SLEEP EXPERIENCES SCALE; SCL-90 = SYMPTOM CHECK LIST-90.
Discussion
The present study examined source monitoring in participants with highly implau-
sible autobiographical memories and control participants. Our results show that 
participants with previous-life memories had a stronger tendency to judge names 
of previously presented non-famous people as famous than controls. In line with 
Clancy et al. (2002), we found that memories of highly unlikely events are associated 
with elevated levels of depression (as measured by the SCL-90 depression subscale) 
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and other signs of psychological distress. That is, participants with memories of pre-
vious lives reported heightened levels of dissociation, sleep disturbances, cognitive 
failures, and, to a lesser extent fantasy proneness. However, in contrast to Clancy et 
al. (2002), we found only sleep disturbances (ISES) to be related to the false fame 
index.  In future research, it would be informative to explore whether the speciﬁc 
content of these previous-life memories (amount of detail, vividness of detail, etc.) 
or the conﬁdence in these memories might be possible moderators in the relation-
ship between the false fame effect and the various personality and psychopathology 
characteristics. Such moderator variables might explain the discrepancies between 
our data and those of Clancy et al. (2002). Since no detailed description of these fac-
tors was given by the previous-life participants, we can only speculate about how, 
for example, eccentricity of previous-life memories might modulate the link between 
previous-life memories and dissociation or fantasy proneness.
 Our ﬁnding that people with previous-life memories exhibit a relatively robust 
false-fame illusion is important because this may help to explain how these people 
come to accept their previous-life memories as genuine memories. When individuals 
with a tendency to make source monitoring errors are repeatedly asked to imagine 
events that supposedly took place during past lives, even highly implausible events 
suggested by the therapist may come to generate feelings of familiarity (as indicated 
in this experiment by the false fame effect; see Jacoby et al., 1989). This line of rea-
soning ﬁts nicely with what is known as the “illusion of truth”, whereby reiterating 
assertions make these assertions more believable (Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 1989; 
Bacon, 1979; Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Hertwig et al., 1997). Research by Hasher 
et al. (1977) and Bacon (1979) demonstrated that repetition of an assertion and/or 
the recognition of an assertion as old, increases the conﬁdence in its truth. This ef-
fect is independent of the actual truth of the assertion.  In a related vein, familiarity 
(which automatically increases with repetition; Begg et al., 1992) may erroneously be 
interpreted as a diagnostic sign of the truth status of the event (see also Chapter 1). 
Indeed, Hyman and Kleinknecht (1999) argue that another possible cognitive process 
in the development of pseudo-memories is plausibility, which is of course closely 
related to familiarity. Even if it is highly unlikely, once an event is perceived as plausi-
ble, individuals can acquire the autobiographical belief that the event has happened 
to them. Another possible step would be the acceptance of their thoughts and fanta-
sies about the event as genuine memories (Mazzoni et al., 2001; see also Scoborria 
et al., 2004; Smeets et al., 2005). One decisive factor in these cognitive processes is 
source monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993), because source confusion 
can lead to acceptance of internally generated events as externally perceived.
 It is likely that pseudo-memories in the clinical context involve source moni-
toring errors (e.g., Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999). It is also evident that the false fame 
effect is a pure laboratory manifestation of a source monitoring error (Multhaup, 
De Leonardis & Johnson, 1999). Things are quite different with most autobiographi-
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cal retrieval tasks (e.g., diary studies). Nevertheless, some authors have argued that 
small scale laboratory tasks tapping memory illusions can not be generalized to situ-
ations in which full-blown autobiographical pseudo-memories are implanted (Pezdek 
& Lam, 2007). There are two issues here that are relevant to the study of pseudo-
memories. One issue is whether laboratory phenomena like false fame illusions tap 
a broad aspect of source monitoring integrity. We believe they do: It is not unlikely 
that people who mistake familiarity for fame also tend to confuse fantasies that feel 
familiar with memories of things that really happened. A second issue is that of cau-
sality. One causal scenario is that individuals with source monitoring difﬁculties are 
more sensitive to the memory corrupting effects of hypnosis and develop pseudo-
memories of previous lives along this route. Another causal scenario is that treat-
ment techniques like hypnosis and memories of previous lives have led to a liberal 
style in making source monitoring decisions. Of course, our results are silent as to 
this causal issue.
 Several limitations of the current study deserve some comment. Firstly, like most 
studies on people with alien abductions, our study relied on a small sample. Yet, effect 
sizes indicate that our ﬁndings are quite robust. Secondly, unlike Clancy and her col-
leagues (e.g., Clancy et al., 2002), we did not differentiate between those who recovered 
or repressed their memories of previous lives. Another limitation is the lack of control for 
psychopathology in the previous-life and control group. The participants undergoing pre-
vious-life therapy suffered from several psychopathological symptoms. As their scores 
on the SCL-90 indicate, our control sample did not suffer from psychological distress. 
Thus, one could speculate that psychopathology is the driving force behind the source 
monitoring difﬁculties in the previous-life group. While the non-signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween SCL-90 and false fame illusion seems to argue against this possibility, the point 
remains that lack of power may have contributed to our failure to detect a signiﬁcant cor-
relation between these two variables. In line with this, one could argue that differences in 
psychopathology distress are inherent to our method of recruitment of the previous-life 
participants. It might well be that persons who undergo reincarnation therapy may be 
looking for an explanation for their current psychological distress. One possibility in try-
ing to circumvent this problem would be to recruit previous-life participants in the general 
population or to match the control group on presence of psychopathological signs. In 
future research, it would also be worthwhile to use three instead of two groups of partici-
pants; those who underwent reincarnation therapy and did or did not develop autobio-
graphical memories of previous lives (similar to the recovered and repressed distinction 
by Clancy et al., 2002), and a control group with no reincarnation beliefs or memories. If 
both previous-life groups are matched on psychopathology scores, this could also take 
care of the lack of control for psychopathology that existed in our study.  In more general 
terms, future studies should make an attempt to identify the causal antecedents of source 
monitoring problems typical for people with implausible memories.
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CHAPTER [10] GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The central theme inspiring the studies presented in this dissertation concerned the 
identiﬁcation of neurocognitive correlates of source misattributions and pseudo-
memories in healthy young individuals and in clinical samples. In this Chapter, we 
will highlight the most important ﬁndings of our empirical work. Furthermore, a the-
oretical framework is presented and directions for future research will be sketched.
Psychometrics and normative data 
Part A of this dissertation focused on the construction, validation, and standardization 
of a pseudo-memory paradigm and a neurocognitive task. Thus, Chapter 2 described 
the construction, validation, and standardization of a Dutch version of the Deese/
Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM paradigm; Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDer-
mott, 1995) in an undergraduate sample. Since most of the studies using this para-
digm in foreign (i.e., not English) languages have used translations of the original 
normative lists (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999), 
a well-documented Dutch version of the paradigm was in order. Although all lists 
were constructed in a similar way – namely on the basis of Dutch word association 
norms - rates of falsely recalling and recognizing the critical lure words varied widely 
across lists. This can be ascribed to differences in associative strength. Furthermore, 
participants often recognized critical lures with high conﬁdence, as indicated by the 
“remember” responses for critical lure intrusions (e.g., Tulving, 1985). Therefore, 
stimulus material appears to be an important determinant of pseudo-memory rates. 
Pezdek and Lam (2007) argue that the DRM paradigm is a fail-safe semantic priming 
task that always produces pseudo-memories. However, we demonstrate in Chapter 
2 that this conclusion does not hold, since we identiﬁed word lists that did not elicit 
critical lure pseudo-memories (i.e., null lists). The top 16 lists identiﬁed in our study 
yielded rates of false recall and recognition of critical lures that were comparable to 
the effects described by Roediger and McDermott (1995) and Stadler, Roediger, and 
McDermott (1999).
 Chapter 3 reports the results of four studies on the factor structure and psycho-
metric properties of the Random Number Generation task (RNG; Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 
1994, 1995), a neurocognitive task measuring monitoring, updating, and inhibition 
function. More speciﬁcally, study 1 revealed a three factor structure solution: seri-
ation, repetition, and cycling. These factors are related to inhibition of stereotypical 
schemas, output inhibition, and monitoring of previous output, respectively. Study 2 
examined the test-retest reliability of these RNG factors in a sample of undergradu-
ate students and schizophrenic patients. We found modest to satisfactory test-retest 
correlations and no inﬂuence of practice, with RNG indices loading on the seriation 
factor showing statisfactory stability across time. Study 3 and 4 described criterion 
and construct validity. The results indicated that RNG has acceptable psychometric 
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properties and primarily taps inhibition, updating and monitoring functions in nor-
mal as well as clinical populations. 
Neurocognitive functioning and pseudo-memories
The aim of the studies described in Part B was to examine the relationships between 
suboptimal neurocognitive functioning, source misattributions, and pseudo-mem-
ory development in healthy undergraduate participants. We speciﬁcally focused on 
inhibitory control (executive function) and working memory capacity, as previous 
research in older participants and children offered some tentative indication for a 
speciﬁc link between these neurocognitive functions, source misattribution and 
pseudo-memories (e.g., Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver, 
2002; Hedden & Park, 2003; Lödvén, 2003; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 2004; 
Moscovitch, 2000; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004; Roberts & Powell, 2005; Ruffman, Rus-
tin, Garnham, & Parkin, 2001). 
 Results from the studies described in this part of the thesis support the idea that 
suboptimal inhibitory control (either measured directly or manipulated indirectly; 
see Chapter 7) and working memory capacity are related to recollecting words never 
presented (Chapters 4 and 5), misattributing imagined actions as performed (Chapter 
6), recognizing non-presented stereotype-consistent information, and confabulating 
information (Chapter 7) in healthy young samples. Chapter 4 showed that in our 
sample of undergraduates, individual differences in inhibitory function as measured 
by the RNG task (see Chapter 3) contribute to false recognition and to a lesser ex-
tent to false recall. That is, we found a relationship between a deﬁcient inhibition of 
cognitive schemas and false recognition of non-presented critical lure words in the 
DRM paradigm. This pattern was further supported by extreme group analysis per-
formed on the inhibition scores. Our ﬁndings could not be explained by differences 
in learning performance between groups. Thus, this study provides evidence for the 
hypothesized relationship between executive functions and pseudo-memory crea-
tion in undergraduate students.
 Chapter 5 elaborated on the ﬁndings of the previous Chapter. The two stud-
ies described in this Chapter investigated whether individual differences in simple 
and complex Working Memory Capacity (WMC) are related to pseudo-memories of 
non-presented critical lure words. Given that correct source monitoring is important 
to avoid pseudo-memory development and working memory is involved in keep-
ing distinctive perceptual and contextual information during encoding and retrieval 
online, one would have expected an increased susceptibility to pseudo-memories 
when working memory capacity is suboptimal. We wanted to ﬁnd out whether this 
line of reasoning also held for different measures (i.e., aspects) of working memory 
(simple vs. complex WMC). The two studies described in this Chapter converge on 
the notion that poor simple WMC (as indexed by suboptimal backward digit span) is 
related to false recognition and, to a lesser extent false recall of critical lure words. 
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Complex WMC did not relate to false recall or recognition of the critical lure words. It 
should be noted that in our studies, we did not warn participants about the intentions 
of the DRM paradigm. It is plausible to assume that such warning instruction exerts 
increased executive demands on WMC, leading to a reduction in encoding distinctive 
perceptual features. This implies that WMC measures, as they differ in the amount of 
executive demands that they pose on individuals, have differential effects on source 
monitoring and pseudo-memory development. Thus, when executive demands are 
high, complex WMC predicts source monitoring failures. When one has poor com-
plex WMC in a high executive demand environment, encoding of distinctive percep-
tual and contextual features of to be remembered information is suboptimal. While 
retrieving this information, distinctive features cannot be used, leading to reliance 
on more schematic general knowledge (i.e., familiarity). When speciﬁc tasks do not 
require high executive demands like in standard DRM procedures, then simple WMC 
predicts source monitoring failures. 
 Since this issue warranted further research, Chapter 6 in part examined wheth-
er complex WMC was related to source misattributions in a high executive demand 
environment. In this study, undergraduates were subjected to an action source moni-
toring paradigm, in which to-be-remembered acts had to be performed, while others 
only had to be imagined, thereby putting increased executive demands on WMC. 
Subsequently, the presented actions were paired with actions that were roughly 
similar in content and form. For each pair, old-new discrimination (i.e., correct rec-
ognition) and source attribution (having performed or only imagined the action) de-
cisions had to be made. In line with the ﬁndings of Watson, Bunting, Poole, and 
Conway (2005) and as concluded in Chapter 5, under increased executive demands 
(imaging and performing speciﬁc action items), poor complex WMC was related to 
claiming having performed an action while, in fact, it was only imagined. Thus, re-
sults of Chapter 6 also indicate that even in a healthy undergraduate sample, WMC, 
source monitoring, and pseudo-memory development are related in a theoretically 
meaningful way. 
 In Chapter 7, we investigated whether an active manipulation of inhibitory con-
trol leads to an increased number of source misattributions for general schematic 
knowledge. More speciﬁc, in this study people did or did not receive an instruction 
to actively inhibit their thoughts on activated neutral or negative stereotypes about 
race, while reading a stereotype-free crime story. We anticipated that this active inhi-
bition would lead to a decrease in focus on the source of information during encod-
ing due to increased executive demands. During later retrieval, one then more likely 
relies on primed general schematic knowledge, which may lead to misattributing 
non-presented schematic knowledge as being presented. This was, indeed, born out 
by the data. The fact that heightened recognition of non-presented stereotype-con-
sistent information was only found in the negative stereotype prime condition is in 
line with the stereotype literature. This literature shows that when people ascribe rec-
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ollected items to a stereotyped individual, stereotype-based expectations inﬂuence 
response criteria for making source attributions (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). In 
this way, perceivers may be more inclined to attribute expectancy-based stereotypi-
cal items (e.g., Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999). 
Source monitoring in schizophrenia(-like symptomatology)
Previous studies have suggested that schizophrenic patients are remarkably adroit 
at recognizing previously presented verbal information and identifying the source of 
their memories (e.g., Brébion, Amador, David, Malaspina, Sharif, & Gorman, 2000; 
Brébion, Gorman, Amador, Malaspina, & Sharif, 2002; Brunelin et al., 2006; Keefe, 
Arnold, Bayen, & Harvey, 1999; Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, & Watson, 2004; 
Moritz, Woodward, & Ruff, 2003; Nienow & Docherty, 2004; Vinogradov, Willis-Shore, 
Poole, Marten, Ober, & Shenaut, 1997). The antecedents of these recognition errors 
and source misattributions are, however, open to empirical scrutiny. Two lines of 
research may elucidate these memory aberrations in schizophrenia. 
 To begin with, apart from the involvement of medial temporal lobe/diencephalon 
(MTL/D) functions, memory functioning in schizophrenia may also be affected by 
executive dysfunctions. Since schizophrenic patients exhibit marked deﬁcits in ex-
ecutive and memory tasks (e.g., McKenna, Ornstein, & Baddeley, 2002; Weinberger 
et al., 2001), this hypothesis was investigated in Chapter 8. Results showed that, rela-
tive to controls, patients with schizophrenia exhibit a strong tendency to recognize 
presented (i.e., old) words as new (i.e., misses). Furthermore, correct recognition 
rates of the schizophrenic patients were signiﬁcantly lower compared to those of 
controls (e.g., Moritz, Heeren, Andresen, & Krausz, 2001b) and were accompanied 
by a lowered conﬁdence. As to pseudo-memories, in line with prior research (e.g., 
Elvevåg et al., 2004), both groups showed a substantial number of pseudo-memories 
for critical lure words. However, it was the control group that had the highest level 
of false recognition. For source misattribution, our ﬁndings concur with previous 
research by Keefe et al. (1999), Moritz et al., (2003), and Vinogradov et al. (1997) in 
that schizophrenic patients, compared to healthy controls, were more likely to make 
internal-external source misattributions with inﬂated conﬁdence ratings. The execu-
tive functioning indexes were signiﬁcant predictors of correct recognition, but not of 
source misattributions or pseudo-memories. 
Secondly, we investigated whether participants with schizophrenia-like symp-
tomatology show similar memory aberrations as those with schizophrenia, and 
whether neurocognitive deﬁcits relate to these memory aberrations. The study de-
scribed in Chapter 6 demonstrates that participants with high scores on the Schizo-
typal Personality Scale (STA; Claridge & Broks, 1984) more often falsely claim to have 
performed actions when in fact they have only imagined them. Furthermore, signiﬁ-
cant negative correlations were found between STA scores, correct recognition, and 
source attribution scores, indicating poorer correct recognition and more source mis-
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attributions with increasing levels of schizotypy. However, high and low schizotypal 
participants did not differ with regard to neurocognitive functions as measured by a 
complex WMC task (i.e., O-span). These ﬁndings are in line with source monitoring 
studies among schizophrenic patients (e.g., Nienow & Docherty, 2004) and hallucina-
tion-prone participants (Larøi, Collignon, & Van der Linden, 2005) in that schizotypal 
participants exhibited a deﬁciency in internal source attribution. 
 In both Chapters (6 and 8), susceptibility to source misattribution was not re-
lated to WMC (Chapter 6) or executive dysfunctions (Chapter 8). Only correct recog-
nition was predicted by executive function measures in the schizophrenic sample. It 
seems that prefrontal mediated cognitive (dys)functions are only one of several fac-
tors that contribute to different memory aberrations in schizophrenia and schizophre-
nia-like symptomatology. More recently, it has been hypothesized that schizophrenic 
patients display a more general cognitive deﬁcit, namely a tendency to excessive 
knowledge corruption. That is, a vast amount of what patients strongly believe to be 
true is, in fact, false (e.g., Moritz et al., 2003; 2004; Moritz & Woodward, 2006) and 
this false information is held with strong conviction. This was also found in Chapter 8, 
where greater knowledge corruption in schizophrenia was detected for source misat-
tributions and misses (see also Moritz & Woodward, 2006). This knowledge corrup-
tion could be a consequence of a liberal acceptance bias, whereby fragmented and 
partial information is taken as sufﬁcient evidence to accept a response option. In this 
sense, schizophrenic patients increasingly rely on the familiarity of an event, thereby 
merely knowing that an item has occurred without experiencing vivid perceptual rec-
ollections. Absence of such retrieval cues for errors will caution healthy participants 
against high conﬁdence ratings, whereas participants with a more liberal acceptance 
threshold will use this information as sufﬁcient evidence for high levels of subjective 
conﬁdence. 
Plausibility, familiarity, and recollection
Several researchers argue that plausibility is an important prerequisite for source 
misattribution and pseudo-memory development (e.g., Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 
2001; Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). Plausible events fuel familiarity (“It could have 
happened”). Once familiarity of an event is achieved, this can relatively easily be 
converted into a belief that the event did take place, with the following step being 
misattribution into a true recollection. Typical studies to investigate this hypothesis 
have presented participants with descriptions of true and false plausible and im-
plausible events. After this presentation, it is identiﬁed whether source misattribu-
tions are more prevalent for plausible as compared to implausible false events or 
vice versa (Pezdek et al., 1997). A fascinating question that arises is whether reports 
of implausible events are also associated with a tendency to commit source misat-
tributions. This issue was studied in Chapter 9, in which participants with highly im-
plausible autobiographical beliefs and memories (hypnotically induced previous-life 
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beliefs and memories) were compared to matched controls who did not report such 
highly implausible events. Results showed that previous-life participants were more 
susceptible to source misattributions in comparison to matched control participants. 
This can best be explained by the fact that an implausible event can become subjec-
tively plausible once this event is repeatedly imagined or thought about. This, in turn, 
may create a feeling of familiarity (e.g., “Illusion of Truth”; Arkes, Hackett, & Boehm, 
1989; Bacon, 1979). Familiarity can be erroneously interpreted as a diagnostic sign 
of the truth status of an event, thus creating a belief that the event indeed has hap-
pened. The following step is to misattribute it as a genuine memory. Our ﬁndings 
suggest that subjective rather than objective plausibility may be seen as a necessary 
factor in the cascade to a full blown pseudo-memory. 
 We readily acknowledge that in our discussion so far, we have implicitly allud-
ed to causal mechanisms amounting to the idea that prefrontal dysfunctions, source 
misattributions, familiarity and so forth function as antecedents of pseudo-memo-
ries. But, of course, the studies described in this thesis were largely correlational 
in nature and so there is the theoretical possibility that people ﬁrst come to adopt 
pseudo-memories (e.g., as a result of social pressure, e.g., Roediger, Meade, & Berg-
man, 2001) and then become sloppy in their source monitoring decisions. 
An integrated theoretical framework
With this restriction in mind, we will brieﬂy describe an adapted memory recon-
struction framework, inspired by the ﬁndings of this dissertation. This framework 
also draws upon the ideas from several other investigators, including Johnson et al. 
(1993), Kopelman (1999, 2002), McDermott and Watson (2001), Moscovitch and Wino-
cor (2002), Reyna and Brainerd (1995), and Schacter et al. (1998). It is not our intention 
to completely review and reformulate existing theories (as described in Chapter 1). 
Our objective is to add to the framework that can be derived from these theories the 
main ﬁndings of this dissertation. The resulting framework focuses on the key encod-
ing, consolidation, retrieval processes, and neural correlates that contribute to the 
reconstructive aspects of memory. 
 In summarizing the framework described in Chapter 1, memory representa-
tions of past events can best be described as patterns of features that were active 
during encoding of different aspects of the experience (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). 
During encoding, these features need to be bound together efﬁciently, but also need 
to be distinctive enough (pattern separation). To remember an event, one has to reac-
tivate the features that constitute the desired memory representation and set speciﬁc 
criterions for memory retrieval. During encoding, consolidation, and retrieval, there 
are several problems that need to be solved in order to create accurate representa-
tions of past events. Internal (neurocognitive functions, general schematic knowl-
edge, personal plausibility) and external (social inﬂuences) factors can inﬂuence 
these memory processes (see FIGURE 10.1).
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FIGURE 10.1 SYSTEMS INVOLVED IN THE GENERATION OF PSEUDO-MEMORIES. 
Encoding and consolidation
On receiving input (real life event, stimulus material, etc.) that needs to be encoded, percep-
tual and contextual details making up the memory representation need to be connected to 
form a “coherent representation” (e.g., feature binding process; Moscovitch, 1994; Mosco-
vitch & Winocur, 2002). When attention is paid to this input, different regions in the primary 
sensory and association cortex are activated that constitute the different aspects of this 
input. The medial temporal lobe/diencephalon (MTL/D) area connects these different brain 
regions that are simultaneously active during the encoding of this event. Thus, distributed 
patterns of activity in the neocortex that constitute the memory of different aspects are 
linked to representations in region CA3 of the hippocampus (Dodson & Schacter, 2002a), 
whereby each aspect of the representation is assigned its own hippocampal “index”. 
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 A necessary function for optimal encoding is efﬁcient working memory (e.g., 
Cowan, 2005). Working memory capacity (WMC) can be described as the set of pro-
cesses that hold a limited amount of information in a readily accessible state for use 
in an active task. During encoding, this neurocognitive function is involved in holding 
memory representations on line, updating these representations, assigning memory 
for temporal order, selective attending to-be-stored information, and manipulating 
information. As was found in Chapters 5 and 6, suboptimal WMC undermines fea-
ture binding and pattern separation processes. As a consequence, ineffective feature 
binding leaves the person only with a global impression of the event (i.e., remember-
ing the general gist or familiarity of the event). A second problem that then needs 
to be solved at encoding is to keep the bound representations separate from each 
other. If there is overlap between representations, one is inclined to rely on general 
similarities (i.e., familiarity), which opens the gates for source misattribution and 
pseudo-memory development. A recent meta-analysis (e.g., Wager & Smith, 2003) 
found support for left frontal dominance in verbal working memory capacity tasks 
with low executive demands (e.g., digit span tasks). The authors also noted that WMC 
tasks requiring increased executive processing (e.g., complex WMC tasks) generally 
produce more dorsal frontal activations than do storage-only tasks. This underlies 
the conclusion drawn in Chapter 5 that WMC tasks differing in executive demands 
may differentially affect source monitoring. The involvement of different neural pro-
cesses may thus explain why WMC tasks are not in the same way related to source 
monitoring. This issue, however, needs to be further investigated.
 The MTL/D region also contributes to pattern completion at retrieval. During 
the retrieval of relatively recent episodes (for which there still is a hippocampal in-
dex corresponding to that aspect of an event), cues activate the event’s index in 
region CA3 of the hippocampus, and activation spreads from the index to all the 
features comprising that event. Once an event is consolidated, however, activation 
can spread directly between the episode’s features, and the hippocampus no longer 
plays an important role in pattern completion. Thus, although the MTL/D plays an im-
portant role in the encoding of memory traces, it does not appear to be a necessary 
part of the retrieval of remote episodic memories.
Retrieval
Accurate encoding of memory representations is not sufﬁcient to retrieve an accu-
rate representation. Of importance is the degree to which features of the retrieval cue 
match the features of the memory representation during pattern completion. One 
problem is that retrieval cues can potentially match representations other than the 
one that is desired. This is most certainly the case when representations overlap or 
when representations are inefﬁciently encoded, which may lead to overreliance on 
the general gist or familiarity of representations. For this reason, retrieval has to be 
focused. 
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 Once familiarity or recollection-based memory representations are in the focus 
of attention, a source monitoring decision must be made about whether the activated 
information is a veridical recollection of a previously experienced event, or whether 
it is based on fantasy, experiences by others, or memories of imagined events. Dur-
ing this phase of the retrieval process, criterion-based decisions must be made, such 
as evaluating and monitoring relevant information and inhibiting irrelevant informa-
tion. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays a critical role in this effortful aspect of retrieval. 
In other words, the PFC contributes “intelligence” to what essentially is a “stupid” 
MTL/D structure (e.g., Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002, p. 205). Inefﬁcient criterion set-
ting based on subtle neurocognitive deﬁcits in working memory or executive func-
tioning can relate to source misattributions and later pseudo-memory development, 
as was suggested by the ﬁndings in our studies (described in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7). 
In this respect, Chapter 4 concludes that retrieval focus and criterion-setting involve 
cognitive inhibition of schema-related material. Lack of cognitive inhibition may lead 
to liberal criterion setting and an inability to suppress related information, with the 
potential consequence of source misattributions. Furthermore, it is in this post-re-
trieval monitoring stage that general schematic knowledge, expectancies, and meta-
memorial beliefs can inﬂuence memory representations, as was found in Chapter 7 
(e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2001, 2002b).
 Neurocognitive dysfunctions are an important but by no means invariable an-
tecedent of source misattribution and faulty retrieval from declarative memory. Bi-
ases introduced by social environment (e.g., social stereotypes; Chapter 7) at input 
and/or the semantic belief system (believing in implausible events; Chapter 9; Liberal 
acceptance bias; Chapter 8) may also exert their inﬂuence on the prefrontal post-
retrieval control system and declarative memory retrieval. It seems likely that the 
interaction between social and biological factors is important.   
Future directions
Personality characteristics, neurocognitive functions, and pseudo-memories
As said before, in healthy samples, there are various traits, notably dissociation 
and depression (or negative affectivity), that seem to predispose to pseudo-memo-
ries (e.g., Candel, Merckelbach, & Kuijpers, 2003; Horselenberg, Merckelbach, van 
Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004). On the other hand, the connection between these traits 
and pseudo-memories is far from robust (e.g., Wright, Startup, & Mathews, 2005). 
That is, some studies were unable to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between dissocia-
tion and pseudo-memories (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Muris, Rassin, Sijsenaar, & 
Spaan, 2000). Perhaps, then, traits like dissociation and depression serve as ante-
cedents of pseudo-memories to the extent that they are accompanied by subtle dis-
turbances in neurocognitive functions like poor working memory or poor inhibitory 
control. Thus, the precise connection between dissociation, depression, neurocogni-
tive functions, and pseudo-memory development requires systematic study. Note 
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that there is some tentative evidence that dissociative symptoms go along with mild 
executive dysfunctions. Relying on a sample of forensic patients, Cima, Merckelbach, 
Klein, Shellbach-Matties, and Kremer (2001) found that high levels of dissociative 
symptoms were related to poor performance on a “frontal” task (the Behavioural 
Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome; BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, 
& Evans, 1996). Likewise, Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Geraerts, and Smeets (2004; but 
see Wright & Osborne, 2005) noted that in a healthy undergraduate sample, dissocia-
tive symptoms were linked to certain aspects of the RNG task (cf. supra). With these 
ﬁndings in mind, we believe that research on the associations between traditional 
personality traits (e.g., dissociation), neurocognitive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibi-
tion, working memory), and pseudo-memories might be fruitful.
Neurocognitive functions and pseudo-memory
In recent years, researchers have formulated more ﬁne graded models for deﬁning 
neurocognitive functioning (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, 
Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000). Studies have focused on speciﬁc executive func-
tions that have been frequently postulated in the literature. Multiple tasks tapping 
each target function were then selected. Next, the unity or diversity of these execu-
tive functions was examined at the level of latent variables, based on factor analyses 
and structural equation modeling. For example, Miyake et al. (2000) examined the 
separability of three executive functions in a healthy adult sample: shifting of mental 
sets, updating and monitoring of working memory representations, and inhibition 
of prepotent responses. In their attempt to further unravel inhibitory control, Fried-
man and Miyake (2004) examined the relationships among three inhibition-related 
functions in an adult population: resistance to distractor interference, resistance 
to proactive interference, and prepotent response inhibition. In future research, it 
would be interesting to look at the separate contributions of these different executive 
subfunctions to source misattribution and pseudo-memory development, so as to be 
able to formulate more detailed models of neurocognitive functioning and memory 
reconstruction.
 Apart from the involvement of suboptimal executive functioning and WMC in 
pseudo-memory, there are good indications that another neurocognitive function 
may also be relevant here, namely the amount of attention that we allocate to any 
given task. A typical methodology used in the past years is the dual task, in which 
two competitive tasks have to be performed simultaneously. This methodology has 
been particularly fruitful in probing the role of attention in accurate memory (e.g., 
Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984). A key ﬁnding from investigating the ef-
fects of dual task or divided attention on memory is that during encoding this manip-
ulation leads to a substantial decrease in accurate memory during retrieval. In recent 
years, researchers have argued that divided attention conditions may also be impor-
tant to examine the effects of varying attention demands on source monitoring and 
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pseudo-memory development (e.g., Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002; Seamon et al., 
2003). In these studies, it is hypothesized that dividing attention disrupts perceptual 
and contextual encoding (e.g., Troyer & Craik, 2000), leading to a lack of feature bind-
ing and pattern separation. Rather than relying on more detailed forms of “recollec-
tion”, one may under such conditions be more susceptible to familiarity-based source 
misattributions. All in all, most of the research so far has explored across-popula-
tion differences like comparing young adults with older participants (e.g., Koutstaal, 
Schacter, & Brenner, 2001). This line of research is still evolving, thereby offering op-
portunities for theoretical as well as practical relevant research. Below, we elaborate 
on a recently completed study on the effects of divided attention during encoding on 
the creation of pseudo-memory.
Divided attention intermezzo
In this study, we investigated whether divided attention and warning instructions in 
undergraduate students would inﬂuence susceptibility to pseudo-memories for non-
presented critical lure words in the DRM paradigm. The research was partly based 
on the methodology by Watson et al. (2005) investigating the relationship between 
complex WMC, warning, and pseudo-memory development. The Watson et al. study 
showed that undergraduates with suboptimal complex WMC recalled more criti-
cal lure words than individuals with high WMC when participants were forewarned 
about the tendency of the associative lists in the DRM paradigm to elicit non-present-
ed critical lure words (e.g., Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997). This ﬁnding was thought 
to reﬂect participants’ suboptimal WMC, i.e., poor ability to actively maintain task 
goals and their difﬁculty to avoid the seductive power of familiarity. In our study, we 
hypothesized that dividing attention would reduce attention given to distinctive per-
ceptual and contextual details and reduce possibilities to actively maintain task goals 
like keeping online the warning instruction, making recall of the critical lure word in 
the DRM paradigm more likely. Attention was actively manipulated by means of an 
oddball task. In a typical oddball task (Huettel & McCarthy, 2004), participants have 
to identify infrequent “target” stimuli within a series of rapidly presented “standard” 
stimuli. This experiment used an auditory oddball task in which infrequent high tones 
had to be identiﬁed amongst frequent low tones. A 2 (warning vs. no warning) x 2 
(oddball vs. no oddball) between-subjects design was used. Mean proportion DRM 
correct recall and false recall of critical lures served as primary measures. Our sam-
ple consisted of 77 undergraduate students (12 men). Mean age of the participants 
was 19.43 years (SD = 1.35; Range: 17-24). The four conditions did not differ in age or 
gender distribution. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups. In condition 1 
(standard group, n = 20), participants were subjected to a standard DRM paradigm, 
including 16 word lists that were visually presented. In condition 2 (unwarned/di-
vided attention group, n = 18), participants simultaneously had an auditory oddball 
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task together with the visual presentation of the 16 DRM word lists. In condition 3 
(warned group, n = 20), participants received a warning concerning the potential 
effects of the DRM paradigm before visual presentation of the word lists. Finally, in 
condition 4 (warned/divided attention group, n = 19), before simultaneously being 
subjected to the oddball and DRM task, participants ﬁrst received a warning instruc-
tion. Mean proportion scores of DRM indices for the four conditions can be found in 
TABLE 10.1. 
TABLE 10.1 MEAN PROPORTION (SD) SCORES OF DRM CORRECT RECALL AND DRM FALSE RECALL OF CRITICAL LURE WORDS FOR THE FOUR CONDITIONS. 
CONDITION 1 CONDITION 2 CONDITION 3 CONDITION 4
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
DRM
Correct recall .65 (.06) .51 (.08) .63 (.08) .53 (.08)
False recall critical lure .30 (.14) .36 (.14) .16 (.15) .34 (.19)
 For correct recall, a signiﬁcant main effect of divided attention was found [F (1, 
73) = 47.90, p < .001] in that participants in the no oddball condition outperformed 
the participants in the oddball condition. Neither a main effect of warning, nor a 
signiﬁcant interaction effect was found (both F’s < 2, both p’s > .05). For recall of criti-
cal lure words, signiﬁcant main effects were found for warning [F (1, 73) = 5.04, p < 
.03] and oddball [F (1, 73) = 11.79, p = .001]. More speciﬁcally, participants in the no 
warning condition had more critical lure intrusions compared to those in the warning 
condition. For the oddball task, simultaneous presentation of an oddball task during 
word lists signiﬁcantly increased critical lure intrusions compared to the no-oddball 
condition. A marginally signiﬁcant interaction effect was found [F (1, 73) = 2.91, p = 
.09], indicating that participants in the no oddball condition with warning made sig-
niﬁcantly less critical lure intrusions compared to the other conditions. 
 These new data show that dividing attention can have detrimental effects on 
correct recall in the DRM paradigm (see for similar results Pérez-Mata et al., 2002; 
Troyer & Craik, 2000). Divided attention also signiﬁcantly increases pseudo-memory 
development. Moreover, a warning during the oddball task can not reduce pseu-
do-memory intrusions compared to the oddball task without warning. The effect of 
warning is in line with ﬁndings by Waston, McDermott, and Balota (2004). Mean-
while, research on how divided attention affects pseudo-memory development has 
primarily focused on word list paradigms. In future research, it would be of theoreti-
cal and practical interest to investigate divided attention in other, more ecologically 
relevant, pseudo-memory paradigms. 
 Research linking attention to pseudo-memory development has been primarily 
concerned with actively manipulating attention by presenting dual tasks or giving 
warnings. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has looked at how indi-
vidual differences in attention networks may relate to source monitoring and pseu-
do-memory development. In the early nineties, Posner and Petersen (1990) proposed 
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that sources of attention form a speciﬁc system of anatomical areas, which can be 
broken down into three networks. These three functions involve achieving and main-
taining an alert state (alerting), selection of information from sensory input (orient-
ing), and resolving conﬂicts among responses (executive attention; Fan, McCandliss, 
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). In further elaborating our theoretical framework, it 
would be of interest to identify the individual contribution of these attention func-
tions to memory reconstruction. For this reason, the attention network test (ANT), 
speciﬁcally designed to measure these three networks could be related to various 
pseudo-memory paradigms.
 
Social inﬂuence, pseudo-memories, and behavioural consequences
Most of the studies described in this dissertation bear relevance to speciﬁc theoretical 
issues, in that a more ﬁne graded memory reconstruction model can be described. 
However, apart from these theoretical issues, relevance to applied ﬁelds of psychol-
ogy is also of interest. In Chapter 7, we argued that primed general schematic knowl-
edge could have detrimental effects on memory accuracy when asked to actively 
inhibit this general schematic knowledge. Research linking stereotypes to memory 
accuracy bears relevance to the legal arena. Stereotypes might inﬂuence witness 
reports of criminal events, police interrogations, and court hearings. In fact, it seems 
safe to assume that all key players in this arena (witnesses, victims, defendants, po-
lice investigators, judges, and juries) may be sensitive to the memory undermining 
effects of stereotypes. A recent study by Lane (2006) is noteworthy in this respect. 
This study examined the effect of divided attention during encoding of an eyewitness 
event on participants’ memory for the source of post-event misleading information. 
Results revealed that divided attention participants showed poorer memory for the 
eyewitness event and were more likely to misattribute post-event misinformation to 
the event than participants in the full attention condition. Inspired by this ﬁnding, we 
recently completed a study in which we actively manipulated attention during the 
encoding of an eyewitness event after which post-event stereotype misinformation 
was given to the participants. Half of the participants thus encoded the crime story, 
which did not contain any information on the stereotype (i.e., drug addict) under full 
attention, while the other half was given a divided attention task. After encoding the 
crime story, participants were given a series of questions about the story and were 
asked to ﬁll out these questions as if police investigators interrogated them. In each 
condition, half of the participants were further subjected to a neutral or stereotype 
misinformation paradigm. The participants in the stereotype misinformation condi-
tion received misinformation intended to prime a hard drug addict. In the neutral 
misinformation condition, non-stereotype items were suggested to the participants. 
To test memory accuracy for the crime story, participants were subjected to a rec-
ognition task, containing factual items, non-witnessed stereotype-neutral items, 
and non-witnessed stereotype-consistent items. Results showed that participants in 
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the divided attention condition scored signiﬁcantly higher on stereotype-consistent 
items than participants in the full attention condition. A main effect of misinformation 
was also found, in that participants in the stereotype misinformation group scored 
signiﬁcantly higher on the stereotype-consistent items compared to participants in 
the neutral misinformation condition. Highest scores on stereotype-consistent items 
were found for the divided attention group who also received stereotypical misinfor-
mation. Even stereotype items that were not part of the misinformation were recog-
nized as such.
 These studies show that it might be promising to combine methodologies 
from different disciplines (e.g., social psychology, experimental psychology, neu-
ropsychology) to approach practically relevant memory reconstruction topics. More 
speciﬁcally, since we found that individual differences in speciﬁc neurocognitive 
functions make people more or less susceptible to source misattributions and pseu-
do-memories, it would be of interest to identify individuals with low or high WMC, 
executive functioning, or attention capacity, and to ﬁnd out whether they are more or 
less susceptible to social inﬂuences like stereotype reliance. 
 Recently, authors have emphasized the behavioural consequences of source 
misattributions and pseudo-memories, thus acting upon memory, whether true or 
false (e.g., Berstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005a,b; Smeets, Merckelbach, Horse-
lenberg, & Jelicic, 2005). This interest was inspired by the general idea that memo-
ry is in the service of overt behaviour (e.g., Neisser, 1996). Cognitive neuroscience 
has made it plain that, apart from its involvement in memory monitoring, the PFC 
also employs consolidated memories to direct other activities, such as behavioural 
planning. Since behavioural consequences are of theoretical and practical impor-
tance, it would be interesting to investigate whether, for example, stereotype prim-
ing leads to stereotype-consistent pseudo-memories and to stereotype-consistent 
overt behaviour (e.g., avoiding speciﬁc social categories), and whether both effects 
of stereotype priming are related to each other. Furthermore, it would be of interest 
to investigate whether speciﬁc individuals or environmental conditions (i.e., divided 
attention) make people more susceptible to act upon true and pseudo-memories. 
Cognitive neuroscience and pseudo-memories
As highlighted in Chapter 1, neuroscience research of memory distortions and pseu-
do-memories has mainly focused on: 1. Identifying patterns of neural activity that 
can distinguish between true and false recognition, 2. Identifying brain regions that 
contribute to false recognition, and 3. Identifying which brain regions play a role in 
monitoring or reducing false recognition (see Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). There is 
now general consensus that sensory activity is greater for true than for false recogni-
tion and that both the hippocampus and PFC are involved in encoding and retrieving 
true and pseudo-memories. When overlooking this ﬁeld of literature, one paradigm 
stands out as the standard: the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDer-
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mott, 1995). This has to do with speciﬁc methodological demands: To identify neural 
activity related to true and pseudo-memories, researchers need to have a substantial 
number of pseudo-memories per participant to be able to compare them to true 
ones. Therefore, most of what is known about the cognitive neuroscience of pseudo-
memories is, in fact, knowledge about the neurobiology of pseudo-memories for 
words. Okado and Stark (2005) were the ﬁrst to develop stimulus materials closer to 
the complex visual scenarios in real life that can elicit memory distortions and can 
be used in neuroimaging research. These researchers used 8 complex vignettes, each 
of which was presented to participants through 50 colour slides. Participants were 
scanned while watching these vignettes (i.e., original event phase). Later, during a 
standard misinformation phase, participants watched these vignettes again, not be-
ing aware that 12 critical slides were altered in some way. Two days later, a recogni-
tion task was presented, comprising of multiple choice factual knowledge questions 
and a source memory test. Activity that subsequently led to true and pseudo-memo-
ries was examined during both encoding phases. Results showed two interaction 
patterns between encoding phase and type of memory in the MTL/D and PFC re-
gions. In the left hippocampus tail and perirhinal cortex, a predictive item-encoding 
pattern was observed, in that during the original event phase, activity was greater for 
true than pseudo-memories, whereas during the misinformation phase, activity was 
greater for pseudo than true memories. A second pattern of activity consistent with 
encoding source or contextual aspects was observed in the hippocampus and adja-
cent cortex. It would be informative to explore in future studies whether complex and 
“realistic” pseudo-memory paradigms like the one used by Okado and Stark (2005), 
can be implemented in cognitive neuroscience settings, thereby increasing practical 
use and generalizibility of the standard DRM ﬁndings. Furthermore, since every neu-
roimaging technique (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Positron Emission 
Tomography, electroencephalogram) has its drawbacks of lacking spatial resolution, 
temporal resolution, and/or causal interpretations, it would be informative to com-
bine these techniques and to incorporate new tools for memory reconstruction re-
search like Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS; Komssi & Kähkönen, 2006; Sack 
& Linden, 2003). TMS can be conceptualized as a virtual lesion technique, capable of 
disrupting organized cortical activity, transiently and reversibly. Combining neuroim-
aging techniques, like TMS-EEG or TMS-fMRI would provide us with more detailed 
insight in cortical reactivity and connectivity underlying memory reconstruction.
Clinical implications
Our results may have implications for the ﬁeld of clinical psychology and neuropsy-
chology. To begin with, there are some tentative indications that internal source 
misattributions may be seen as a risk factor for developing schizophrenia. In line 
with source monitoring studies in schizophrenia (e.g., Nienow & Docherty, 2004) 
and schizophrenia-like symptomatology (e.g., non-clinical positive symptomatology; 
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Larøi et al., 2005), schizotypal participants have been found to exhibit a deﬁciency 
in internal source attribution. It would be of clinical relevance to set up longitudinal 
studies in which participants showing schizophrenia-like symptomatology are fol-
lowed and monitored on source misattributions to determine whether deterioration 
in source misattribution is associated with the onset of schizophrenia. Source misat-
tribution and in particular a tendency to treat imagined events as having an external 
origin, may convey a sense of reality to unusual sensations, paranoid ideation, and 
idiosyncratic beliefs and perceptions. If such internal-external misattributions serve, 
indeed, as antecedents of schizophrenia, early interventions targeting these misat-
tributions might have therapeutic potential.
 More generally, identifying the neurocognitive antecedents of pseudo-memo-
ries can help clinicians developing neurocognitive rehabilitation programs for clini-
cal samples. An example would be metacognitive skills trainings for schizophrenic 
patients. Thus, people who are at increased risk for making source misattributions 
and pseudo-memories due to neurocognitive deﬁcits may learn to be more aware of 
this risk, may be cautioned about trusting partial information, and may learn ways to 
conﬁrm hypotheses in a more stringent manner. 
Forensic implications
The MP3 murder case
On Wednesday April 12th, 2006, around 4.15 pm, the 17 year old Joe van Holsbeeck 
and a friend were awaiting the arrival of another friend in the entrance hall of the 
central railway station in Brussels, Belgium. Their friend was scheduled to arrive by 
train at 4.30 pm. To pass the time, Joe listened to music on his MP3-player. Then, two 
young men asked Joe and his friend for directions to the Nieuwstraat, a well-known 
shopping street in Brussels. A few moments later, their intentions changed as they 
tried to steal Joe’s MP3-player. Joe resisted and one of the offenders drew a knife. 
The other culprit pushed Joe’s friend aside. Joe was stabbed several times, once near 
his hart. The two offenders ﬂed in the direction of the Grand-Place. Several hours 
later, Joe succumbed to his injuries in the Sint-Pieters hospital in Brussels. 
 On Thursday April 13th, 2006, the police questioned thousands of commuters 
in the entrance hall of the central station in Brussels. They were asked whether they 
had witnessed what from then on was called the “MP3 murder”. This yielded 20 use-
ful tips. A recurrent statement by several witnesses was that the perpetrators were 
North-Africans, probably Moroccans. A police spokesman adopted this typology and 
stated on Belgian news broadcasts that the culprits had a North-African background. 
It was in this climate that Brussels Member of Parliament, Fouad Ahidar, called on 
the immigrant community to help searching the perpetrators of this murder. He also 
stated in the press: “For a long time now, I try to raise this matter with the immi-
grant community and federal authorities that criminal Moroccan or Turkish young-
sters choose their victim on the basis of their looks of being not religious persons.” 
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At the same time, photographs showing the perpetrators drawn from closed circuit 
television video footage, picked up by surveillance camera’s around the Brussels 
central station were released by the police authorities. On these somewhat blurred 
photographs, most of the Belgian people indeed identiﬁed the perpetrators as Mo-
roccan or Turkish. However, eyewitness accounts did not reveal any new and useful 
information. For this reason, the Belgian police authorities decided to narrow their 
investigation and show video footage of the surveillance camera’s to several schools 
in the Brussels region. This turned out to be the right decision. Several teachers and 
students identiﬁed the perpetrators as Adam G. and Mariusz O. Both perpetrators 
were eventually arrested and confessed. They were young adolescents and had a 
Polish background.
 This case description shows how general schematic knowledge (i.e., stere-
otypes) can affect our perception and lead to expectancy based stereotype-consis-
tent pseudo-memories once this general schematic knowledge has been triggered. 
The effect of general schematic knowledge, like stereotypes, on memory accuracy is 
underrated in judicial settings. As was found in several studies including ours, prim-
ing participants with stereotype knowledge, either based on race, gender, or other 
social categories may undermine accurate memory. When combined with instruc-
tions not to think of speciﬁc stereotype information (as can be the case in jury-based 
courtrooms) or in circumstances where one is distracted by other peripheral actions 
(dividing attention, as can be the case when witnessing a criminal event), one is in-
clined to rely on general schematic knowledge thereby blurring the original memory 
representations.
Neuropsychology in the judicial system
The two introductory cases (Bob Hunter and JD) describe two brain-damaged patients 
who came to the attention of police investigators. The review in Chapter 1 and the 
studies on pseudo-memories in undergraduates described in this dissertation, make 
it clear that in cases such as those with which we began this dissertation, knowledge 
about the relationship between neurocognitive functions and memory reconstruction 
might inform police investigations. Clearly, speciﬁc precautions should be taken when 
interrogating people with brain damage, like asking short questions, limiting the length 
of the interrogation, avoiding suggestive questioning, and so on. When one does not 
have this speciﬁc knowledge, it may happen that one misinterprets the testimonies 
of, say, Bob Hunter as accurate recollections of past experiences. This point does not 
only hold for brain damaged suspects or eyewitnesses. As described in Chapter 8, 
speciﬁc psychopathology like schizophrenia may also undermine memory accuracy. 
When these patients come in contact with police investigators, similar precautions 
are in order (see for example, Merckelbach, Smeets, Peters, & Jelicic, 2005). Finally, as 
discussed in this dissertation, individual differences in neurocognitive functions could 
also inﬂuence memory accuracy in children, undergraduates, and the elderly. 
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 To make professionals sensitive to this speciﬁc problem, it should be dealt with 
in courses on interviewing techniques at the police academy. Perhaps, one should 
consider screening vulnerable suspects or eyewitnesses on neurological or psycho-
pathological status as soon as they enter the police station. Trained forensic psychol-
ogists and neuropsychologists could play an important role in this screening. They 
could also provide police investigators with speciﬁc clues as to how to set up their 
interrogations in order to receive accurate recollections.
Final remarks
The data presented in this dissertation demonstrate that individual differences in 
neurocognitive functions are related to memory reconstruction. More speciﬁcally, 
cognitive functions related to what Goldberg (2001, p. 21) describes as the “brain’s 
chief executive ofﬁce” clearly contribute to memory reconstruction. This author 
(Goldberg, 2001, p. 22) further suggests: “The leader’s role is elusive but critical. Let 
the leader lapse, however brieﬂy, and disaster strikes.” In drawing parallels with our 
ﬁndings, when the leader does not function optimally, small calamities may occur, 
like misattributing a fantasy to a real event. In the legal arena, these “small” calami-
ties sometimes have “disastrous” consequences.
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[NOTES]
Chapter 1 - General introduction: Neuropsychology and pseudo-memories
1 The story of Bob Hunter is also described in Merckelbach & Jelicic (2005), Hoe een 
CIA-agent zijn geheugen hervond en andere waargebeurde verhalen (pp. 137-150), 
and Merckelbach, Jelicic, Candel, & Horselenberg (2002), Sleutelen aan geheugen-
verlies: iatrogene elaboratie van een retrograde amnesia, Maandblad Geestelijke 
Volksgezondheid, 57, 923-935. Also, a documentary was devoted to this case, entitled 
“De man in het niets” by Rens Oomens and André Bannenberg.
2 The story of JD is based on a real case. The case has been anonimized and essential 
demographic details have been changed. See Case No. AY8840, Rechtbank Breda, 26 
September 2006, available at : http://rechtspraak.nl.
3 In this review, we do not address the distinction between episodic and semantic 
memory. However, it should be noted that there is still no consensus on whether 
episodic and semantic information is acquired through distinct memory systems and 
have different neural correlates or whether both kinds of information are acquired 
through common processes and brain circuits (e.g., Foster & Jelicic, 1999; Gainotti, 
2006; Moscovitch et al., 2005). 
Chapter 2 - Inducing pseudo-memories: A Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-Mc-
Dermott paradigm
1 In the Stadler et al. (1999) normative study, associations to 36 critical lures were 
used. For 4 critical lures (ﬂag, high, rubber, slow), no Dutch normative data were 
available in the Lauteslager et al. (1986), Van Loon – Vervoorn, and van Bekkum, 
(1991), and van der Made-van Bekkum (1973) Dutch word association norms. These 4 
words were therefore not used in the current study.
Chapter 3 - The Random Number Generation task: Psychometric properties and nor-
mative data of an executive function task in a mixed sample
 
1 One could speculate that these instructions may inﬂuence the RNG outcome mea-
sures of repetition avoidance or serial responding. However, several studies (Chapter 
4; Towse, 1998) have found that healthy participants who have received these instruc-
tions commit qualitatively and quantitatively similar errors as those without such 
warning (e.g., Giesbrecht, Merckelbach, Geraerts, & Smeets, 2004; Ginsburg & Kar-
piuk, 1994).
180
2 When looking at the underlying correlations between the extracted factors in the di-
rect oblimin PCA, no signiﬁcant correlations were apparent (all r’s < .15). This shows 
that the three extracted factors are independent, thereby supporting the use of Var-
imax PCA. 
3 Previous research has found that randomization performance in schizophrenia may 
improve with onset of neuroleptic medication due to an improvement of concentra-
tion, but soon declines again to off-medication baseline (e.g., Axmacher, Bente, & 
Ferner, 1970).
4 Here, we describe the standardized factor scores for the test-retest stability and 
construct validity of the RNG. Results for separate RNG indices can be obtained from 
the author.
5 Separate one-way ANOVA’s were also carried out with groups being the Study 2 
young adult subsample (n = 59), the mid-age subsample (n = 40), and the schizo-
phrenic subsample (n = 26), using post-hoc Bonferroni corrections. These analyses 
yielded similar results. 
6 The Games-Howell post-hoc procedure is designed to analyze data from unbal-
anced designs in which sample variances differ (e.g., Field, 2005). 
Chapter 4 - Recollecting words never presented part I: Mild executive dysfunctions 
in undergraduate students
1 Analyses based on factor scores as described in Chapter 3 yielded comparable cor-
relations in that proportion recognition of critical lure words was signiﬁcantly related 
to the seriation factor: r = .26, p = .03. All other correlations between factor scores and 
DRM recall and recognition indices remained non-signiﬁcant. 
Chapter 5 - Recollecting words never prestented part II: Poor working memory ca-
pacity in undergraduate students
1 To correct for possible ceiling effects in our critical lure data, corrected false recog-
nition of critical lures (false recognition of critical lure - false recognition of unrelated 
lure; M = .81, SD = .16; Range: .65) was calculated and related to the digit span scores. 
Only backward digit span score was negatively related to corrected false recognition 
of critical lures and in fact the magnitude of this correlation was similar to that found 
in the uncorrected analysis (r = -.39, p < .01).
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2 As in Study 1, we also calculated corrected false recognition of critical lures (M =.63, 
SD = .16; Range= .75) to control for possible ceiling effects in false recognition. In line 
with Study 1, and the analyses in Study 2, only backward digit span signiﬁcantly cor-
related with corrected false recognition (r = -.50, p < .01).
Chapter 6 - Action source monitoring, schizotypal traits, and working memory
No footnotes
Chapter 7 - Suppression of stereotypes leads to false recollections of a crime: Inﬂu-
ence of inhibition instruction on memory accuracy
1 In this pilot study, the order of the primes was counterbalanced. Mean sympathy 
score for the Dutch group was 6.23 (SD = 1.08) and that for the foreign group was 
4.61 (SD = 1.00). 
Chapter 8 - Memory efﬁciency, source attributions, and executive dysfunctions in 
schizophrenia
1 WCST categories completed was left out of the regression analyses, because this 
variable strongly correlated with the other WCST scores (r > .80, p < .001), indicating 
multicollinearity. 
2 A negative correlation was found between misses and false alarms of critical lure 
words when both samples were pooled (r = -.49, p < .001; two-tailed) thereby under-
scoring this possible explanation.
Chapter 9 - Remembering previous lives and source monitoring
1 Both types of correlational analyses (collapsing across groups and groups sepa-
rately) were also carried out using non-parametric statistics (Spearman’s rho). All 
correlations between false fame index and personality traits remained non-signiﬁ-
cant, all rs’s < .40, all p’s > .05. 
Chapter 10 - General discussion and conclusion
No footnotes
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SUMMARY
[S]UMMARY
Our memory is reconstructive in nature. Sooner or later, a good number of our ex-
periences will be forgotten, and the events we do remember, may differ from how 
they actually took place. Often, there are only minor discrepancies between actual 
events and our memories (i.e., memory distortions), but sometimes we remember 
events that never happened in reality. In such cases, people are said to have pseudo-
memories.
 In recent years, a vast amount of research has explored whether certain person-
ality traits may be related to source misattributions and pseudo-memories. However, 
the connection between these traits and memories for events that did not take place 
is far from robust. In this respect, ﬁndings in neuropsychological research could give 
us a better clue on individual differences in the development of pseudo-memories. 
Up until now aging and lesion studies suggest that neurocognitive dysfunctions play 
a critical role in the creation of memories for events that did not happen. Therefore, 
focusing on neurocognitive concepts that may relate to pseudo-memories might be 
more fruitful. Given the considerable amount of aging and clinical research, it is sur-
prising how few studies have explored whether individual differences in neurocogni-
tive tasks in healthy adults inﬂuence vulnerability to pseudo-memories. Also, speciﬁc 
questions remain open to debate on the relationship between neurocognitive func-
tions and pseudo-memories in speciﬁc clinical samples. These are the central themes 
inspiring the studies presented in this dissertation.
 Part A of this dissertation is devoted to the validation of a pseudo-memory 
paradigm and neurocognitive task. Chapter 2 describes the construction, validation, 
and standardization of a Dutch version of the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm 
(DRM paradigm; Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) in an undergraduate 
sample. Brieﬂy, in this paradigm participants are given lists of semantically related 
words (e.g., bed, pajama) that refer to a non-presented critical lure word (e.g., sleep). 
In subsequent memory tests, a vast amount of participants claim to remember these 
non-presented critical lure words. Results of this study show that although all lists 
were constructed in a similar way (on the basis of Dutch word association norms), 
rates of falsely recalling and recognizing the critical lure words varied widely across 
lists. Furthermore, participants often recognized critical lures with high conﬁdence, 
as indicated by the “remember” responses for critical lure intrusions. 
 Chapter 3 reports the results of four studies on the psychometric properties 
of the Random Number Generation task (RNG; Ginsburg & Karpiuk, 1994, 1995), a 
neurocognitive task measuring monitoring, updating, and inhibition function. The 
factor structure of the RNG is best described by a three factor solution (Study 1): Se-
riation, repetition, and cycling related to inhibition of stereotypical schemas, output 
inhibition, and monitoring of previous output, respectively. Study 2 examines the 
test-retest reliability of these RNG factors in a sample of undergraduate students and 
schizophrenic patients. We found modest to satisfactory test-retest correlations and 
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no inﬂuence of practice, with RNG indices loading on the seriation factor showing 
satisfactory stability across time. Studies 3 and 4 describe results on criterion and 
construct validity of the RNG task. The results indicate that RNG has modest to ac-
ceptable psychometric properties and primarily taps inhibition, updating and moni-
toring functions in normal as well as clinical populations. 
 The studies described in Part B focus on the relationships between subopti-
mal neurocognitive functioning, source misattributions, and experimentally induced 
pseudo-memory development in healthy undergraduate participants. The study de-
scribed in Chapter 4 shows that in our sample of undergraduates, individual differ-
ences in inhibitory function as measured by the RNG task (see Chapter 3) are related 
to false recognition and to a lesser extent to false recall of non-presented critical lure 
words in the DRM paradigm. 
 Chapter 5 elaborates on these ﬁndings. The two studies described in this Chap-
ter investigate whether individual differences in simple and complex Working Memo-
ry Capacity (WMC) are related to false recall and recognition of non-presented critical 
lures. The two studies converge on the notion that poor simple WMC (as indexed by 
suboptimal backward digit span) is related to false recognition and, to a lesser extent 
false recall of critical lures. Complex WMC did not relate to false recall or recognition 
of the critical lure words.
 Because this WMC – pseudo-memory link warranted further study, Chapter 6 
in part examines whether complex WMC is related to source misattributions in a 
high executive demand environment. In this study, undergraduates are subjected to 
an action source monitoring paradigm, in which to-be-remembered acts have to be 
performed, while others only have to be imagined, thereby putting increased execu-
tive demands on WMC. Subsequently, the presented actions are paired with actions 
that are roughly similar in content and form. For each pair, old-new discrimination 
(i.e., correct recognition) and source attribution (having performed or only imagined 
the action) decisions have to be made. In line with the ﬁndings of Watson and col-
leagues (2005), we found that poor complex WMC is related to source misattribu-
tions in a high executive demand environment (e.g., claiming having performed an 
action while, in fact, it is only imagined).
 Chapter 7 describes a study in which we investigated whether an active manipu-
lation of inhibitory control leads to an increased number of source misattributions and 
subsequent pseudo-memories for general schematic knowledge. More speciﬁcally, in 
this study people did or did not receive an instruction to actively inhibit their thoughts 
on activated neutral or negative stereotypes about race, while reading a stereotype-
free crime story. We anticipated that such active inhibition would lead to a decrease 
in focus on the source of information during encoding due to increased executive 
demands. During later retrieval, one will more likely rely on primed general schematic 
knowledge, thereby misattributing non-presented general schematic knowledge as 
being presented. Our ﬁndings, indeed, supported this line of reasoning.
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SUMMARY
 Part C of this dissertation describes two studies addressing the relationship 
between neurocognitive dysfunctions, source misattributions, and pseudo-memo-
ries in clinical samples. In the study described in Chapter 8, we investigated whether 
executive dysfunctions could explain certain memory aberrations in schizophrenic 
patients. It was found that, relative to matched controls, patients with schizophrenia 
make less correct recognitions. As to pseudo-memories, both groups showed a sub-
stantial number of pseudo-memories for critical lures. However, it was the control 
group that had the highest level of false recognition. For source misattribution, our 
ﬁndings concur with previous research in that schizophrenic patients, compared to 
healthy controls, were more likely to make internal-external source misattributions 
with inﬂated conﬁdence ratings. The executive functioning indexes were signiﬁcant 
predictors of correct recognition, but not of source misattributions or pseudo-memo-
ries in schizophrenic patients. 
 An important question in investigating the relationship between neurocog-
nitive functioning, pseudo-memories, and source misattributions is whether such 
misattributions may also occur for highly implausible events. This issue is studied 
in Chapter 9, in which participants with highly implausible autobiographical beliefs 
and memories (hypnotically induced previous-life beliefs and memories) are com-
pared to matched controls who do not report such highly implausible events on their 
susceptibility to make source misattributions. Results show that previous-life par-
ticipants are more susceptible to these misattributions in comparison to matched 
control participants. Our ﬁndings suggest that subjective rather than objective plau-
sibility appears to be a necessary factor in  the cascade of processes that lead to full 
blown pseudo-memories. 
 Finally, in Chapter 10, the results of our work are summarized, discussed, an in-
tegrated theoretical framework is presented, and some ﬁnal conclusions are drawn. 
To further illustrate our ﬁndings, some new data on the link between pseudo-memo-
ry and neurocognitive functions are brieﬂy presented. Directions for future research 
are also discussed. 
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[S]AMENVATTING
Onze herinneringen zijn geen exacte kopie van een feitelijke gebeurtenis, maar re-
constructies van deze gebeurtenis. Door deze reconstructie kunnen we ons zaken 
anders gaan herinneren dan hoe zij zich in werkelijkheid hebben voorgedaan. Dit kan 
variëren van kleine vervormingen (bv. ik herinner me een blauwe taxi terwijl de taxi 
geel was) tot het herinneren van dingen die nooit hebben plaatsgevonden (je herin-
nert je dat je gisteren een vriend bent tegengekomen in de stad, terwijl dit in werke-
lijkheid niet zo was). In een dergelijk geval spreken we van een pseudo-herinnering. 
  De belangstelling voor onderzoek naar pseudo-herinneringen heeft zich in de 
afgelopen jaren sterk gericht op de vraag wie de mensen zijn die zulke “herinne-
ringen” ontwikkelen. Helaas is de zoektocht naar persoonlijkheidstrekken als voor-
speller van herinneringen voor gebeurtenissen die zich niet hebben voorgedaan 
nogal teleurstellend geweest. Recent neuropsychologisch onderzoek bij ouderen en 
klinische groepen suggereerde een neuropsychologische verankering van pseudo-
herinneringen. Ofschoon er veel onderzoek is uitgevoerd naar de relatie tussen pseu-
do-herinneringen en neurocognitieve disfuncties bij ouderen, patiënten met hersen-
schade en klinische stoornissen, heeft er nauwelijks onderzoek plaatsgevonden naar 
de neuropsychologische determinanten van zulke “herinneringen” bij gezonde vol-
wassenen. Bovendien blijft een aantal vragen rond de relatie tussen neurocognitieve 
functies en pseudo-herinneringen in klinische groepen onbeantwoord. Deze onder-
werpen vormen de centrale thema’s in dit proefschrift en worden nader beschreven 
in Hoofdstuk 1.
 In deel A staat de validatie van een pseudo-herinnering paradigma en een 
neurocognitieve taak centraal. Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft de standaardisatie van een Ne-
derlandse versie van het Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigma (DRM paradigma; 
Deese, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Kort gezegd komt dit paradigma hierop 
neer: proefpersonen krijgen een lijst van woorden aangeboden (bv. bed, pyama) die 
semantisch gerelateerd zijn aan een niet gepresenteerd woord (bv. slaap), welke het 
kritische woord wordt genoemd. Wanneer hen later gevraagd wordt de gepresen-
teerde woorden te herinneren, komt een substantieel deel van de proefpersonen 
met het kritische niet-gepresenteerde woord op de proppen. De resultaten van onze 
studie tonen aan dat, hoewel al de woordenlijsten op een vergelijkbare manier zijn 
geconstrueerd, ze grote verschillen vertonen m.b.t. het uitlokken van het kritische 
woord. Als later aan de proefpersonen wordt gevraagd of ze hier een echte herinne-
ring aan hebben, geeft men in de regel aan dat hun herinneringen waarheidsgetrouw 
zijn. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 worden de resultaten besproken van 4 studies naar de psy-
chometrische aspecten van de Random Number Generation taak (RNG; Ginsburg & 
Karpiuk, 1994; 1995). De RNG is een neurocognitieve test die “monitoring”, “updat-
ing”, en “inhibitie” functies meet. Studie 1 beschrijft een drie factoren structuur voor 
de RNG taak: “seriation”, “repetition” en “cycling”. Deze factoren zijn gerelateerd aan 
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inhibitie van stereotype schema’s, output inhibitie, en monitoren van voorgaande 
output. In Studie 2 wordt de test-hertest betrouwbaarheid van deze RNG factoren 
beschreven in een groep van studenten en schizofrene patiënten. We vonden een 
bescheiden tot bevredigende test-hertest correlatie. Studies 3 en 4 beschrijven crite-
rium en construct validiteit. Op basis van deze resultaten kan geconcludeerd worden 
dat de RNG over matige tot acceptabele psychometrische eigenschappen beschikt, 
en primair inhibitie, updating en monitoring functies meet in zowel normale als kli-
nische groepen. 
 Deel B van dit proefschrift focust zich op onderzoek naar de relatie tussen neu-
rocognitieve functies, bronverwarring, en experimenteel uitgelokte pseudo-herin-
neringen bij een groep van gezonde volwassenen. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt ondersteu-
ning gevonden voor een relatie tussen individuele verschillen in inhibitie functie en 
foutieve herkenning en, in mindere mate, herinnering van het niet gepresenteerde 
kritische woord in het DRM paradigma. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 bouwt voort op de bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 4. De twee 
studies beschreven in dit hoofdstuk zoeken ondersteuning voor de vraag of individu-
ele verschillen in werkgeheugen capaciteit (simpel vs. complex) gerelateerd zijn aan 
experimenteel uitgelokte pseudo-herinneringen in het DRM paradigma. De resulta-
ten van deze studies tonen aan dat onder beperkte cognitieve belasting, suboptimale 
scores op een simpele werkgeheugentaak (achterwaartse digit span) gerelateerd zijn 
aan foutieve herkenning van het kritische woord en, in mindere mate, foutieve herin-
nering van het kritische woord. 
 In Hoofdstuk 6 vindt de lezer een empirische toetsing van de hypothese dat 
bronverwarringsfouten, in situaties waarbij proefpersonen cognitief belast worden, 
gerelateerd zijn aan beperkingen in complexe werkgeheugen capaciteit. Deze hy-
pothese is ontleend aan onderzoek van Watson en collega’s (2005). Aan de proefper-
sonen wordt gevraagd speciﬁeke acties (bv. breek een tandenstoker in tweeën) in 
te beelden of uit te voeren. Vervolgens worden deze gepresenteerde acties gepaard 
aangeboden met acties die grotendeels overeenkomen wat betreft inhoud en vorm 
(bv. breek een tandenstoker in drieën). Voor elk paar moet de proefpersoon aangeven 
welke handeling oud of nieuw is en moet bovendien worden aangegeven of hij/zij 
de oude handeling zich slechts heeft ingebeeld of daadwerkelijk heeft uitgevoerd. De 
resultaten blijken de hypothese te ondersteunen.
 Hoofdstuk 7 beschrijft een studie waarbij proefpersonen expliciet de bood-
schap kregen gedurende een bepaalde tijd niet te denken aan algemene stereotype 
schema’s rond etniciteit, geslacht en leeftijd (actieve inhibitie). Dit moest gebeuren 
tijdens het lezen van een misdaadverhaal dat stereotype neutraal was. Naar aan-
leiding van eerder onderzoek (bv. Araya et al., 2003) verwachtten we dat door deze 
actieve inhibitie van schema informatie, de broninformatie van het verhaal subopti-
maal opgeslagen wordt. Tijdens het ophalen van die informatie zullen proefpersonen 
echter paradoxaal meer gaan vertrouwen op die algemene stereotype schema’s die 
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ze eerst moesten onderdrukken wat op zich dan leidt tot een toename in bronverwar-
ring fouten tijdens een herkenningstaak. De resultaten ondersteunden deze redene-
ring. 
 Deel C van het proefschrift richt zich op de relatie tussen neurocognitieve dis-
functies, het toeschrijven van broninformatie, en pseudo-herinneringen bij klinische 
groepen. In Hoofdstuk 8 wordt een studie beschreven waarbij gekeken wordt naar 
de relatie tussen uitvoerende controle disfuncties en geheugen afwijkingen (bronver-
warring, pseudo-herinneringen, etc.) bij schizofrene patiënten. De resultaten tonen 
aan dat schizofrene patiënten slechter zijn in het correct herkennen van woorden in 
vergelijking met gezonde controles. Verder vertonen zulke patiënten een verhoogde 
neiging om dingen die door henzelf gezegd zijn toe te schrijven aan iemand anders. 
Uitvoerende controle disfuncties bij schizofrene patiënten waren met name ver-
bonden met correcte herkenning van stimulusmateriaal, en niet met bronverwarring 
of pseudo-herinneringen.  
 Tot nog toe is er voornamelijk onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de relatie tussen neu-
rocognitieve functies, bronverwarring en pseudo-herinneringen voor waarschijnlijke 
gebeurtenissen, zoals woordenlijsten, simpele acties, misdaadverhalen. Een vraag 
die echter gesteld moet worden is of personen ook pseudo-herinneringen kunnen 
ontwikkelen voor gebeurtenissen die zeer bizar en onwaarschijnlijk zijn. Deze vraag is 
onderwerp van studie in Hoofdstuk 9. In deze studie wordt de gevoeligheid voor het 
maken van bronverwarring fouten onderzocht bij proefpersonen die herinneringen 
hebben aan voorgaande levens en controleproefpersonen zonder zulke onwaar-
schijnlijke herinneringen. De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat personen met 
zulke bizarre herinneringen meer vatbaar zijn voor het maken van bronverwarring 
fouten in vergelijking met de andere groep. 
 Ten slotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 10 eerst een samenvatting gegeven van de be-
vindingen. Deze worden ook nader bediscussieerd en geïntegreerd in een algemeen 
theoretisch raamwerk. Na het beschrijven van een aantal resultaten uit nieuwe stu-
dies, wordt dit hoofdstuk beëindigd met een bespreking van de klinische implicaties 
van het gepresenteerde onderzoek. 
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